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This dissertation revisits the theory of stakeholder salience set forth by Mitchell, Agle and
Wood (1997), exploring the ways in which the salience model might be expanded to more fully
capture the elements to which managers pay attention, as well as the accuracy of the attributes
that define stakeholders’ relationship with the firm. Two main questions are investigated: 1) what
stakeholder elements affect salience? 2) Which of these stakeholder elements and attributes are
most relevant to the explanation of salience? In a first tense, the nuances of the concept of
stakeholder salience (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) are brought to light
in the development of a tetrad of constructs wherein stakeholders are more accurately envisioned
as groups who ask the firm to undertake a specific requested action, via a request tactic, in
regard to an issue of concern, and where these four elements are expected to affect salience. In a
second case, the original attributes of salience – power, legitimacy and urgency – are
reconfigured along the newly-formed tetrad and the interaction between attributes is further
examined. Therefore, the main contribution of this dissertation is theoretical. Grounded in the

assumption that firms behave to maintain legitimacy, this new model expands the original view
of salience by drawing on the social approval literature to propose new attributes of salience.
Notably, this dissertation argues that group status represents a superordinate construct that
captures how managers initially respond to their constituents. Likewise, it is suggested that issue
prominence, requested action legitimacy and request tactic legitimacy play an important role in
attracting managerial attention. Taken together, these developments enable the construction of a
new model of salience, which is presented in Chapter 4. The new model is then tested in a fiveyear study of shareholder resolutions, representing a request tactic, submitted on a myriad of
prominent social and environmental issues by shareholder groups of varying status in the U.S. to
tease apart the significance of the group, issue and requested action on firms’ responses to
stakeholders. New research directions and managerial implications complete this document.
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CHAPTER 1
___________________________________________________

PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THE
DISSERTATION

1

This dissertation is set within the field of business and society, which is primarily
concerned with the ways in which firms interact with, and are influenced by, a broader
set of constituents. Assuming that conforming to social expectations is critical to firms’
survival through the maintenance of legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991), it
has been noted that firms increasingly respond to pressures from various constituents by
taking on more varied and more committed forms of social responsibility. Yet, with
limited resources to allocate and confronted with multiple and often conflicting
stakeholder claims, managers must prioritize certain actions over others. The general aim
of this dissertation is, thus, to define the elements that factor into managers’ decisions to
allocate salience to stakeholders and their claims.
Specifically, this dissertation revisits the theory of stakeholder salience as set forth by
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) in two broad ways, corresponding to two overarching
research questions: 1) what stakeholder elements affect salience? 2) Which of these
stakeholder elements and attributes are most relevant to the explanation of salience? In a
first tense, this dissertation re-examines the stakeholder concept and, building on Eesley
and Lenox’s (2006) work, proposes that other stakeholder elements than the group itself
affect salience, such as issues and requests. Second, this analysis draws on the social
approval literature to rethink the value of the original attributes of salience – power,
legitimacy and urgency – across stakeholder elements, and analyze their possible
compounding effects. Accordingly, new attributes such as group status, issue
prominence, requested action legitimacy and request tactic legitimacy are set forth to
capture how managers accord salience to their varied constituents. Taken together, these
developments inform the construction of a new theoretical model of salience that more
2

fully depicts how managers perceive and respond to their stakeholders’ requests, the
ultimate objective of this dissertation.
While a more detailed account of the evolution of the business and society field can
be found in Appendix I, the remainder of this chapter outlines the research plan of this
dissertation. To begin, however, a brief overview of the problem of stakeholder salience
is presented so as to inform the reader of the setting in which this dissertation is
developed and to provide a motivation for this work.

THE PROBLEM OF STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE
In refining the original definition of stakeholders, a term coined by the Stanford
Research Institute in the 1960’s, Freeman and Reed (1983: 91) propose a broad and a
narrow definition of stakeholder as, respectively, “any identifiable group or individual
who can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the
achievement of an organization’s objectives (Public interest groups, protest groups,
government agencies, trade associations, competitors, unions, as well as employees,
customer segments, shareowners, and other stakeholders...)” and “any identifiable group
or individual on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival”. While
the broad sense definition reveals the perception that multiple and varied groups affect
and are affected by the firm, termed the stakeholder perspective, the narrow sense
definition can lead to interpretations that shareholders, as a stakeholder group, deserve
primacy because they are the foundational block of a firm’s survival, thus representing
the stockholder view (Buono & Nichols, 1990). Even though attempts to reconcile the
stakeholder and stockholder views have recently surfaced in the literature (Boatright,
3

2006), the enduring antagonistic nature of these views begins to expose the tension that
rests at the heart of salience theory: firms must make decisions in regard to the
stakeholders that will obtain priority in resource allocation.
Unable to address every stakeholder issue or request simultaneously, firms make
choices which, according to Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), are based on stakeholder
salience. It is noteworthy that these authors use the term salience to refer to “the degree to
which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims” (Mitchell et al., 1997:
854), which is a different sense than the term’s common lexicon meaning. Assuming that
firms perform better when they take into consideration the needs of important
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984), Mitchell and colleagues (1997) propose a model
suggesting that managers’ perceptions of the relative presence or absence of salience
attributes determine who and what makes its way on managers’ agenda, and where
salience attributes are posited as the power and legitimacy of the stakeholder and the
urgency of the group’s claim or of the importance of the group’s relationship with the
firm. In other words, the more stakeholders are perceived to possess these salience
attributes, the higher the priority these groups have with the firm.
In Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) typology, stakeholders that are perceived to
possess only one attribute are categorized as latent, with low salience, and stakeholders
that are perceived to possess two attributes as expectant, with moderate salience in the
eyes of managers. Only those groups who are perceived to possess all three attributes are
considered highly salient to managers, and those who are perceived to possess no
attribute are termed potential stakeholders, or non-stakeholders at present. Furthermore,
4

stakeholders can alter their status with the firm by acquiring missing attributes of salience
– by forming coalitions or through political action, for example. Hence, the model is
somewhat dynamic.
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory has been widely recognized as a basis for
research in firm-stakeholder engagements and is referred to, in this dissertation, as the
original theory of salience. Cited 910 times 1 by scholars who have used it as a lens for
better understanding firms’ social responsibility activities and stakeholder relations,
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of salience has undoubtedly laid the groundwork
for a vast amount of research and practice in the field. Yet, some problems remain with
the theory, which in turn inform the work undertaken in this dissertation.

MOTIVATION FOR THIS DISSERTATION
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) work calls for further refinement of their conceptual
framework and for the examination of whether their descriptions of stakeholder attributes
are adequate and hold in firms’ settings. In addition, the authors suspect that there are
interrelations among the variables identified – and possibly others – that would reveal
more subtle and basic systematic. As such, they question whether power, legitimacy and
urgency are in fact the correct and parsimonious set of variables needed to accurately
describe and predict salience.
Since Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) impactful theory, however, little has been done
to address these important questions. In addition, the theory shows further drawbacks that

1
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call for a more in-depth analysis. First, the theory is unclear as to the stakeholder
elements that are perceived by managers and that matter to salience. For instance, the
theory sometimes refers to the stakeholder group (when discussing the effect of power on
salience, for example) and sometimes to the stakeholder claim, without explaining what a
claim might represent and under which circumstances managers perceive the group or the
claim to garner salience. Second, the theory relies on a narrow view of legitimacy which
is loosely applied at different levels of analysis, i.e., to the stakeholder group and its
claim. Finally, while Mitchell and colleagues (1997) suggest that salience attributes
might compound to generate a greater effect in managerial perceptions, the theory hinges
on their simplistic addition, thus neglecting to account for likely interaction effects.
Extant empirical tests of Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) framework have proven scarce
and often ambiguous (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008), confirming that such further
developments are necessary.
Against this background, the purpose of this dissertation is to provide a refined model
of salience so as to offer a solid platform to both theoretical and empirical research. This
task is carried out in the belief that Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory as well as
subsequent work on firm-stakeholder engagements can be used as a springboard to a
more comprehensive theory of salience. In doing so, it highlights that drivers of
managerial attention have been inaccurately conceptualized in the literature because other
stakeholder elements than the group matter in attracting managerial attention;
specifically, characteristics of stakeholder issues and requests also affect salience.
Furthermore, attributes of salience have failed to provide clear empirical direction and
might not represent a comprehensive way to depict salience, showing the need to be
6

rethought. As a result, this dissertation is primarily concerned with two main research
questions: 1) what stakeholder elements affect salience? 2) Which of these stakeholder
elements and attributes are most relevant to the explanation of salience? The following
section describes the research plan of this dissertation.

RESEARCH PLAN
The two research questions outlined above serve to guide both the theoretical and
empirical inquiries developed in this dissertation. Yet, since the main contribution of the
present work is of theoretical nature, emphasis is placed primarily on the theory of
salience and its conceptual gaps. As such, following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2
offers a select literature review centered on Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s (1997) original
theory of salience. Since this theory is grounded in Freeman’s (1984) management
framework, Chapter 2 begins with a review of the tenets of stakeholder theory and
threads through early models of stakeholder salience to the in-depth presentation of
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) theory. The theory is then assessed critically, highlighting
the areas for refinement that this dissertation undertakes.
Specifically, the review of Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory draws attention to
their inconsistent use of salience attributes to refer, at times, to stakeholder groups or
stakeholder claims. In doing so, a cascading point arises in the need to specify the
stakeholder elements that matter to salience, and particularly to clarify what a stakeholder
claim is. Finally, since Mitchell and colleagues (1997) allude to the importance of
considering the interaction effect generated by overlapping salience attributes, this

7

dissertation questions whether alternative attributes of higher order would not simply
better represent stakeholder salience to managers.
Four empirical studies rooted in the original theory of salience complete Chapter 2.
Each is presented in light of its contribution to refining the original theory of salience.
And, each provides foundational insight to inform the development of the new model of
salience developed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation.

Creating a New Model of Salience
The reconstruction of the salience model is divided in two parts corresponding,
respectively, to Chapters 3 and 4. The development of the new model essentially begins
where extensions of the original model have left off; first, by describing in detail who
stakeholder groups are and by discussing the attributes of salience that pertain to the way
in which managers evaluate these groups. And, second, by specifying the additional
stakeholder elements that matter to obtaining managerial attention. To begin, Chapter 3
clarifies our understanding of stakeholder groups’ identity by drawing attention to the
heterogeneity of typical stakeholder group categories (those labeled ‘employees’ or
‘shareholders’, for example) and by bringing to light the work of Phillips (2003)
pertaining to stakeholder legitimacy. As a result, stakeholder groups are conceptualized
herein as individual entities – actors or organizations – who become stakeholders when
they are perceived to possess some form of legitimacy, either normative or derivative, in
the eyes of managers.
The ensuing argument proposes that if legitimacy is an attribute of stakeholder
identification – a basic attribute that all stakeholders must have to be considered as such –
8

then it is possible that a higher order attribute might better describe how managers accord
salience among stakeholder groups. Furthermore, when considering Mitchell and
colleagues’ (1997) suggestion that groups’ power and legitimacy might interact to
generate a compounding effect in managers’ perceptions, there appears to be a sound
basis on which to build the case for a more compelling attribute describing group
salience. Accordingly, this dissertation includes insights from the social approval
literature (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Pfarrer, Smith,
Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2005; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001) to propose that a
superordinate attribute, group status, constitutes a more precise way to describe how
managers initially perceive and respond to their constituents.
Status is used herein along Washington and Zajac’s (2005: 284) definition as “the
socially constructed, intersubjectively agreed-upon and accepted ordering or ranking of
individuals, groups, organizations, or activities in a social system.” Hence, status
provides the following conceptual advantages: it effectively situates actors in a
competitive ranking of social honor, it draws on both socially and economically-derived
characteristics (recalling Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) attributes of power and
legitimacy), and it enables the assessment of individual groups’ desirability to managers’
relationships in a one-dimensional indicator. As a result, it is argued that group status
represents a more precise evaluation of how managers accord salience to their
constituents than adding power and legitimacy dimensions alone, as do Mitchell and
colleagues (1997). Chapters 3 and 4 further develop how Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997)
conception of power and legitimacy might be better envisioned as permeating the new
model of salience.
9

Chapter 4 explains what stakeholder claims are and their role in salience. Building on
the work of Eesley and Lenox (2006), claims are described through three interrelated
elements: specific requested actions in regard to an issue of concern, brought to the
attention of managers via a request tactic. This development contributes to expanding our
understanding of the stakeholder elements that matter to salience, notably by
incorporating the refinements that have been proposed over the years, where salience
accorded to stakeholder groups is distinguished from the salience of the issue or of the
stakeholder request. Figure 1 illustrates my interpretation of Mitchell’s and colleagues’
(1997) framework and Figure 2 my representation of Eesley’s and Lenox’s (2006) refined
model.
Figure 1. Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s (1997) Theory of Stakeholder Salience

Stakeholder

Managers’
perceptions
of power,
legitimacy
and
urgency

Salience
(changes to
activities/
performance)
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Figure 2. Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) Model of Stakeholder Salience

Response to stakeholder

Stakeholder group

Stakeholder request
Requested
action

Managers’
perceptions of
power and
legitimacy
Managers’
perceptions of
legitimacy and
urgency

Salience
(changes to
activities/
performance)

Request
tactic

Based on Freeman’s (1984) seminal work on stakeholder management, a core
argument of this dissertation is that the stakeholder term, as used by Mitchell and
colleagues (1997), subsumes the implicit references to stakeholder claims. And, that
while we must recognize stakeholder groups’ heterogeneity and overlap (Rowley &
Moldoveanu, 2003), we must also expand our understanding of the stakeholder elements
that matter to attracting managerial attention to include stakeholder issues and requests.
As a result, the concept of stakeholder is reconsidered as a tetrad of interrelated
constructs including the group, its issue of concern and the specific request that it brings
to the firm, considering both the request tactic and the requested action.
While Eesley and Lenox (2006) use the terms ‘issues’ and ‘requests’ interchangeably,
this dissertation argues that these terms are conceptually distinct as well, and more
nuanced. Indeed, a group such as an activist organization could advocate in favor of an
11

issue such as the natural environment and yet bring about a request that the firm does not
perceive as legitimate and thus does not respond to. Eesley and Lenox (2006) further
develop the idea that request tactics may also carry salience assessments and control for
this variable in their analysis. The present dissertation builds on this argument to propose
that requests encompass both a tactic and a proposed action, these distinct elements each
carry salience attributes.
An important shortcoming of Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of salience is the
lack of precision as to which attributes relate to what stakeholder elements (i.e., can
groups be urgent and claims powerful?) and as to how the attributes “add together” to
generate salience. Accordingly, this new model of salience provides a more careful
examination of the salience attributes and their possible compounding effect in two broad
ways: first, by rethinking the weight of the existing salience attributes – power,
legitimacy and urgency – among the four stakeholder elements in the tetrad developed
here; second, by advancing alternative attributes of higher order that capture some of the
expected interaction effects suggested in the original theory of salience and that are
thought to better explain stakeholder salience in a general way.
To be sure, since the new model of salience is anchored in the premise that firms
behave to maintain or acquire legitimacy, it is advanced that issue prominence captures
the interacting effect of issues being legitimate and urgent. Derived from the issues
management and corporate political activity streams of literature, the concept of issue
prominence reflects at once the awareness that issues garner among a broad constituency
and their particular relevance to the firm’s activities, offering a more accurate way to
12

describe issues’ salience. Finally, this dissertation also considers how the legitimacy of
the requested action and the request tactic affect managerial attention.
Therefore, the primary contribution of this dissertation is the theoretical development
of an expanded theory of stakeholder salience hinged on two main contributions: the
expansion of the stakeholder concept to a tetrad of interrelated elements – groups, issues,
requested actions and request tactics – and the revision of the salience attributes that
matter to obtaining salience, together offering a new view on stakeholder salience that
goes beyond the additive model originally set forth by Mitchell and colleagues (1997).
These developments are illustrated in a new model, presented in the last part of Chapter
4.
A Note on the Use of Legitimacy in this Dissertation

This dissertations uses ‘legitimacy’ to refer to several distinct concepts. As such, this
brief parenthesis serves to outline the three different meanings specified in the term
legitimacy since it is an important concept to the new model of salience. Explicitly, this
dissertation refers to the firm’s legitimacy, the stakeholder group’s legitimacy and the
stakeholder claim’s legitimacy.
In its broad sense, legitimacy refers to the acceptance benefiting organizations that
adopt the practices and procedures defined by prevailing social institutions (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). And, while legitimacy is critical for emerging organizations to obtain
resources (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), once a field is established, legitimacy generates
isomorphic pressures to which firms yield in their pursuit of survival (DiMaggio &
13

Powell, 1983). This type of legitimacy represents the fundamental premise on which the
new model of salience is grounded: because legitimacy is essential to firms’ survival,
firms’ managers will accord attention to the stakeholders and claims that align with their
desire to gain social approval.
Yet, the concept of legitimacy has been interpreted, represented and applied in many
different ways over the years (Bitektine, 2011) and two more types of legitimacy matter
to our specific understanding of salience: stakeholder groups’ legitimacy and claims’
legitimacy, which are addressed more fully in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. The
legitimacy of stakeholder groups’ relationship with the firm and that of stakeholder
claims has often been confounded in the literature (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley & Lenox,
2006; Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore, this dissertation supports that stakeholder groups’
legitimacy can take one of two forms or both: normative, when the firm perceives that it
owes a moral obligation to the group, or derivative, when the group is perceived to
possess the ability to affect the firm’s activities and/or its normative stakeholders
(Phillips, 2003).
Likewise, the legitimacy of stakeholder claims, which refer to stakeholders’ requested
actions on an issue of concern via a request tactic, encompasses two elements: cognitive
and socio-political legitimacy assessments. Cognitive legitimacy concerns the taken-forgrantedness of a claim to the firm’s activities while its socio-political legitimacy relates
to its appropriateness to external constituents. This dissertation argues that both types
must be present in order for a claim to obtain salience. In order to clarify these three
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broad uses of the term legitimacy, Table 1 presents a summary with brief explanations
that are continued in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this dissertation.
Table 1. Summary of Three Uses of the Legitimacy Construct in this Dissertation
Type of
legitimacy

Description

Role in salience

Main
reference(s)

Firm legitimacy

Conformity
with social
norms and
expectations

Fundamental premise: firms
seek to acquire and maintain
legitimacy, which is critical
to their survival.

Meyer and
Rowan (1977);
Suchman (1995)

Stakeholder group
legitimacy

Normative
and/or
derivative

Normative and derivative
legitimacy parallel Mitchell
and colleagues’ (1997)
legitimacy and power
attributes, emphasizing their
compounding effect.

Phillips (2003)

Claim legitimacy
(issue, requested
action, request
tactic)

Cognitive and
socio-political

Cognitive and socio-political
legitimacy influence firms’
perceptions in regard to the
appropriateness of
stakeholder issues and
requests.

Aldrich and Fiol
(1994);

Prevailing interpretations define legitimacy as relative to the perceptions of those
who assess it (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), highlighting the importance of considering
different types of legitimacy. As such, it is important to distinguish between the various
conceptions of legitimacy because while firms seek to maintain legitimacy within their
operating environment, they also evaluate their stakeholders’ legitimacy and the
legitimacy of their claims. Taken together, these assessments shape to a large extent the
salience that is accorded to stakeholders and their claims.
15

Overview of Methodology
Chapters 5 and 6 of the dissertation present an empirical test performed with the
objective of examining the validity of the newly defined concepts pertaining to the
expanded model of salience. The sample consists of shareholder resolutions, a request
tactic, including all social and environmental proposals filed in the United States between
2004 and 2008 (1,851 observations). The request tactic of shareholder resolution filing is
chosen because it represents a very salient tactic: it is legitimate in the U.S. business
system, and presents an element of urgency in its imposed timelines as well as its
mandatory character. Yet, previous studies of shareholder resolutions have shown that
this tactic, while highly salient, is not sufficient to elicit positive managerial responses to
stakeholder requests (Clark & Crawford, 2012; David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Eesley
& Lenox, 2006). As shareholder resolutions also signify highly publicized threats to the
firm’s legitimacy, they further pressure firms to respond to shareholder proposals in
cogent ways.
Firms’ responses to shareholder resolutions can only take one of three forms. From
the most negative to the most positive, firms can oppose shareholder proposals by
requesting that the proposal be omitted, they can react defensively by putting the
shareholder proposal for vote in their proxy materials, or they can accommodate the
shareholder proposal by negotiating a withdrawal (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009;
O'Rourke, 2003). These modes of responsiveness correspond to degrees of managerial
attention (i.e., salience) obtained by the specific group, issue, requested action and
request tactic tetrad, with withdrawals representing the highest degree of salience. Thus,
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this tactic represents an ideal setting to determine the combinations of group status, issue
prominence and requested action legitimacy that lead to firm responses representing three
degrees of salience.
In Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) typology, shareholders are positioned as the most
highly salient group, possessing at once perceived power, legitimacy and urgency (in
Mitchell’s and colleagues’, 1997: 879 definition, a “definitive stakeholder”), and hence
the most likely group to elicit a positive firm response to any type of request. Even while
limited to the shareholder group, the present study seeks to contribute to more than the
narrow view of stakeholder theory, that is, to examine firm behavior toward stakeholder
groups of varying importance to firms’ core economic interests. It is important to note
that shareholder activists represent a heterogeneous denomination, including groups such
as institutional investors, coordinated activists and even individuals committed to the
advocacy of specific social issues (Bauer, Braun, & Viehs, 2010). As such, while
institutional investors and large pension funds can embody the typical influence of
shareholders on managerial attention, interest groups, individual investors unknown to
the firm and boutique organizations advocating for social issues usually buy only the
minimum number of shares required to engage in shareholder resolution filing to advance
their own advocacy agenda. Therefore, each of these categories of investors are
perceived in drastically different ways by managers (Gillan & Starks, 2007), which
impacts the salience accorded to the group proposing the resolution. More detail on the
opportunities and limitations inherent to the chosen sample are provided in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 6 centers on the methods and results. While one of the key findings of this
study is that the status of a stakeholder group is the most impactful determinant of
salience, the analysis reveals that issue prominence and requested action legitimacy also
matter to managers. In addition, results demonstrate significant interaction effects
between the elements of the tetrad, confirming that salience is accorded along a
combination of elements perceived by managers in a non-linear fashion. The implications
of these results and of the new model of salience for future research and managers are
discussed in Chapter 7. In this final chapter, a number of promising ideas are generated
for subsequent studies and a general conclusion completes this document.
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CHAPTER 2
___________________________________________________

STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE:
A SELECT LITERATURE REVIEW
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The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the theory of salience developed by
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997). In doing so, it seeks to offer a sound understanding of
what the theory, as well as its subsequent empirical refinements, provides to researchers.
Thus, after a brief review of the tenets of stakeholder management theory, this chapter
turns to an in-depth dissection of Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of salience and
concludes with the presentation of the refinements offered by four empirical studies that
test their model: Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld (1999), Eesley and Lenox (2006), David,
Bloom and Hillman (2007), and Boesso and Kumar (2009).

STAKEHOLDER THEORY
Stakeholder theory, as outlined by Freeman (1984), can be summarized along this
logical argument: the firm cannot ignore the effects of its actions on others, or others’
potential effects on it. As a result, the firm is forced to take interest in stakeholder
behaviors, values and contexts, which are best addressed when the firm possesses a clear
vision of what it stands for so as to develop an adequate stakeholder management
enterprise strategy. Stakeholder relationships operate at three levels of analysis, the
rational level (how stakeholders are perceived by the organization), the process level
(how stakeholder relationships are operationalized into standard firm procedures), and the
transactional level (how stakeholder relationships are bargained on a daily basis)
(Freeman, 1984). These levels of analysis inform the structure, the processes and the
business functions of the firm, which in turn inform its strategic planning process. Over
time, the interests of multiple stakeholders need to be balanced such that this view posits
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the term ‘business’ to broadly equate ‘creating value for stakeholders’ (Freeman, 2004;
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & De Colle, 2010).
While the theory touts a managerial perspective that is at once descriptive,
prescriptive and instrumental (Freeman, 2004), it has also been largely criticized for its
lack of managerial practicality. Donaldson and Dunfee (1994: 255) argue that the advice
given by stakeholder theory is “frustratingly vague” and that “stakeholder approaches are
merely able to advise managers to consider both the interests of stockholders and other
‘stakeholders’”. Jones and Wicks (1999: 206) concur that “the term stakeholder concept
(…) is relatively vague and, thus, gives little direction to either the study or the practice
of management”.
Phillips and Reichart (2000: 185) point out another shortcoming of stakeholder theory
in the problem of stakeholder identity. “That is, the theory is often unable to distinguish
those individuals and groups that are stakeholders from those that are not. This inability
to distinguish stakeholders from non-stakeholders threatens the very meaningfulness of
the term.” Indeed, in a review of his original work, Freeman (1994: 411) observes that
most writings on stakeholder management assume that conceptually, a stakeholder theory
of the firm is simply common sense, good business, while recognizing that practically, a
problem lies in the question of “What is a stakeholder?”
Freeman (1994) notices that in early stakeholder work, there was little philosophical
sophistication such that stakeholders were envisioned as generic groups, unindividuated.
The literature progressed to suggest that stakeholders have to be understood nominally, as
individuals who stood in relationships with the firm through memberships in stakeholder
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groups or through role-related activities. As a result, stakeholders acquired a moral status
which shifted the literature’s focus to the identification of the principles that should
govern the interaction of the firm with those groups and individuals termed stakeholders.
Gioia (1999: 229) augment this line of reasoning by drawing attention to the tension
created by stakeholder theory’s assumptions that “the interests of all (legitimate)
stakeholders have intrinsic value” and that “no set of interests is assumed to dominate the
others” and the implication that managers are not expected to acknowledge that some
interests are pragmatically more important than others. According to Gioia (1999: 229),
these assertions are not only unrealistic and naïve, but “hopelessly idealistic”. Indeed, he
concludes that “trying to juggle all interests and accord them egalitarianism is a sure way
for influential managers to find themselves bereft of their influence” (Gioia, 1999: 229).

EARLY MODELS OF STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE
In this context, the creation of a model that helps determine who and what really
counts for managers is of critical importance to the survival of the theory and to its
practical use among managers. The attention is generally placed on managers because of
their decision-making role in the firm, but also because of their unique role as a
stakeholder group empowered to make decisions pertaining to competing stakeholder
claims. To be sure, every stakeholder group is part of the nexus of contracts that
constitutes the firm (Hill & Jones, 1992). Managers are unique in that they are positioned
at the center of this nexus; they are the only group in relationship with all other
stakeholder groups. Because managers are also the only group with direct control over
the decisions of the firm, it follows that they must allocate resources “in the manner most
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consistent with the claims of the other stakeholder groups” (Hill & Jones, 1992: 134).
Indeed, Mitchell and colleagues (1997: 871) assert that “it is the firm’s managers who
determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive management
attention.”
In fact, most studies addressing stakeholder theory consider managers and the firm as
one (Freeman, 1984; Hosseini & Brenner, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997). As such, early
models of stakeholder salience focused on claim prioritization centered on how the firm’s
strategy aligned with the values and behaviors of certain groups (Freeman, 1984;
Freeman & Gilbert, 1988). Determining what the firm stands for in terms of its enterprise
strategy may dictate priorities for certain relationships while putting off others. In this
way, the firm’s strategy for stakeholder management is relative to its values and
direction, which are unique to each firm (Freeman & Gilbert, 1988).
The traditional stakeholder matrix, by contrast, aims to provide a prescription that
applies for every similar situation in a static manner. Stakeholder groups are categorized
along two axes: their relative competitive threat, and their relative cooperative potential.
Depending on where groups stand in the matrix, there is a prescription in the form of a
specific strategy for how to manage this group (Freeman, 1984; Savage, Nix, Whitehead,
& Blair, 1991). For example, a stakeholder with low relative threatening potential and
low relative cooperative potential should be monitored while the firm maintains its
present position in regard to this group (Polonsky & Scott, 2005).
A similar matrix developed by Hosseini and Brenner (1992) aims at describing and
predicting how managers balance choices pertaining to stakeholder claims, given the
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nature and composition of their organization. The authors place stakeholders in the
matrix’s rows and the concerns of those stakeholders in the columns; using the analytic
hierarchy process, managers can assign weights to the influence of each stakeholder and
obtain an overall importance score that prescribes and/or predicts the firm’s actions
towards this stakeholder in accordance with its particular decision-making approach and
the relative influence of the stakeholder group (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Hosseini and Brenner’s (1992) Matrix of Stakeholder Claim Prioritization
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However, these models are often disparaged for their apparent simplicity and lack of
dynamism. Stakeholder prioritization, many claim, is issued from a complex interaction
between the firm’s attributes and ethical orientation, which informs its perceptions of
stakeholders, and stakeholder attributes, ultimately defining the firm-stakeholder
relationship (Boesso & Kumar, 2009; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Elms, Berman, & Wicks,
2002; Jones, Felps, & Bigley, 2007; Jones & Wicks, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). Indeed,
many of these early models were founded on Freeman’s (1984) claim that groups become
stakeholders when they have a legitimate claim on the firm, with legitimacy as a key
feature of the model but used inconsistently within and across models. Against this
background, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) present a more theoretically-grounded theory
of stakeholder salience while also retaining the simplicity of these earlier models.
In effect, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) set forth a more complete model that
proposes at once a descriptive and predictive model of firms’ stakeholder management
strategies that shows dynamism in firm-stakeholder relationships. In this way, Mitchell
and colleagues’ (1997) model attempts to resolve both the problem of stakeholder
identification – by outlining characteristics of stakeholders and non-stakeholders in a
practical manner – and the problem of stakeholder salience – by distilling the firmstakeholder relationship attributes that contribute to attention from the firm.
Still, the last fifteen years have seen little theoretical development on salience while
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory appears to lack applicability, both academically
and practically. A review of this foundational theory is presented below. Throughout,
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conceptual and practical issues are raised as they represent the building blocks of the new
model of salience developed in the next two chapters.

MITCHELL, AGLE AND WOOD’S (1997) ‘PRINCIPLE OF WHO
AND WHAT REALLY COUNTS’
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) recognize that manager-stakeholder relationships
involve complex considerations that are not readily explained by traditional stakeholder
frameworks because the pragmatic reality is that managers cannot attend to all actual or
potential stakeholder claims. These considerations fuel the need for a wider-ranging
model of stakeholder prioritization. First, however, stakeholders must be identified and
categorized in order to provide managers with bases for the allocation of salience.

The Origins of Stakeholder Identification and Salience Attributes
Recalling the narrow and broad definitions of stakeholders presented in Chapter 1,
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) draw attention to the different orientations that these
definitions entail. Those endorsing the narrow view, i.e., that stakeholders are “those
groups on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival” (Freeman &
Reed, 1983: 91), are grounded in the practical reality of firms’ limited resources. As such,
they seek to establish the direct relevance of stakeholder groups to the firm’s core
economic interests or of their legitimacy in pressing moral claims to the firm. Thus, the
narrow view is akin to the search for “a normative core of legitimacy, so that managers
can be advised to focus on the claims of a few legitimate stakeholders” (Mitchell et al.,
1997: 857).
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The broad view, by contrast, is rooted in the empirical reality that firms can be
affected by or affect almost anyone. In this view, identifying stakeholders and responding
to their claims is extremely complex for managers to apply because these groups are
disparate and may not always have legitimate claims on the firm. Thus, in attempting to
provide a model of stakeholder identification, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) start with
as broad a definition of stakeholder as possible so as not to exclude any group a priori.
From an extensive literature review, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) observe that
scholars typically classify those who have a “stake” in the firm by way of possessing one
or two attributes: a claim (whether legitimate or illegitimate) and/or the ability to
influence the firm (i.e., what they refer to as power). Mitchell and colleagues (1997) draw
from several theories, including agency, resource dependence, and transaction cost, to
bring to light the importance of power in the context of their theory of stakeholder
salience. Agency theory suggests that managers will attend to stakeholders that have the
power to reward or punish them; resource dependence theory proposes that stakeholders
have power when they have the ability to control resources that are needed by the firm;
transaction costs theory implies that external stakeholders can elevate the costs to the
firm of certain business activities, which justifies managerial attention in the form of
greater integration into the firm of those stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). Thus, power
is presented as an attribute determining stakeholder salience.
A group possesses a claim on the firm generally because it is in relationship with the
firm, or because it stands to be affected by the firm in some way (Carroll, 1989;
Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Hill & Jones, 1992; Starik, 1994). The
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importance of legitimacy in salience is rooted in organizational theories that adopt an
open-systems orientation, such as institutional theory and population ecology. In effect,
these theories support that legitimate stakeholders are those that really count for the firm
because the lack of legitimacy results in isomorphic pressures to conform or mortality,
thus putting the legitimacy of the claim at the center of the very definition of who is and
is not a stakeholder2.
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) also identify urgency as a third attribute that drives
salience. Urgency, which they describe as “the degree to which stakeholder claims call
for immediate attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997: 864), encapsulates insight from many
organizational theories including agency, population ecology, transaction costs,
institutional and resource dependence in that each of these theories refers to an ‘attentiongetting capacity’ in some form or another. Nevertheless, the idea that urgency contains
both a time-sensitiveness and a criticality component is based on the work of Jones
(1991), which is presented in greater detail later on in this dissertation. Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) contend that the three attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency,
distilled from economic and legitimacy-based theories of organizations, form the bases
on which managers perceive salience among their stakeholders and respond to their
claims, with only those stakeholders who are perceived by managers to possess all three
attributes winning the highest priority of managerial attention.

2

Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) attribute legitimacy to the group. Yet, they also use the term ‘legitimacy
of the claim’ in a few places in their paper. Overall, this dissertation understands their perspective to be that
a stakeholder who has a legitimate claim is by extension in a legitimate relationship with the firm.
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The Definition of Salience Attributes
In Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) typology of stakeholder identification, all three
attributes of salience possess some common features. They are variable, as opposed to
steady states, in that they can change over time and through circumstances. They are a
socially constructed, as opposed to an objective, reality. Managers may also have
perceptions about the strength of these attributes even when these are not consciously or
willfully exercised by the stakeholder. For example, a stakeholder could be perceived as
powerful even though it is not conscious of its capacity to exercise power in its
relationship with the firm.
The identification and categorization of stakeholders according to power, legitimacy
and urgency, is necessary to the reconciliation of previous work done in CSR, Mitchell
and colleagues (1997) argue. Reviewing the work of Frederick (1978 paper, published in
1994), Mitchell and colleagues (1997) draw attention to the term CSR1 as representing
firms’ moral focus on social responsibility, and to the term CSR2 as referring to an
amoral focus on social responsiveness centered on fulfilling the firm’s economic
interests. Therefore, according to these authors, a comprehensive theory of stakeholder
management must include both concepts of legitimacy and power because each alone
only provides a one-sided perspective to firms’ stakeholder management practices.
“When stakeholder theory focuses only on issues of legitimacy, it acquires the fuzzy
moral flavor of CSR. Focusing only on stakeholder power, however, as several major
organizational theories would lead us to do, yields the amorality and self-interested action
focus of CSR2. Instead, we propose a merger (Mitchell et al., 1997: 882).” The effect of
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each attribute on salience, as set forth by Mitchell and colleagues (1997), is critically
reviewed below.
Power

Mitchell and colleagues (1997) describe power as a transitory attribute that reflects
one’s ability to impose its will in a relationship. The authors use Etzioni’s (1964)
categorization of power according to the resource used to exercise power, such that
power can stem from the use of physical resources, force or violence (termed coercive
power), from the use of material or financial resources as rewards (termed utilitarian
power), or from the use of symbolic resources such as elements embodying prestige,
esteem or acceptance for example (termed normative power). From this definition, it is
understood that power is not a static attribute of a party but rather a dynamic concept that
is re-evaluated constantly by the firm.
However, the bases of power outlined above serve more as an illustration that power
can vary in form as well as in intensity and less as a core element of the managerial
perceptions of their stakeholders’ power. To be sure, the theory of stakeholder salience
developed by these authors relies on the perception of overall power accorded to the
stakeholder group, regardless of the bases on which it may be sitting. In fact, the
distinctions among power bases outlined above may add unnecessary complexity to the
model of salience since empirically and practically, it is arduous if not impossible to
compare the value of each type on salience. Accordingly, subsequent empirical studies
have generally interpreted power in its economic sense (David et al., 2007; Eesley &
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Lenox, 2006), further restricting the applicability of the model to market stakeholders.
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) also propose that stakeholder power is perceived within a
range from non-existent to complete and that it can be latent in a relationship, triggered
by conditions that pertain to other salience attributes. In this way, the authors imply an
interaction effect of some significance but one that was underdeveloped in the original
theory.
Legitimacy
Relying on Suchman’s (1995) broad-based definition of legitimacy, Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) understand legitimacy as a desirable state of acceptance through
conformity to social norms. Whereas Table 1 in Chapter 1 distinguished between three
uses of the term legitimacy needed to understand salience, Mitchell and colleagues
(1997) draw on Wood (1991) to argue that legitimacy operates at different levels of
analysis: the individual, organizational, and societal, each of which may be prone to
different dynamics of legitimacy definition and negotiation.
Yet, the authors transpose the concept of firm legitimacy to the stakeholder’s claim
without adjusting for potential conceptual disparities, for example in the criteria or
characteristics on which legitimacy is based upon. Indeed, legitimacy is typically
understood in a national and cultural context where norms and values implicitly – as well
as explicitly – dictate how one should behave. Similarly, firms perceive their constituents
as legitimate or illegitimate entities based on their rightful existence in the society in
which they operate. For example, stockholder groups are a highly institutionalized party
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whereas some special interest groups’ very existence may be viewed as illegitimate by
members of a society, affecting the legitimacy granted to that group by the firm.
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) argue that although managers’ perceptions of
legitimacy may differ from the stakeholders’ evaluation of their claim’s legitimacy, this
attribute is either present or absent. This view resonates with other notable voices writing
about legitimacy do (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), but comes at odds
with others who have described legitimacy as a “level of social acceptability bestowed
upon a set of activities or actors” (Washington & Zajac, 2005: 284; emphasis added).
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) also hint to the possible interaction between
legitimacy and power – mostly in terms of one’s legitimate or illegitimate use of power –
but leave the reader wondering how and when these two attributes might compound to
create a larger effect in firms’ perceptions. Mitchell and colleagues (1997) assert that
these two attributes are independent and that, when also taking into consideration the
urgency of stakeholder claims, the three together determine how managers prioritize their
stakeholders.
Urgency
For Mitchell and colleagues (1997: 867), urgency is a multidimensional attribute that
exists only when two conditions are present: “(1) when a relationship or claim is of a
time-sensitive nature and (2) when that relationship or claim is important or critical to the
stakeholder”. These two conditions form the bases on which urgency is determined.
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Because urgency demands attention, they argue, it acts as a catalyst to managers’
perceptions of stakeholder salience.
Yet, while to Mitchell and colleagues (1997) urgency is a critical element, notably
because it renders the framework dynamic, empirical tests of Mitchell and colleagues’
(1997) theory have not found urgency to be a significant determinant of the groups to
whom managers pay attention. Furthermore, note that Mitchell and colleagues (1997:
867) refer to urgency as a “degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate
attention” (emphasis added). In this phrasing, it is possible to detect a preliminary,
perhaps involuntary, deconstruction of the term stakeholder that seems to recognize that
stakeholder claims can drive perceptions that are distinct from that of the stakeholder
group itself. These latter two points are left to future researchers to parse out, a task
undertaken in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

The Interaction Between Salience Attributes
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) allude to the interaction of salience attributes (power,
legitimacy and urgency) in their statement that salience increases with the number of
attributes that managers perceive to pertain to their relationship with stakeholders. Recall
that these authors also posit that salience does not require all three elements of power,
legitimacy and urgency to be present, but a single or a mix of these important elements to
be perceived by managers. Indeed, “there remain stakeholders who do not have power,
but who nevertheless matter to firms and managers” (Mitchell et al., 1997: 864). Eesley
and Lenox (2006: 768) concur that “even if a stakeholder group lacks power, (…) the
legitimacy of the group may be sufficient to elicit a positive firm response”. Furthermore,
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they explicitly posit that each attribute is independent while arguing in parallel that each
attribute’s contribution to salience “depends upon interaction with the other two
attributes” (Mitchell et al., 1997: 870). More specifically, they note that power and
legitimacy are often intertwined in the notion of legitimate or illegitimate use of power.
However, as it applies to the theory of salience, it is possible that a more relevant way
to approach the interaction between legitimacy and power is in terms of the
circumstances in which power or legitimacy can confer the other attribute by extension.
For example, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) suggest that power gains authority when
coupled with legitimacy and gains exercise when combined with urgency. Similarly, they
propose that legitimacy gains rights when allied with power, and voice when tied to
urgency. Finally, urgency coupled with power can grant access to decision-making
channels and, when combined with legitimacy, can encourage one-sided stakeholder
action. When all three attributes operate in conjunction, Mitchell and colleagues (1997)
contend that reciprocal acknowledgement and actions are spurred between stakeholders
and managers.
Nevertheless, their theory does not address how and under which circumstances the
attributes of salience interact, and it is unclear whether the outcomes of these interactions
are independent and reliable. For example, if power coupled with legitimacy grants
authority and legitimacy coupled with power grants rights, how exactly do managers
perceive stakeholders that possess at once power and legitimacy? Are they authoritarian
and rightful? How do these derived attributes (authority and rights) impact salience, and
are these secondary attributes what truly drives salience? Or, is it simply the addition of
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power and legitimacy, as suggested in the original theory, that impacts managerial
perceptions? These questions lead to the consideration that perhaps a superordinate
attribute could better represent managers’ perceptions of their stakeholders while
encompassing some of power and legitimacy’s interaction effect on salience. This idea is
explored in greater depth in Chapter 3.
In sum, although Mitchell and colleagues (1997) acknowledge that power, legitimacy
and urgency can combine in certain ways, they argue that these constructs are
independent of one another and have value autonomously in the theory of salience. The
authors casually mention a deeper level of analysis to salience attributes, but leave those
underdeveloped as well as confounded with other salience attributes in their paper. Not
surprisingly, several scholars have attempted to take up the notion of this interaction;
these articles and their contributions are addressed later on in this chapter.

The Theory of Stakeholder Salience
So far, it is Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of stakeholder identification that
has been described, because it serves as an important building block to their theory of
stakeholder salience. In its broad form, a theory of salience attempts to define which
characteristics lead certain stakeholder claims to win managerial attention. Mitchell and
colleagues (1997: 873) propose a model which basic proposition is that “Stakeholder
salience will be positively related to the cumulative number of stakeholder attributes –
power, legitimacy, and urgency – perceived by managers to be present.” This model rests
on three assumptions: managers pay attention to various classes of stakeholders because
they wish to achieve certain ends; stakeholder classes are identified based on managers’
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perceptions of stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency; and these attributes are
constructed reality perceived by managers, who determine stakeholder salience from their
perceptions of power, legitimacy and urgency in what appears an additive fashion. Still,
even while Mitchell and colleagues (1997) recognize the role of managers’ cognition in
determining salience, it does not play a central role in their theory. Rather, the theory
centers around the identification and addition of stakeholder attributes.
Latent stakeholders are accorded low salience because they only possess any one
attribute. Those groups who are perceived to possess only power lack a legitimate
relationship or an urgent claim to exercise their power to the firm. Those groups who are
perceived to possess only legitimacy in their relationship with the firm lack the power
and urgency to press managers to action (Mitchell et al., 1997). Although, the authors
note, managers may often give those stakeholders attention nonetheless as a result of the
firm’s moral drive. Those groups who are perceived to possess only urgent claims lack
the power and legitimacy to attract managerial attention. In sum, those latent stakeholders
are the least likely groups to receive any managerial attention.
Expectant stakeholders obtain moderate salience because managers perceive them to
possess any two attributes. Mitchell and colleagues (1997) argue that by raising their
stake from one to two attributes, stakeholders move from passive to active in that they
feel entitled to expect firm responsiveness to their claims. Stakeholder groups who are
perceived to be both powerful and legitimate are part of a firm’s dominant coalition, who
have a set mechanism to communicate with the firm, and through which they assert their
influence. Stakeholders who have urgent and legitimate claims lack the power necessary
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to bring about firm responsiveness. In this way, they are dependent upon alliances with
other groups to promote their interests to the firm. Stakeholders who are perceived to
possess urgency and power but lack legitimacy often have to resort to coercive power to
exercise their will, due to their illegitimate standing. These are dangerous groups that
press their claims through possibly violent means such as terrorist attacks or sabotage, for
example (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Definitive stakeholders are those few groups who are perceived to possess all three
attributes at once. As such, they are positioned to obtain the highest degree of salience.
Stockholders are a prime example of stakeholders that managers recognize as powerful,
with legitimate and urgent claims all at once, assuring them high priority on managers’
agenda. As noted above, while Mitchell and colleagues (1997) vaguely suggest that
salience attributes may interact when managers form perceptions of their stakeholders,
this dissertation makes note that this observation does not permeate their theory of
salience. For instance, the theory of salience rests on the addition of these three
independent attributes, not on their compounding effect. Furthermore, the authors use the
legitimacy attribute loosely in that it sometimes refers to the legitimacy of the stakeholder
relationship with the firm (i.e., referring to the moral grounds that confer stakeholder
legitimacy), and other times describes the legitimacy of the stakeholder claim on the firm
(i.e., referring to the appropriateness of the claim in view of social norms and values).
Finally, it is implicit in their model and in the vocabulary used throughout that there
exists some level of distinction between the stakeholder group and its claim on the firm.
However, such distinction is not articulated in the paper and leads us to believe that the
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stakeholder concept as used in Mitchell and colleagues (1997) may subsume a number of
more distinctive stakeholder elements that need to be further refined for empirical
modeling. A few scholars have undertaken this endeavor. Some of the more recent work
on stakeholder salience is outlined in the following section.

REFINEMENTS TO MITCHELL AND COLLEAGUES’ (1997)
THEORY OF SALIENCE
Since Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) seminal paper, a few authors have attempted to
test and refine the model of who and what really counts in obtaining managerial attention.
In this section, four articles that have provided empirical and/or theoretical value to the
model of salience are reviewed in greater depth: Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld (1999),
Eesley and Lenox (2006), David, Bloom and Hillman (2007) and Boesso and Kumar
(2009). In each case, emphasis is placed on the contributions that these articles have
provided to revise the original theory of salience.

Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld’s (1999) Empirical Test
Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld (1999) test Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theoretical
model of salience using the definitions of power, legitimacy, urgency and salience
offered by the original authors. In keeping with Mitchell and colleagues (1997), they
construct an empirical model where stakeholder salience is positively related to the
cumulative number of power, legitimacy, and urgency attributes that are perceived by
managers to be present. Based on survey data obtained from CEOs, Agle and colleagues
(1999) add a moderating variable in the form of CEO values, as an extension to Mitchell
and colleagues’ (1997) framework.
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Agle and colleagues (1999) borrow from Fiske and Taylor’s (1984) social cognition
theory to attempt to bridge our understanding of why individual factors (such as
managerial perceptions) affect organizational outcomes (such as the prioritization of
specific stakeholder claims over others). Accordingly, Agle and colleagues (1999) derive
from social cognition theory that managers’ perceptions of stakeholder salience are based
on three pillars: the domination of the manager’s visual field, managers’ prior knowledge
and expectations – which lead them to notice variance in behavior, and managers’
selectivity – which they experience through individual experience. They further augment
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) model by adding variables of firm performance in order
to explore the empirical relationship between stakeholder salience and firms’ social and
financial performance.
Agle and colleagues (1999) base their empirical study on the survey responses of 80
CEOs of firms evaluated by the Kinder Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) database,
implying that all firms were large and public since these are the only firms analyzed by
KLD. The survey was composed using only one descriptor of each construct, leading the
authors to use the very term of the construct in its descriptive assessment: for example,
surveying CEOs on whether enumerated stakeholder groups “had power, whether used or
not” to assess managerial perceptions of stakeholder power, “exhibited urgency in its
relationship with our firm”, to assess managerial perceptions of stakeholder urgency, and
“were viewed by our management team as legitimate”, to assess managerial perceptions
of stakeholder legitimacy. CEOs were also asked to evaluate whether each stakeholder
group was “highly salient to our organization” in order to assess the salience accorded to
each stakeholder group (Agle et al., 1999: 525).
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Notably because the survey descriptors include the name of the construct loaded
higher on those factors, the study presents some evident concerns in the self-reporting
bias. Indeed, CEOs attributing high power, legitimacy and urgency to stakeholder groups
may feel compelled to subsequently report that they also accorded high salience to those
groups, artificially creating the correlation between cumulative salience attributes and
high salience. Not surprisingly, regression results show that each attribute of power,
legitimacy and urgency as well as the cumulative number of these attributes’ presence
has a significant effect on salience.
While the authors do not test for interaction effects between salience attributes or
second-order attributes that derive from the various possible combinations of power,
legitimacy and urgency, they discern some nuances in the data. By sorting the salience of
those attributes by specific stakeholder groups, Agle and colleagues (1999) find that
stakeholders who are part of the traditional production function view of the firm (i.e.,
shareholders, employees and customers) receive more attention than stakeholder groups
who are part of the expanded view of the firm (i.e., governments and communities). For
the shareholder group – a definitive stakeholder group in Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997)
typology – Agle and colleagues (1999) find that urgency is the most significant attribute
in obtaining managerial attention.
CEO values are estimated as either self-regarding or other-regarding. Each scale was
created from previous literature and refined through rigorous pilot testing. The study
reports that CEOs’ self-regarding values have a moderating effect on the salience of the
employee stakeholder group only, and that CEOs’ other-regarding values have a
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moderating effect on the salience of the customer stakeholder group only, thus
concluding that CEO values are not a significant moderator of stakeholder group salience
overall. While this finding could be the product of measurement issues such as the
development of an original survey measurement scale, it minimizes the importance of
measuring managers’ own values in a model of salience.
The authors also test corporate social performance (CSP) using KLD data on four
dimensions: employee relations, community relations, environment, and products. The
study reports no significance in the relationship between stakeholder group salience and a
matched dimension of CSP. In other words, firms’ whose CEOs reported high salience to
employees did not perform better than their peers on employee relations, and those who
reported high salience to shareholders did not perform better on financial measures, for
example. Still, subsequent research has outlined a number of issues with the KLD dataset,
which records strengths and concerns in the firm’s activities on a number of unrelated
dimensions of social performance, such as the natural environment, employee relations
and charitable giving, among others. Aggregating all of these strengths and concerns has
been shown to deter statistical results due to the lack of a mirror relationship between
KLD strengths and concerns as well as to an inaccurate portrait of the firm drawn by the
lumping together of variables that have little to do with one another (cf. Mattingly &
Berman, 2006; Strike, Gao & Bansal, 2006). Therefore, it is possible that Agle and
colleagues’ (1999) results lack significance due to measurement issues.
In sum, through their empirical test, Agle and colleagues (1999) confirm Mitchell and
colleagues’ (1997) stakeholder salience model in the significance of power, legitimacy
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and urgency attributes. They show that stakeholder classes matter in managerial
perceptions of salience attributes, yet expose that measuring managerial perceptions and
managers’ own values is a delicate endeavor. The results of this study thus suggest that
salience might be more accurately assessed, empirically, by evaluating firm actions as
opposed to surveying managers, a suggestion well taken by Eesley and Lenox (2006).

Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) Stakeholder Triplet
In one of the few large scale empirical studies attempting to test and refine Mitchell
and colleague’s (1997) theory of stakeholder salience, Eesley and Lenox (2006) evaluate
firm responsiveness to 600 shareholder actions addressing environmental issues. For the
purposes of this dissertation, the focus is set on two contributions of Eesley and Lenox’s
(2006) study: their consideration of salience attributes as an objective reality as opposed
to a constructed, perceived reality by managers, and their expansion of the stakeholder
concept into the stakeholder-request-firm triplet, which refers to the relationship between
firms and stakeholders and the moderating nature of the request.
Eesley and Lenox (2006) choose to examine firm actions instead of managerial
perceptions because they are concerned that – as some other empirical studies have
shown – managers’ self-reported measures of their perceptions of salience attributes may
lead to bias and/or correlation. Thus, they redefine saliency as “the degree to which a
firm positively responds to a specific stakeholder request” (Eesley & Lenox, 2006: 767),
considering positive firm actions that are consistent with stakeholders’ requests, and
empirically measure this concept through actual, recorded, firm responses to stakeholder
requests.
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Eesley and Lenox (2006) also redefine salience attributes. They adopt an alternative
definition of power based on resource dependence theory, emphasizing the importance of
the relationship attributes of the stakeholder-request-firm triplet set forth in their model.
Accordingly, they propose to measure power as a ratio representing the relative access to
financial resources by the stakeholder (on the numerator) and the firm (on the
denominator), in effect asserting that stakeholder power is moderated by the financial
power of the firm.
In defining legitimacy, Eesley and Lenox (2006) observe that Mitchell and colleagues
(1997) appear to confound group and issue legitimacy. As such, Eesley and Lenox (2006)
propose to single out these terms in their study. Then again, these authors use the terms
‘issue’ and ‘request’ interchangeably in their argument, while they also make a case for
the separation of these terms. They contend that stakeholder group legitimacy can be
accurately measured through public opinion surveys that gather social perceptions on
certain groups. Similarly, they propose that request legitimacy can be assessed via public
opinion surveys that define which issues are most important to respondents. In both
cases, Eesley and Lenox (2006) code legitimacy along a ranking order, answering
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) call for an assessment of the legitimacy attribute as a
degree.
As for the attribute of urgency, Eesley and Lenox (2006) note that Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) confer urgency to the stakeholder group but that their original
definition refers to the urgency of stakeholder claims. Thus, Eesley and Lenox (2006)
draw on the psychology literature to argue that the urgency of the request is more
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relevant to a model of salience than the urgency of the group, and they measure this
variable by evaluating the wording of the stakeholder request. They code requests
demanding changes or cessation in current practices as urgent, and requests referring to
future action (or inaction) as non-urgent. Hence, Eesley and Lenox (2006) code urgency
in a binary fashion where Mitchell and colleagues (1997) had set forth the concept of
urgency along a degree.
With the addition of request tactic and requested action controls in their model,
Eesley and Lenox (2006) are able to explain more than 50% of the variance in firm
responses to stakeholder actions on the issue of the natural environment with their
augmented model of stakeholder salience. Therefore, the expansion of the stakeholder
concept into the stakeholder-request-firm triplet appears promising for future research.
To be sure, the distillation of the stakeholder concept into a stakeholder group, a request
tactic and a requested action shows significant and positive effects on the way in which
firms respond to stakeholder actions. Furthermore, by exploring the granularity of the
stakeholder concept in this way, Eesley and Lenox (2006) start the task of reallocating
salience attributes to elements of the triplet, defining for instance that urgency is more
relevant for the request than for the group, and that requests as well as groups present
legitimacy assessments.
Yet, the fact that these authors test their model with archival measures instead of
surveys of managerial perceptions creates some noise in the model. For example, it is
unclear whether the attribution of legitimacy to a stakeholder group via public opinion
surveys corresponds to the legitimacy that managers attribute to this same group.
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Likewise, the legitimacy of a request as evaluated by society can vary greatly from the
perceptions of legitimacy that managers accord to a stakeholder request. Eesley and
Lenox’s (2006) measure of power as a ratio of financial resources can also narrow the
range of power that managers may assign to stakeholders to economic power and limit
the applicability of the study to firm’s market stakeholders.
Finally, their coding of urgency could have presented some issues in that 1) it did not
take into account the criticality of the relationship between the firm and the stakeholder
(the second condition to urgency presented in the original theory of salience) and 2) they
could have confounded the principle that requests for pledges to future action also require
changes to present activities, such that both categories (urgent and non-urgent in Eesley
and Lenox’s (2006) typology) were actually considered urgent by the firm.
In sum, Eesley and Lenox (2006) make a good case for further expanding the concept
of stakeholder into a group and a request addressing an issue of concern, and for reevaluating the allocation of salience attributes among these elements. Their empirical
findings also suggest that Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory might not
comprehensively account for the stakeholder attributes that explain salience. As such,
Eesley & Lenox (2006) call for the investigation of higher order attributes that might
more precisely embody the ways in which managers accord attention to their
stakeholders. And, for this reason, it is interesting to consider how David and colleagues
(2007) account for the overlap between salience attributes.

45

David, Bloom and Hillman’s (2007) Focus on Shareholder Salience
Focusing on the shareholder group, David, Bloom and Hillman (2007) bring to light
the richness of this group’s heterogeneity to investigate two key questions: whether firms
are more responsive to shareholder proposals3 that are filed by shareholders that are
perceived as more salient (as defined by Mitchell and colleagues (1997)), and whether
such shareholder activism leads to improvements in firms’ CSP. Defining stakeholder
saliency as a combination of the managerial perceptions of the stakeholder’s power to
influence the firm, the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the firm, and the
urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the firm, David and colleagues (2007) hypothesize
that shareholders are a heterogeneous stakeholder group with varying degrees of salience
to managers, such that managers are likely to be more responsive to proposals filed by
more salient shareholder groups.
The authors analyze 1,307 shareholder resolutions filed with 218 firms between 1992
and 1998. Firms may receive several proposals in each or some of the studied years but
do not always receive a proposal. Responsiveness to each shareholder proposal is
categorized as a challenge when the proposal is omitted, as an opposition when the
proposal is presented for proxy voting and as a settlement when firms negotiate a
withdrawal with the filer 4. Shareholder proposals must be responded to in some way, yet

3

Shareholder proposals are thus termed until they reach resolution in the form of one of three outcomes: an
omission, a proxy vote, or a withdrawal. The vocabulary used herein thus refers to shareholder proposals
when they are in a stage prior to resolution, and to shareholder resolutions thereafter.
4

A similar categorization constitutes the methodology of the empirical test presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of
this dissertation.
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these categories represent the only three responses that firms can choose from in reaction
to a shareholder proposal.
David and colleagues (2007) operationalize salience attributes by grouping together
power and legitimacy. They argue that the amount of the shareholder filer’s ownership
stake in the firm testifies of both its power – in that a larger amount of shares owned
presupposes a greater capacity to influence the firm – and its legitimacy – as large block
owners are perceived as more legitimate than small block owners (where the difference
between small and large block owners is set at 1,000 shares in this study). David and
colleagues (2007) also argue that power and legitimacy are attributed together because of
the filer’s affiliation, or links with other visible shareholder groups (e.g., the Interfaith
Center of Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) and the Council of Institutional Investors
(CII)). As such, filers that are affiliated with either the ICCR or the CII are deemed more
powerful and legitimate than other filers. Therefore, David and colleagues (2007) support
in their empirical model the argument that power and legitimacy intersect in some way.
Yet, they conceptualize it more as an overlap than a compounding effect, a point that is
addressed in the next chapter of this dissertation.
Contrary to power and legitimacy, which are attributed to the stakeholder group,
David and colleagues (2007) operationalize urgency as a function of the stakeholder’s
issue. Following Hillman and Keim (2001), the authors distinguish between issues
affecting primary stakeholders (i.e., customers, suppliers, employees, community
residents and employees) – which they categorize as urgent – and issues affecting society
(such as military industries, nuclear energy, and ‘sin’ industries) – which they categorize
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as non-urgent. Moreover, David and colleagues (2007) evaluate salience attributes in a
binary fashion, whereas Mitchell and colleagues (1997) as well as subsequent research
using survey responses (Agle et al., 1999; Boesso & Kumar, 2009) promote a continuum
scale.
Using hierarchical linear models to accommodate the multiple levels of analysis
(some characteristics pertain to each proposal, others to the firm), David and colleagues
(2007) find that responsiveness is positively associated with salience attributes. In other
words, filers that present larger ownership stakes in the firm, are affiliated with either the
ICCR or the CII, and who address stakeholder issues in their proposals, are more likely to
settle with managers (i.e., negotiate a withdrawal) – the highest degree of salience in their
study.
The authors then test whether shareholder resolutions spark improvements in firms’
CSP. Using aggregated dimensions of KLD (both by adding the strengths and subtracting
the weaknesses in each category and then adding the single score of each category across
all dimensions to create a composite measure) – a method criticized by recent studies, as
mentioned above – the authors find a negative association between activism and CSP,
supporting the hypothesis that managers respond symbolically, as opposed to
substantially, to shareholder proposals. The authors conclude that instead of pressuring
firms to improve CSP, shareholder activism may on the contrary engender a diversion of
firm resources away from CSP into political activities used to resist external pressures so
as to maintain managerial independence.
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In sum, David and colleagues’ (2007) study offers a more fine-grained analysis of
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) model, supplying more subtle distinctions and
explanations of variability within the shareholder group, drawing out its heterogeneity.
The authors also initiate a disaggregation of the stakeholder concept, albeit less
thoroughly than Eesley and Lenox’s (2006), by proposing that certain salience attributes
pertain to the group (power and legitimacy, in an aggregate fashion) while the other
pertains to the stakeholder issue (urgency), and isolate the request tactic of filing
shareholder proposals. Their findings in regard to the effect of shareholder resolutions on
CSP recall the study by Agle and colleagues (1999) and offer additional insight into the
reasons why salience accorded to certain groups might not translate into improved CSP
because of the decoupling process that appears to take place within the firm. These
results thus appear to align with Agle and colleagues’ (1999) explanation that centers
firm’s critical concern for maintaining legitimacy, also the fundamental premise relied
upon in the present dissertation.

Boesso and Kumar’s (2009) Cross-Country Test of Salience Attributes
Boesso and Kumar’s (2009) study examines how managers associate power,
legitimacy and urgency with various stakeholder groups in a cross-cultural setting and,
accordingly, how managers prioritize stakeholder claims. As an extension of this model,
the authors also evaluate the extent to which firms engage in dialogue with stakeholder
groups that they perceive to be salient through firms’ voluntary disclosures in their
annual reports.
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Much like Agle and colleagues (1999), Boesso and Kumar (2009) focus on
managerial perceptions of salience attributes. In addition, they argue that because
perceptions are formed based on societal values and beliefs, a cross-cultural analysis can
provide additional insight into stakeholder prioritization factors. The study relies on
survey questionnaires collected during a 2005 management conference from 130
managers in the United States and 114 managers in Italy, operating in various industries.
The choice of USA and Italy as comparative countries is justified by similarities in
economic development and differences in institutional and social contexts, which enable
the examination of social values and managerial perceptions of stakeholder prioritization.
Boesso and Kumar (2009) adopt a descriptive approach in exploring whether there is
a difference in the managerial perceptions of power, legitimacy and urgency associated
with various stakeholder groups. Conducting a separate analysis of variance for the
American and the Italian sample, significant differences appear in the managerial
perceptions of salience attributes across five stakeholder groups, where groups are
assumed to be homogeneous and defined in accordance with Clarkson’s (1995) definition
of voluntary and involuntary stakeholders 5. Boesso and Kumar (2009) choose the
financial community, labor unions and customer groups to represent voluntary
stakeholders, (i.e., those who bear some form of risk as a result of having invested in the
firm), and the environmental advocacy groups and professional industry groups to
represent involuntary stakeholders, (i.e., those who may be placed at risk as a result of the
firm’s activities).
5

Clarkson (1995) defines voluntary stakeholders as those who possess the capacity to affect the firm, by
contrast with involuntary stakeholders, who stand to be affected by the firm’s activities.
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Salience attributes – power, legitimacy and urgency – are assessed by slightly altering
the survey questions developed by Agle and colleagues’ (1999). However, Boesso and
Kumar (2009: 79) attempt to minimize self-reporting biases by randomizing the order of
the questions and by varying the questions’ wording to avoid naming the constructs, for
example evaluating a stakeholder power by asking whether the group is perceived to have
“the ability to apply a high level of direct economic reward or punishment” on a 7-point
Likert scale.
Results indicate that the financial community is perceived as the most salient
stakeholder group in both the USA and Italy, although perceptions of the attributes of
power, legitimacy and urgency vary in the two samples. For instance, the American
sample reported the financial community as having the greatest power and professional
industry groups as having the greatest legitimacy and urgency. In contrast, the Italian
sample reported labor unions as having the greatest power and urgency, and professional
industry groups as having the greatest legitimacy.
Boesso and Kumar (2009) do not simply examine whether power, legitimacy and
urgency are present in an additive fashion. They use the richness of the Likert scores to
evaluate the impact of interacting attributes. The combinative influence of these attributes
is assessed by multiplying the reported score on the Likert scale for each attribute.
Boesso and Kumar (2009) find the combination of power and legitimacy to be the
strongest predictor of engagement between firms and stakeholders, as evidenced by the
annual reports’ voluntary disclosures, followed by the combination of power and
urgency. The interaction between legitimacy and urgency is the weakest predictor for
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most stakeholder groups, in both the USA and Italy. This finding indicates that
combinations of salience attributes appear more significant in determining salience than
the possession of one or the other attribute.
While Boesso and Kumar (2009) adopt Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) definitions of
salience attributes and their basic model of stakeholder salience, they also attempt to
avoid some of the self-reported pitfalls incurred by previous empirical studies, as
mentioned above. One weakness they identify is that while the managers to which they
had access were well-informed on the topic of stakeholder management, they were not
the actual decision-makers of stakeholder management in their firm, as opposed to Agle
and colleagues (1999) who were able to survey CEOs. Ideally, Boesso and Kumar (2009)
suggest, measures of managerial perceptions may be best operationalized through
archival data reporting stakeholder dialogue and engagement efforts, or through a
combination of interviews and focus groups.
Hence, Boesso and Kumar (2009) provide a recent account of managerial perceptions
of stakeholder group salience in two country contexts, a study designed to bring to light
the importance of societal values in stakeholder prioritization variance. They confirm that
perceptions of power, legitimacy and urgency play a critical role in the importance
accorded to stakeholder groups, but more importantly they contribute the unique finding
that power and legitimacy, in combination, represent the strongest predictor of
managerial attention, followed by the combination of power and urgency, and lastly by
legitimacy and urgency. This finding provides important clues for future research seeking
to delve into the interaction effect of perceived attributes on managerial attention.
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The authors also draw attention to the central role of legitimacy concerns for the firm
in that institutional contexts underpinning managers’ values and perceptions influence the
stakeholder groups that are granted priority. This heightened concern for organizational
legitimacy is reflected in the original problem of stakeholder management: given limited
resources and the inability to attend to all stakeholder claims, how do firms manage
competing interests from their stakeholder groups? Boesso and Kumar (2009) argue that
firms address the stakeholder concerns that are most congruent with societal values in
order to maintain legitimacy in their operational setting, an argument that serves as the
foundational premise of the new model of salience developed in the next two chapters. It
is interesting to note that Boesso and Kumar’s (2009) findings differ from the conclusion
reached by Agle and colleagues (1999), who assert that urgency is the catalytic attribute
driving salience for the stockholder group. Still, while Boesso and Kumar (2009) and
Agle and colleagues (1999) pay great attention to managerial perceptions of salience
attributes in their study, they fail to expand on the stakeholder concept which they both
report to be unclear in its reference to stakeholder groups and stakeholder claims
somewhat interchangeably. Thus, it appears that future research would greatly benefit to
merge the tracks followed by Eesley and Lenox (2006) and David and colleagues (2007)
in refining the stakeholder concept, while also incorporating the findings and the
conclusions reached by Agle and colleagues (1999) and Boesso and Kumar (2009) when
analyzing salience attributes and managerial perceptions. A summary of these studies’
findings, method, operationalization and contributions to the theory of salience is
presented in Table 2 below.
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Table 2. Summary of the Contributions of Four Empirical Studies that Test the
Original Theory of Salience
Authors

Determinant(s)
of salience

Methodology

Agle et al.
(1999)

Power, legitimacy Survey to
and urgency,
CEOs
although the
impact of each
varies by
stakeholder group

Managerial
perceptions

Expose the difficulty
of measuring
managerial
perceptions and nonsignificance of
managerial values;
validate the original
theory of salience at
face value

Eesley and
Lenox
(2006)

Group relative
Probit
power and request statistical,
legitimacy
crosssectional

Firm actions

Power and legitimacy
are attributed to the
group, legitimacy and
urgency to the
request; relative
attribution of salience
attributes (firmstakeholder);
decomposition of the
stakeholder into
group, issue,
requested action and
tactic

David et al.
(2007)

Relative power,
legitimacy and
urgency within
the shareholder
group

Firm actions

Decomposition of the
stakeholder into
group and issue;
consideration of
power and
legitimacy’s overlap;
consideration of
stakeholder groups’
heterogeneity

Boesso and
Kumar
(2009)

Cumulative group Survey to
power and
managers
legitimacy

Managerial
perceptions

Cross-cultural
comparison of
salience determinants
validates that firms
accord salience to
stakeholders to

Statistical,
crosssectional
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Operationali Contributions to the
zation
theory of salience

maintain legitimacy;
combination of power
and legitimacy
strongest predictor of
salience

THE NEXT PHASE
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of stakeholder salience has become highly
popular as evidenced by the number of citations that their paper has received over the last
fifteen years. Indeed, the term salience has become commonly used in boardrooms and
higher education classrooms while it continues to increase its currency in the stakeholder
management literature. As such, it has almost become unquestioned that managerial
attention results from their perceptions of stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency.
Yet, in Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) seminal paper, there remains several unanswered
questions (for example concerning the attributes of salience), confounded constructs that
need to be further explained (in the attributes of salience and the distillation of the
stakeholder concept) as well as some ideas that appear core to the theory and yet remain
underdeveloped in the literature (such as the moderating role of managers’
characteristics).
More recent research also seems to move beyond the taken-for-granted attributes of
the original theory of salience by returning to the roots of the stakeholder management
approach and seeking to integrate organizational-level factors as well as other possible
determinants of stakeholder salience (Berman et al., 1999; Greenley, Hooley, Broderick,
& Rudd, 2004; Jones et al., 2007). Hence, the aim of this dissertation is to contribute to
these efforts seeking to expand our understanding of salience by drawing from additional
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theoretical lenses, notably the social approval literature, to develop the stakeholder
elements that matter to managers and the attributes that attract salience.
The proposition of a new model of salience is the topic of the next two chapters.
Chapter 3 begins by focusing on stakeholder groups and the ways in which managers are
influenced by their relative status in according them salience. Chapter 4 follows by
proposing three elements describing what stakeholder claims are and the attributes that
affect how managers perceive these claims. Taken together, these contributions inform
the new model of salience presented in the last part of Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
___________________________________________________

THE PROPOSITION OF A NEW MODEL OF
SALIENCE:
PART I, WHO ARE STAKEHOLDERS?
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Informed with the literature presented in the first two chapters, the present chapter
begins to reconstruct the Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) model of stakeholder salience
by exploring, in this first part, how groups’ attributes influence managerial perceptions
and salience. In Chapter 4, the concept of stakeholder claim is clarified as requested
actions in regard to an issue of concern, made via a request tactic. Since it is argued that
both stakeholder groups and claims matter to salience, the stakeholder concept is
effectively expanded into a tetrad composed of the following constructs: ‘stakeholder
group’, ‘issue’, ‘requested action’ and ‘request tactic’. This tetrad is augmented by the
reevaluation of the salience attributes that actually garner salience for each of these
elements. Taken together, these developments contribute to the creation of an expanded
model of salience, which is presented in Chapter 4. Throughout the development of the
new model of salience, hypotheses are also enunciated in order to define the new model,
and are then tested in subsequent chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 5 and 6).
The new model of salience rests on the assumption that managerial action symbolizes
firms’ desire to acquire and maintain legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991).
Thus, this development of a model of who and what really counts for managers draws
extensively on the social approval literature to define the attributes that managers respond
to in according salience. In doing so, it answers Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) own call
for a closer examination of the three attributes – legitimacy, power and urgency – as to
whether they represent a parsimonious set, which in reality do not fully explain salience.
Mitchell and colleagues (1997: 870) claim that each attribute’s contribution to salience
“depends upon interaction with the other two attributes” and that in providing a
comprehensive theory of salience, the interaction between the attributes of power and
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legitimacy must be further investigated. This chapter thus addresses how the attributes of
power and legitimacy originally ascribed to stakeholder groups are shown to interact, and
how they may be better envisioned as permeating managerial perceptions of their
constituents.
Further, important weight is placed on Eesley and Lenox’s (2006: 778) observation
that “there may be higher order issues of legitimacy that may decide social standing”. In
fact, this dissertation proposes that merely examining the interaction of power and
legitimacy is not sufficient to explain salience but rather that there is a need to set forth a
superordinate attribute that best embodies how managers primarily perceive their
constituents, rooted in their pursuit of social approval. Consequently, it is advanced that
status is a more precise attribute to examine groups. This claim is supported with a
detailed review of the status construct and the ways in which it relates to power,
legitimacy and ultimately with managers’ attention.
Previous studies have suggested relationships between salience attributes but none
has fleshed out the connections that bind these constructs, and none has set forth an
umbrella attribute argued to represent managerial perceptions of their constituents more
accurately. Therefore, after having defined status for the new salience model, a summary
of these interconnections and a review of the ways in which status impacts salience
complete the present chapter.

STAKEHOLDERS AS LEGITIMATE, HETEROGENEOUS GROUPS
Literature on stakeholder salience generally discusses stakeholders in terms of
groups. Indeed, one foundational definition of a stakeholder refers to “any group or
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individual…” (Freeman, 1984: 25). Yet, stakeholders are typically categorized into
groups that are assumed to be homogeneous in their relationship with the firm.
Furthermore, the identification and treatment of stakeholders based on their legitimacy,
or that of their claim, is a point often made in the literature that needs to be further
enlightened (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997; Phillips, 2003), especially since
research in the last fifteen years has provided rich theoretical developments to the
concept of legitimacy. Therefore, this section discusses the importance of recognizing
groups’ heterogeneity in determining salience as well as the role that legitimacy and
power play in identifying stakeholders.

Groups’ Heterogeneous Membership
Much of the stakeholder literature treats groups as homogeneous generic types with
no overlap between groups (Agle et al., 1999; Berman et al., 1999; Clarkson, 1995;
Griffin & Mahon, 1997 ). For example, the ‘customer’ or the ‘employee’ group
encompasses a generic type of customer or employee regardless of the constituents’
specific, perhaps divergent, perspective on what the firm’s objectives should or should
not be. Likewise, one is envisioned as either a consumer or an employee, neglecting to
acknowledge that one could be, and in fact usually is, both. As a result, the literature on
stakeholder identification and existing typologies, such as Mitchell and colleagues’
(1997), fail to provide a true understanding of how groups can be more accurately
envisioned in their efforts to influence firms (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).
In fact, the heterogeneity and overlap inherent to most stakeholder groups has been
exposed in the literature, but mostly by social movement scholars (Elsbach & Sutton,
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1992; King, 2008b; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) and not so much
in studies of stakeholder salience (Agle et al., 1999; Berman et al., 1999; Boesso &
Kumar, 2009). By supporting this more complex view of stakeholder groups, it is in
effect espoused that understanding the “multiple and interdependent interactions that
simultaneously exist in stakeholder environments” is a key building block to a theory that
seeks to describe and predict how firms respond to their various constituents (Rowley,
1997: 887).
The idea that stakeholders must be considered as heterogeneous groups already
permeated Freeman’s (1984) original writings on stakeholder theory as he distinguished
between generic categories of stakeholders (such as ‘employees’, ‘shareholders’, or
‘customers’) and specific groups within each. Yet, scholars have just begun to turn their
attention to how this overlap in interests and identity affects group actions and firm
responses to these assorted constituents. For this reason, this dissertation argues that an
important shortcoming of the original salience model has been the conceptualization of
stakeholder management as consisting of relationships with monolithic stakeholder
groups.
Recognizing stakeholder groups’ heterogeneity is especially important to a
comprehensive model of salience because the theory of salience essentially seeks to
explain why managers pay attention to certain groups and individuals and not others. In
Freeman’s (1984) vocabulary, salience is about accounting for attention to specific
individuals or organizations within generic categories. Specifically, why do managers
agree to fulfill the request of one NGO but ignore another? Why does a firm allocate
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resources to strengthen its relationship with a particular supplier but not another? Why
does a firm negotiate a withdrawal with one shareholder filer but react defensively to the
same proposal from another shareholder?
This dissertation advances the idea that relationships between firms and their
stakeholders are more complex than the perception of these groups’ power and
legitimacy, as suggested the original theory of salience. Because managers operate in a
changing environment where maintaining legitimacy is critical to the survival of their
firm, managers aspire to engage with groups of higher status in order to maintain social
approval. In this light, discerning the heterogeneity of generic stakeholder groups to
distill the characteristics of specific actors within these groups enables precisely that, to
offer a more comprehensive understanding of salience by parsing out the particular status
of each actor within and between generic groups.

Groups’ Legitimate Membership
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) as well as a significant stream of the stakeholder
literature propose that stakeholders can be identified as a function of the legitimacy of
their claim, or of their relationship with the firm. In this view, firms owe a moral
obligation to certain groups, either because of ethical principles of fairness, implicit
social contracts or fiduciary duties (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones &
Wicks, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997; Phillips, 1997), or because the group has the power to
affect other (moral) stakeholders of the firm (Phillips, 2003). It is therefore important to
clarify how groups’ legitimacy has been conceptualized in the literature to refer, at times,
to firms’ moral obligation in their regard and, at other times, to the power that
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stakeholders have to affect firm practices. Indeed, while Suchman’s (1995) socio-political
definition of legitimacy in terms of an organization’s actions’ conformity to social norms
is often used as a basis to stakeholder identification (Mitchell et al., 1997), others have
noted the importance of specifying our understanding of this construct when applied to
salience.
Phillips (2003: 33) argues that, put simply, the term “legitimate stakeholder is
technically pleonastic”:
…the term “stakeholder” may very well imply “legitimacy”
and “illegitimate stakeholder” may be a contradiction.
Indeed, the term “illegitimate stakeholder” is conspicuously
absent from the stakeholder literature. If it is legitimate to
attend to the demands or well-being of a group, that group
is a stakeholder (italics added).
In this view, legitimacy represents the key to the problem of stakeholder identification in
that if we agree that all groups deserving managerial attention are considered legitimate,
then salience cannot be separate from the group’s legitimacy. This argument comes in
contrast with Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) view and suggests that salience is, rather,
awarded to those groups who garner managerial attention based on other attributes. This
view is also corroborated by Deephouse and Suchman (2008), who argue that legitimacy
alone can rarely spur the achievement of anything more than mundane tasks.
Nevertheless, such a view does not mandate that all stakeholders must be considered
as having an equally legitimate claim on the resources of the corporation (Hasnas, 1998;
Marcoux, 2003), a question to which stakeholder theorists are largely non-responsive
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997). Indeed, it is possible
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that managers pay attention to their multiple constituents based on the proportionate
contribution of the stakeholder to the firm. Therefore, this dissertation endorses the view
that even though legitimacy grants stakeholder groups an initial acknowledgement, not all
groups are owed equal consideration and a more imperative attribute defines the
differential salience accorded to legitimate groups, which this dissertation posits to be
group status.
However, legitimacy as discussed above is not restricted to its traditional
understanding as moral concern for stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones &
Wicks, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). It also encompasses the legitimacy that a stakeholder
acquires from having the power to affect the firm and its moral stakeholders. In this way,
power is considered more expansively than a proxy to economic resources as the notion
that groups can actively pressure a firm to fulfill its demands. Phillips (2003) and
subsequent work on stakeholder legitimacy (Jones et al., 2007) refer to these two types of
legitimacy as normative, when the firm owes stakeholders moral concern (e.g.,
employees), and derivative, when stakeholders have the power to affect the firm’s
operations or the firm’s normative stakeholders (e.g., the media).
In an analogous way, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) use legitimacy to refer to the
moral concern of firms toward these stakeholders, and they use power to describe the
disrupting influence of groups and individuals who have the ability to affect the firm and
its moral stakeholders. Yet, subsequent studies of salience have mostly applied this
description of power in the narrow sense of one’s possession of resources needed by the
firm, thus limiting the applicability of their model to market stakeholders by failing to
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explain, for example, how the type of power available to a prominent community
member might be perceived and accorded salience by managers in relation to the
financial power of investors. As such, Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) power attribute is
encompassed by what Phillips (2003) terms derivative legitimacy. And, it becomes clear
that power and legitimacy, in Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of salience, cannot
be accurately perceived as two independent concepts and instead must be understood as
one fundamental attribute awarding a group a position at the stakeholder table. Phillips
(2003: 32-33) concurs: “Conceiving of power as a distinct attribute from legitimacy runs
counter to the received literature on legitimacy in both organization studies as well as
stakeholder theory. (…) There is only legitimacy – power is but one avenue by which it is
acquired”. Yet, it is possible that managers treat normative and derivative stakeholders in
different ways (Phillips, 2003) and that the source of one’s legitimacy affect its salience
to managers. However, such distinctions are left unexplained in the theory of salience.
This discussion of groups’ legitimacy serves to illustrate two cascading points. One,
that the multidimensionality of the power and legitimacy attributes remains
underdeveloped in the stakeholder literature and that these attributes permeate rather than
determine managerial perceptions of their constituents resulting in salience. And, as a
result, that there is a lack of precision as to which attributes represent determinants of
stakeholder identification, that is, a baseline that all groups considered stakeholders have,
and the circumstances in which these attributes command salience. Thus, the following
section pursues Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) suggestion that, in providing a
comprehensive theory of salience, the interaction between the attributes of power and
legitimacy must be further investigated and expanded. This dissertation proposes to
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return to the social approval literature, which explains fundamental firm behavior in the
quest for legitimacy, and to set forth an attribute that better describes how managers
primarily perceive their constituents, that is, group status. This attributes is elaborated
later on in this chapter.
The Interaction Between Legitimacy and Power

As mentioned above, every stakeholder is perceived to possess some form of
legitimacy (either normative or derivative) by virtue of being considered a stakeholder.
Thus, it appears that it is not so much managers’ evaluation of whether one has
legitimacy or not that determines stakeholder salience but rather managers’ perception of
the compounded normative and derivative legitimacy ascribed to their stakeholders
yielding a compelling driver of salience. In the theory of salience, power and legitimacy
are treated as independent but related attributes also posited to interact in certain ways
left largely unexplained in these writings (David et al., 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006;
Mitchell et al., 1997).
Weber (1947) offered some insight by suggesting that these attributes may combine
when the legitimate use of one’s power yields authority. However, as noted by Pfeffer
(1981), power and legitimacy, together, are a force unlike any other; he states that (1981
quoted in Shafritz et al., 2005: 291): “power, once it is transformed through legitimation
into authority, is not resisted.” Furthermore, this combination no longer depends on the
resources that produced the power initially. This observation underscores the fact that
authority, as derived from legitimacy and power, gives a person or group the ability to
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operate with “a taken-for-granted right to act and command within a particular sphere of
activity” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008: 61).
Still, authority is only one of many sources of power in organizations; and, in fact,
other forms of power and influence often prevail over authority-based power (Shafritz,
Ott, & Jang, 2005). Table 3 is a summary of the interaction of power and legitimacy
presented in the literature. The majority of the pivotal studies presented in Table 3
suggest that these attributes are distinct constructs, and while some conceive of power
and legitimacy as additive to some extent, recent studies of stakeholder management
consider, as does this dissertation, that power is an avenue to obtain legitimacy.
Table 3. A Brief Summary of the Literature on Power and Legitimacy’s Interaction
French and Raven
(1959)

Pfeffer (1981)

Power
5 sources of
social power:
reward,
coercive,
legitimate,
referent, and
expert
Distinct
construct

Overt attribute
of the
stakeholder
group in the
relationship
Mitchell, Agle and “ability to
Wood (1997)
influence”
Latent attribute
of the
stakeholder
group

Legitimacy
One way to use
power

Power + legitimacy
Distinct construct:
“authority”

Distinct construct

Distinct construct:
“authority”, which also
represents a form of
power

Latent attribute of the
stakeholder group
conferred by
extension from the
stakeholder’s claim
legitimacy

Distinct construct:
“authority”

Refers to normative
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Underdeveloped in their
writings

Distinct
construct
Phillips (2003)

Eesley and Lenox
(2006)

Jones, Felps and
Bigley (2007)

A source of
legitimacy
(derivative)

Distinct
construct
Overt attribute
of the
stakeholder
group in the
relationship
One source of
legitimacy
(derivative)
Appeals more to
self-regarding
firm cultures

legitimacy
Distinct construct
All stakeholders are
legitimate objects of
managerial attention.
2 sources: normative
and derivative
Distinct construct

Implied: Normative +
derivative legitimacy is
bound to yield higher
salience
Unaddressed

Overt attribute of the
stakeholder group and
of the stakeholder
issue/request
2 sources: power and
moral obligations,
yielding respectively
derivative and
normative legitimacy

Unaddressed
Inferred to follow
Phillips (2003)

Normative legitimacy
appeals more to
other-regarding firm
cultures

Given the conflicting viewpoints on the interaction between power and legitimacy,
the present argument is not that power and legitimacy do not matter to salience, but that
they both permeate stakeholder salience while not fully capturing what influences
managers to respond to their stakeholders. Still, power and legitimacy embody two main
concerns that shape managerial decisions: economic considerations and the need to
garner social approval, which this dissertation suggests could be encapsulated in a more
comprehensive attribute of salience, group status. In this way, status is posited as a
superordinate attribute that encompasses some effects of power, legitimacy as well as
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other possible dimensions that managers perceive as one when evaluating their
constituents. Therefore, in evaluating salience, it is proposed that a group’s status is what
propels it to the forefront of managerial attention.

THE ROLE OF POWER, LEGITIMACY AND STATUS IN
DEFINING GROUP SALIENCE
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) propose that perceptions of power and legitimacy
determine the attention that managers accord to stakeholder (groups). Yet, as mentioned
above, further investigation into the effects of these attributes exposes the need to
consider whether in fact an alternative attribute could better capture the way in which
managers perceive and accord attention to their constituents. The primary purpose of this
section is to argue that the status of a group is the superordinate attribute that initially
propels managers to assign salience to their stakeholders.
For one, status emerged theoretically from two related yet independent constructs: the
economically-rooted notion of power (Thye, 2000; Weber, 1947) which is consistent with
the way in which power has been used in the salience literature and the sociallyconstructed attribute of legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).
Indeed, perceptions of status are influenced by both economic and social attributes,
therefore capturing some aspects of power and legitimacy. Thus, the attribute of status
precisely addresses the suggested interaction between power and legitimacy, yet also
moves beyond the additive framework of the original theory. Second, in most of the
literature on status, this attribute is described as a means to obtaining resources
(Huberman, Loch, & Onculer, 2004; Shafritz et al., 2005), making status highly relevant
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to a theory of salience. Finally, status provides a one-dimensional indicator of an
organization (Jensen & Roy, 2008) that is often a visceral, top of mind perception.
George Orwell’s famous phrase that “all animals are equal, but some animals are
more equal than others” (O'Brien & Dietz, 2011) is a relevant metaphor in our discovery
of the importance of status to salience for those “animals that are more equal than
others”, it is argued, have higher status and, consequently, receive greater attention. Thus,
it is worth exploring the possibility that status represents a more precise interpretation of
how managers actually perceive their constituents.
Below, the status construct is defined for the new salience model, making clear the
ways in which status matters to salience. Then, the theoretical connections between status
and the widely-accepted attributes of power and legitimacy as determinants of a group’s
salience are developed. Finally, the argument that status plays the role of a superordinate
attribute representing how managers initially assign salience to their stakeholders is
expounded.

A DEFINITION OF STATUS FOR THE SALIENCE LITERATURE
It appears that status has been conceptualized in two broad ways in the sociology
literature. Status was first defined as a force shaping social relations, rooted in
assessments of social standing. Referring to the biblical “Matthew effect”, whereby
contributions of apparently similar quality are evaluated more positively when the actor is
of high status and more negatively when the actor is of lower status (Gould, 2002;
Merton, 1968), status was initially addressed in terms of the honor ascribed to a position
of social class (Weber, 1978), that existed independently of economic antecedents
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(Washington & Zajac, 2005). In this perspective, high status generates privileges that are
not based on merit, but based on unearned social rank (Washington & Zajac, 2005). And,
because status is a product of one’s standing in the social hierarchy, it becomes
observable through the respect, deference and social influence given to an actor
(Ridgeway & Walker, 1995).
A second set of conceptualizations were engendered by the work of Podolny and his
early definition of status as “the perceived quality of a producer’s products in relation to
the perceived quality of that producer’s competitor’s products” (1993: 830). In this
definition, there is a noteworthy reference to product quality such that status has shifted
to an attribute that testifies of one’s performance and incorporates some economic
reference. In fact, scholars have used this definition mostly to investigate market
exchange relationships, as opposed to social interactions alone, where quality and
reputation play important roles in partner selection (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999;
Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Pfarrer et al., 2005; Podolny & Castellucci, 1999; Podolny,
Stuart, & Hannan, 1996). Most recent writings on status have criticized this definition
specifically for its confusion with the reputation construct, claiming that conceptualizing
status in this way does not afford control for real and perceived differences in quality or
merit, conflating the effect of an organization’s status with the outcomes of its activities
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Washington & Zajac, 2005).
As a result, a new wave of scholars have sought to isolate a definition of status that
would remain untainted from the influence of other, related constructs, such as legitimacy
and reputation. Gould (2002: 1147) proposed that status is the “prestige accorded to
individuals because of the abstract positions they occupy rather than because of
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immediately observable behavior”, making explicit reference to social ranks while
dissociating from related constructs founded on merit-based behavior, such as reputation.
A summary of the ways in which status has been defined in the literature is provided in
Table 4 below. Most definitions posit status as a relative ranking position in a context of
reference from which a range of privileges ensue.
Table 4. Chronological Definitions of Status in the Literature
Definition

Reference

Inspiration

“An effective claim to social esteem in terms of
positive or negative privileges.”
“A quality of social honor or a lack of it, (which)
is in the main conditioned as well as expressed
through a specific style of life.”

Weber, 1978:
305, 932

Original

“The perceived quality of a producer’s products in Podolny, 1993:
relation to the perceived quality of that producer’s 830
competitor’s products.”
“One's standing in a social hierarchy as determined Thye, 2000: 408
by respect, deference, or social influence.”

Original

“The amount of honor or esteem accorded to a
person or social designation.”

Phillips &
Zuckerman,
2001: 286

Weber, 1922,
1946

“The prestige accorded to individuals because of
the abstract positions they occupy rather than
because of immediately observable behavior.”
“One's standing in a social hierarchy as
determined by respect, deference and social
influence."

Gould, 2002:
1147

Original

Huberman et al.,
2004: 104

Ridgeway &
Walker, 1995

“Status represents a firm’s perceived quality vis-àvis its peers or the amount of “honor or esteem”
accorded to a firm.”

Pfarrer et al.,
2005: 391

Podolny, 1993;
Phillips &
Zuckerman,
2001

“The socially constructed, intersubjectively
Washington &
agreed-upon and accepted ordering or ranking of
Zajac, 2005: 284
individuals, groups, organizations, or activities in a
social system.”
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Ridgeway &
Walker, 1995

Weber, 1978

“The prestige accorded firms because of the
hierarchical positions they occupy in a social
structure.”

Jensen & Roy,
2008: 496

Gould, 2002

“A socially constructed, intersubjectively agreedupon and accepted ordering or ranking of social
actors, based on the esteem or deference that each
actor can claim by virtue of the actor’s
membership in a group or groups with distinctive
practices, values, traits, capacities or inherent
worth.”
“The perceived quality of the products of a
producer relative to either the products of similar
others or its competitors.”

Deephouse &
Suchman, 2008:
59

Washington &
Zajac, 2005;
Benjamin &
Podolny, 1999;
Weber, 1946

Castellucci &
Ertug, 2010: 150

Podolny, 1993

“A position in a social system that can be ranked
Jensen et al.,
among other positions based on relative prestige or 2011: 87
social esteem.”

Weber, 1968;
Linton, 1936;
Merton, 1957

“Effective claim to social esteem in terms of
positive or negative privileges.”

Wry et al., 2011:
155

Weber, 1978

“Position or social standing with reference to a
particular group or society.”

Pearce, 2011: 6

Original

Another noticeable tension lies in the definition of status as either an objective,
structural reality, or a subjective evaluation. Indeed, while it has been demonstrated that
status positions are relatively stable over time, such that it can be possible to establish
some form of objective hierarchy, it is also possible that the status ascribed to an actor
will depend on the evaluator’s perspective, supporting the argument for status as a
subjective evaluation. In his theoretical and empirical inquiries, Gould (2002)
demonstrated that status hierarchies are reinforced by the payoffs of status-related social
interactions. According to this view, regardless of their status position, actors have no
incentive to change their current status attribution patterns because they derive utility
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from the interaction with higher status actors, which are characterized by asymmetrical,
non-reciprocal attributions (Gould, 2002).
Yet, given the latitude of perspectives enabled by today’s technology, actors confront
many evaluations from others, facilitating status mobility (Sullivan & Stewart, 2011).
Organizations also use a wide range of tactics, from more legitimate affiliations with
higher status organizations (Jensen, Kim, & Kim, 2011; Washington & Zajac, 2005) to
less legitimate and even unfair means, such as cheating and sabotage, to increase their
chances of moving up the social hierarchy (Pearce, 2011; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).
Therefore, status has mobility over time but, because status is argued to be mostly
derived from historical legacy (Washington & Zajac, 2005), hierarchies tend to be rather
stable. Status is thus best described by reference to the social context in which it is
assessed, as a form of inter-subjective evaluation (Pearce, 2011).
This dissertation thus proposes to use Washington and Zajac’s (2005: 284) definition,
that status is: “the socially constructed, intersubjectively agreed-upon and accepted
ordering or ranking of individuals, groups, organizations, or activities in a social system.”
This definition is chosen because it is rooted in the original writings of Weber
(1947/1978) and highlights the importance of the context of reference in which actors are
evaluated. Since salience is concerned with how firms interact with their constituents, this
definition is especially well suited to illustrate that status is evaluated among actors in a
relationship with the firm, and within a network of reference, rather than status as an
abstract condition. Status is in fact a good choice of attribute for the very reason that it
offers an ordering characteristic, which implies a necessary relative ranking, a
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perceivable differential between parties (Blau, 1964) that recalls the discussion of
stakeholder group heterogeneity presented above in this chapter.

WHY IS STATUS SUPERIOR TO POWER AND LEGITIMACY IN
EXPLAINING SALIENCE?
The unique qualities of the status construct are assuming an increasingly
preponderant role in the management literature, as scholars realize its explanatory power
in the realm of organizational behavior (Pearce, 2011; Pfarrer et al., 2005; Washington &
Zajac, 2005). At the same time, researchers within the salience domain are still wrestling
with the question of managerial perceptions of salience attributes (Boesso & Kumar,
2009; David et al., 2007; Laplume et al., 2008). Notably, some are in search of a
construct that captures the interaction between power and legitimacy as salience
attributes (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Phillips, 2003) while others question whether they are
indeed independent attributes (David et al., 2007).
This section proposes that status represents a superordinate construct to which
managers primarily respond. Indeed, while status is a type of social evaluation, distinct
yet akin to the concept of legitimacy, it also impacts the power that managers perceive
groups to have. Still, while legitimacy and power are typically applied at the population
level of analysis (in terms of homogenous stakeholder groups), status is an attribute of
specific groups and individuals (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Status also offers the
conceptual and empirical advantage of representing managerial perceptions along a onedimensional attribute that provides a first assessment of firms’ desire to engage with a
party (Jensen & Roy, 2008).
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Thus, status is instrumental, that is, a means to obtaining one’s desired outcome
(Nippa, 2011). The ability of high status groups to obtain a variety of benefits – including
managerial attention – has been demonstrated extensively in the literature (Sullivan &
Stewart, 2011): high status has been linked to cost advantages (Podolny, 1993), faster
growth (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), more input in decision-making (Sullivan &
Stewart, 2011), better results in negotiation (Ball & Eckel, 1996), more managerial
resources (Thye, 2000) as well as to several other privileges that are received
independently of performance (Washington & Zajac, 2005). To be sure, writings as early
as those of Aristotle claim that the exchange of goods should be proportional to one’s
status, with those of higher status gaining more than those of lower status (Thye, 2000).
In short, because high status actors command deference from others, those actors are able
to get more of what they want (Pearce, 2011), capturing the essence of gaining salience.

Status and Power
There is an evident similarity between the principle of ‘who and what really counts’
in the stakeholder literature (Freeman, 1994; Mitchell et al., 1997) and the definition of
politics in the organizational literature as ‘who gets what, when, and how’ (Laswell,
1936). Pfeffer (1981) describes politics as the mechanism that determines the allocation
of firm resources given the inherent differing preferences and conflicts that organizations
must manage. In the stakeholder perspective, much like in the political view of the
organization, the firm is understood as pluralistic and at the center of relationships that
represent diverse interests and goals, ruled by the implicit reliance on market forces
where conflict is expected and resolved through bargaining and political interplay
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between interests (Shafritz et al., 2005). Given these inherent conflicts, political models
of choice presume that it is the power of the social actors that determines the outcome of
the decision process (Pfeffer, 1981), where actors with the greatest power typically gain
the greatest attention (i.e., obtain resources from managers).
While power has been written about extensively in the literature (Hardy, 1996;
Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 2009; Pfeffer, 1981; Shafritz et al., 2005),
sociologists have largely treated power as a force shaping social relations, emphasizing
typologies of power (Thye, 2000). Yet, more recent writings posit power as a structural
capability that favors those with power at the expense of others in resource allocation
(Emerson, 1962; Shafritz et al., 2005; Thye, 2000). As such, power is both context
specific and the attribute of a relationship (Mitchell et al., 1997), implying that one is not
powerful or powerless in some abstract way but rather by reference to other actors
(Shafritz et al., 2005) who are in relationships (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Thye, 2000), like
the manager-stakeholder group relationship at the center of this analysis.
Power, in this resource dependence view, is ascribed to those who control resources
on which others are dependent. And, the amount of power that an actor can exert is
posited as equal to the dependence of others on its resources (Emerson, 1962). As such,
the argument that power is positively related to managerial attention may only be
narrowly applicable to stakeholder salience since various groups may benefit from
different types of power, which may not be comparable on equal footing, as discussed
above. In turn, because organizations are conceptualized as coalitions of varying
interests, layers of influence, politics and power largely determine whose interests will
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prevail (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This conception of power represents one of the basic
tenets of Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of salience. And, as presented above,
this type of power is largely accounted for in the notion of derivative legitimacy, which
merely affords groups and individuals the consideration of a stakeholder status.
Hence, we can expand our understanding of salience by considering the importance
of an actor’s status in the social approval literature. Both theoretical and empirical work
have demonstrated status’ superordinate quality, specifically that status implies power
and, thus, favors high status actors in resource allocation (Huberman et al., 2004). In the
conflict literature, power leads to status and prestige in a one-way direction, which results
in more prestigious actors obtaining a greater share of surplus resources (Thye, 2000).
Other accounts propose that structural power heightens status in groups such that, when
exercised, higher power groups obtain a greater amount of resources that generate
increased expectations for performance and, consequently, the attribution of higher status
(Lovaglia, Skvoretz, Willer, & Markovsky, 1995). In all, scholars reinforce the notion
that status and power are distinct constructs (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Huberman et
al., 2004; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001; Weber, 1947) and, it is augmented here, that
status presents a superordinate quality.
Indeed, a core distinction between power and status is that “when people defer to
those with high status, they do so because they think deference is the proper thing to do,
not because the person wields power over them” (Pearce, 2011: 7), which illustrates that
status and power do not necessarily go hand in hand. To be sure, it is not rare to
encounter powerful actors with low or middle status (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). For
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example, while secretaries typically do not benefit from high status in organizations, they
may hold significant power if their opinion of a job candidate’s personality determines
who gets a second interview. As such, while power is a more active attribute – where A
can get B to do what A wants (Pfeffer, 1981) – status is a more passive attribute – where
B tends to want to do what A wants by virtue of A’s status and, incidentally, a more
commanding attribute.
In both cases, an actor’s ability to obtain the desired resources from managers is
impacted by perceptions of its power and status, but when these resources are controlled
by higher status groups they are perceived to be more valuable, which has the paradoxical
effect of giving more power to those high status groups. Indeed, it has been noted that
power can increase status in certain instances and that status can be an important source
of power and influence in others (Nippa, 2011; Thye, 2000; Weber, 1978). In this way,
because higher status groups gain greater power, it is proposed that status and not power
shapes managerial perceptions of their stakeholder groups, resulting in greater salience.
As mentioned above, this dissertation does not dismiss altogether the effect of power on
salience, but rather suggests that when power has an effect on salience, it can be better
envisioned as permeating manager-stakeholder relationships, while stakeholder group
status determines how managers initially respond to their stakeholders.
As previously discussed, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) note that power is often
conjoint to notions of legitimacy and that a comprehensive theory of salience must
investigate this interaction effect. The interplay between power and legitimacy as well as
the relationship between legitimacy and status are discussed in the following segment.
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Status and Legitimacy
As with the power construct, status shares intricacies with legitimacy because they
both imply social acceptance. However, legitimacy is thought to homogenize (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991) and is best applied to an understanding of populations,
whereas status specifically distinguishes individuals and groups’ position. Legitimacy is
also often cast as a non-rival, fundamentally dichotomous attribute (in terms of whether
one satisfies the acceptable norms or not), while status represents a competitive ordering
of indeterminate objects (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Phillips and Zuckerman (2001)
also argue that an actor’s status influences the perceived legitimacy of its actions. For
example, an action that may be considered illegitimate if perpetrated by a low status actor
may be unquestioned when taken by a group of higher status.
Similarly, Pfarrer and colleagues (2005) find that high status firms’ actions render
certain practices more socially acceptable, such that lower status firms may feel more
confident disclosing less desirable actions like issuing earnings’ restatements when
industry leaders are also doing so. Where higher status firms exhibit more sensitivity to
regulatory pressures for legitimacy, for fear of being targeted by legal sanctions, lower
status firms appear more sensitive to informal pressures to conform, for fear of losing
status in the eyes of industry peers (Pfarrer et al., 2005).
By representing an attribute of specific stakeholder groups, status thus enables the
identification of individual and group differences within a social context, allowing
managers to form perceptions of individual groups’ salience. Status also embodies both
characteristics pertaining to one’s economic success and social approval, tying together,
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albeit in a more comprehensive manner, the roots of influence that power and legitimacy
were pegged to exemplify in the original theory of salience. Finally, through its rivalrous
nature, status enables a more precise empirical examination of groups’ salience. That is,
status makes possible the ranking of several individual groups to managerial attention.
A summary of the interconnections between power, legitimacy and status applied to
salience is presented in Table 5 below. Table 5 shows that while groups with power have
an active lever with which they can cajole firms into fulfilling their requests, groups with
legitimacy do so by association with other groups. On the other hand, groups with status
benefit from a more passive lever, that is, they inspire other actors to defer to their
demands by virtue of their status differential.
Table 5. A Summary of the Roles of Power, Legitimacy and Status in Salience
Power

Legitimacy

Status

Stakeholder group
lever

Access to resources
needed by the firm

License to operate

Status as an
associative resource

Type of lever

Active (wielding)

Active (seeking)

Passive (deference)

Role in salience

Firms respond to
powerful groups
when threatened to
suffer some type of
damage

Firms have a moral
obligation to accord
consideration to
legitimate groups

Firm desire to
engage with high
status groups to gain
access to resources
and
increase/maintain
legitimacy

In sum, the previous section illustrates that the notion that power and legitimacy
interact to generate greater salience from managers is an important underdeveloped area
in the work of Mitchell and colleagues (1997). Still, this dissertation argues that the
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interaction between power and legitimacy does not suffice to explain salience since more
recent writings on stakeholder theory have made light of the role of power in gaining
legitimacy and the fundamental representation of stakeholders as legitimate entities.
Nevertheless, power and legitimacy exemplify economic and social approval streams
of influence, respectively, that impact salience. Therefore, this dissertation augments the
extant literature on these constructs by proposing that status, effectively rooted in both
economic and social approval concerns, represents the superordinate construct that
initially determines groups’ salience. Below, the importance of status in shaping
relationships between firms and their stakeholders is further explained to describe the
ways in which status truly matters to firms’ objective to maintain social approval.

HOW STATUS IMPACTS SALIENCE: RELATIONSHIP AND
NETWORK EFFECTS
An important characteristic of status is that it carries privileges and discrimination in
relationships, as noted in Table 5. Scholars have demonstrated that when a group engages
with a higher status organization, it can enhance its status position (Washington & Zajac,
2005). Affiliation, or tie-related status, helps firms attract a wider set of potential
exchange partners (Podolny & Castellucci, 1999), and thus achieve faster organizational
growth (Podolny et al., 1996). For these reasons, Podolny and Castelluci (1999: 433)
refer to status as a “productive asset” contributing to firm success. In this way,
relationships with groups of various status levels valorize, or contaminate, one’s initial
status position (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).
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In much the same manner, Thye (2000) observes that status characteristics lead
parties to develop expectations of one another, embodied in their status. The author
advances that higher status groups thus receive more opportunities, are evaluated more
positively, have more influence over others and are more likely to be involved in
decision-making. These benefits are all highly relevant to a thorough explanation of
salience. In fact, the argument that managerial responses to stakeholder requests are
likely influenced by the status of the requesting group supports the demonstrated dynamic
that firm ties convey identity through association and impact the outcome of market
transactions (Podolny, 1993).
On the other hand, engaging with low status groups can reduce the status of a high
status firm, threatening its organizational position and legitimacy (Pearce, 2011). Yet,
because the lower status actor needs the association with a higher status actor to enhance
its legitimacy and status, the high status actor gains power through the low status group’s
dependency (Pfeffer, 1981). Using Formula One racing data, Castellucci and Ertug
(2010) find that higher status firms can secure greater effort in their exchange
relationships with lower status partners precisely because their status advantage creates
an incentive for the lower status organization to produce its best work in order to benefit
from the relationship again in the future. As a result, an important part of understanding
salience may be about investigating how firm-stakeholder relationships, as market ties,
satisfy firms’ aim to maintain or enhance their organizational legitimacy by engaging
with higher status groups (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Bitektine, 2011).
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Conceptualizating firms’ relationships with their constituents in terms of advantages
and disadvantages stemming from a network position culminates in the work of Rowley
(1997), who argues that the configuration of organizations’ network of influence shapes
their responses to stakeholder demands. In this way, the firm does not necessarily hold
the central position, yet its position in the network highly impacts the terms of the
relationships that it will seek to cultivate with its stakeholders. According to Rowley
(1997), when a firm responds to a group’s request, it is influenced by the demands of its
whole network. In this way, it is possible that firms’ responses are largely colored by
status positions within the network and firms’ desire to move to a higher status position
within it.
Furthermore, according to Rowley’s (1997) analysis, networks that are denser are
likely to be more able to pressure the focal firm into responding to their collective
requests. Indeed, some writings on status have used the network approach by suggesting
that status reflects a position in a social system (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Pearce,
2011; Podolny & Castellucci, 1999). In this view, market ties are acts of engagement in
which the status of each party influences perceptions, resources and opportunities
(Benjamin & Podolny, 1999).
Status is thus highly relevant to the investigation of stakeholder relationship
dynamics. In exploring the conditions under which secondary stakeholders elicit positive
firm responses, Eesley and Lenox (2006) propose that a more precise analysis of salience
should consider the moderating effect of firms’ characteristics on managers’ perceptions
of stakeholders. In agreement with the literature on status (Pearce, 2011; Washington &
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Zajac, 2005), the definition of status used in this dissertation also conceptualizes this
attribute as a relative position in a relationship, in this case between the stakeholder group
and the firm. The importance of status’ relative feature is that status can be transferred
through the relationship (Podolny, 2005) such that a firm “gains” status as a result of
having engaged, even if only temporarily, with a higher status actor. For example, a new
supplier with low status can permanently increase its status after having fulfilled a
contract for a high status customer. These relationship dynamics make the attribute of
status all the more relevant to the explanation of firms’ responses to their stakeholders.
(Jensen et al., 2011)
In sum, it is argued here that status is an attribute of salience that, while capturing
both economic and social approval elements, offers a more precise concept to describe
how managers initially evaluate their constituents. Consequently, this dissertation
advances that managerial attention to groups’ requests has much to do with three
conditions: 1) the firm’s current status position relative to that of the requesting group in
a network of influence, 2) the privileges or discrimination that the firm stands to incur as
a result of the attention that it gives to a stakeholder, and 3) the firm’s perception of its
peers’ reactions to the relationship that it creates with a group. For example, CalPERS, a
well-known activist-prone asset manager, may have more status than a relatively
unknown asset manager while both are in the generic grouping of “stockholder”, and are
requesting the same action from a firm, regarding the same issue. As a result, the firm
may be more inclined to negotiate a withdrawal with CalPERS than with the individual
activist in order to ingratiate itself among other high status institutional investors. These
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groups’ differential status thus explains the varying degree of salience obtained from the
firm.
As mentioned above, firms’ main concern is with garnering and then maintaining
legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2003) to have access to the resources that they
need to survive. In doing so, firms prefer to engage with high status exchange partners to
enhance their own organization’s legitimacy (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Jensen et al.,
2011) and hence it appears highly possible that firms will respond more positively to
stakeholders with higher status, in hope to create stronger relationships with these groups
than with lower status stakeholders, whom firms are least interested in engaging with. As
a result, it is argued that status represents a more precise attribute to describe how firms
perceive their constituents and initially accord them salience. Consequently, it is
proposed that:
H1. Managerial perceptions of stakeholder group status are positively
related to salience.
Nevertheless, status is an attribute of the stakeholder group, which encapsulates how
groups affect salience. One of the core arguments presented in this dissertation is that
other elements than the group must be considered in identifying salience. In the next
chapter, stakeholder claims are developed as a triad of constructs: requested actions in
regard to an issue of concern, brought to the firm via a request tactic, and the relevance of
salience attributes for each is revisited.

86

CHAPTER 4
___________________________________________________

THE PROPOSITION OF A NEW MODEL OF
SALIENCE:
PART II, WHAT ARE STAKEHOLDER CLAIMS?

87

This chapter pursues the argument that the complexity of the stakeholder concept has
been overlooked by the stakeholder salience literature. As such, while Chapter 3 focused
on the impact of groups’ status in garnering salience, this chapter explores the concept of
‘stakeholder claim’ and advances that a claim is more precisely described as a specific
requested action in regard to an issue brought about via a request tactic. Each of these
elements presents inherent salience attributes, which are explored in this chapter.
These refinements provide a significant advancement to the model of salience
because, in part, empirical evidence has highlighted the confusion between stakeholder
groups and claims that permeates the stakeholder salience theory. Indeed, the present
inquiry is guided primarily by the need to enlighten conflicting representations of the
stakeholder concept in the literature (Rowley, 1997; Starik, 1994), which confound the
terms stakeholder, claims, stakes, interests, issues and requests (Agle et al., 1999; Berman
et al., 1999; Boesso & Kumar, 2009; David et al., 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Elms et
al., 2002; Freeman, 1984, 2004; Jones et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 1997; Savage et al.,
1991). The developments described below draw primarily on Freeman’s (1984) seminal
work on stakeholder management as well as on subsequent literature on stakeholder
theory (Eesley & Lenox, 2006), and are augmented by the issues management literature
and corporate political activity views.

STAKEHOLDER CLAIMS AS A TRIAD OF CONSTRUCTS
As noted by Mitchell and colleagues (1997), the groups who are considered to be in a
relationship with the firm are largely defined by the legitimacy of their claim on the firm:
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“The idea of comprehensively identifying stakeholder
types, then, is to equip managers with the ability to
recognize and respond effectively to a disparate, yet
systematically comprehensible, set of entities who may or
may not have legitimate claims, but who may be able to
affect or are affected by the firm nonetheless, and thus
affect the interests of those who do have legitimate claims.”
(Mitchell et al., 1997: 857), emphasis added.
And, as Freeman (1984: 45) notes, the legitimacy of the group itself does not necessarily
make its demands legitimate:
“…. while managers may not think that certain groups are
“legitimate” in the sense that their demands on the firm are
inappropriate, they had better give “legitimacy” to these
groups in terms of their ability to affect the direction of the
firm. Hence, “legitimacy” can be understood in a
managerial sense implying that it is “legitimate to spend
time and resources” on stakeholders, regardless of the
appropriateness of their demands.
In effect, this dissertation supports the argument that stakeholder groups and their claims
are separate constructs and that each carries attributes of salience independently.
By contrast, Mitchell and colleagues (1997) define salience attributes that are
perceived to pertain to ‘stakeholders’ by referring to the power and legitimacy of the
group and the urgency of the group’s relationship or claim, creating confusion as to the
elements that matter in determining salience. In fact, the term claim itself has been treated
ambiguously in the literature. Authors have used it interchangeably with stakeholder
interests (Berman et al., 1999; Boesso & Kumar, 2009; Elms et al., 2002; Jones et al.,
2007; Mitchell et al., 1997), and to refer to stakeholder issues (Agle et al., 1999; Berman
et al., 1999; Freeman, 1984, 2004; Savage et al., 1991) and/or requests (David et al.,
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2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Yet, it remains unclear how these distinctions in language,
referring to different concepts, inform managers’ perceptions of salience attributes.
This treatment of stakeholders and claims as one concept has been recurrent in
subsequent literature (Agle et al., 1999; Boesso & Kumar, 2009). As such, the present
work builds on Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) study to suggest that claims are more precisely
represented through specific requested actions that groups ask the firm to undertake, via a
request tactic, in regard to an issue. In Freeman’s (1984) book, stakeholders are
conceptualized in a simple fashion as having ‘stakes’ in the firm. Those stakes, Freeman
(1984: 59) argues, are “obviously multi-dimensional”, but such dimensions are not easily
defined. Digging deeper into the concept of what a stake represents leads Freeman (1984)
to define stakes as stakeholder interests represented through issues of concern. This
definition begs the question of what constitutes an issue, the next aspect addressed.

Issues
Much like Freeman (1984) envisioned the ‘stakeholder group’ as a distinct concept
from the issue(s) that the group is concerned with, this dissertation considers Eesley and
Lenox’s (2006) argument that firms’ responses incorporate managerial perceptions of
more than the group itself. Following Eesley and Lenox (2006), managers’ perceptions of
a stakeholder group are seen as distinct from their perceptions of the group’s issue. Still,
further refining Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) study, it is proposed that the distinction
between ‘stakeholder issues’ and ‘stakeholder requests’ must be made clear since these
represent independent constructs as well, and are more nuanced.
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To define what an issue is, it is important to differentiate between stakeholder issues
– which are defined here as the concerns that groups hold in regards to the firm’s
activities or policies – and social issues, which pertain to the social context in which the
firm exists, addressing broader economic, social, political or technological concerns, for
example (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984). In Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) study,
stakeholder issues are empirically estimated by way of public opinion surveys on issues
of importance. Thus, Eesley and Lenox (2006) term stakeholder issues what they measure
as social issues, perhaps improperly correlating these two concepts. Indeed, Clarkson
(1995: 100) note that it is “necessary to distinguish between stakeholder issues and social
issues because corporations and their managers manage relationships with their
stakeholders and not with society.”
However, a social issue can become relevant to a firm when it becomes known, either
through the media, the advocacy of a group or through the personal knowledge or
expertise of a manager. In this way, the manager connects the issue with a specific
stakeholder group, making it relevant to the firm. The mechanisms that render public
issues material to firms’ attention are explored below and augmented with an assessment
of the attributes that matter to issue salience.
How Issues Affect Salience

To describe the importance of issues to a new model of salience, this dissertation
draws on three streams of research: the issues management, the corporate political
activity and the interpretive view of organizational decision-making. The strategic
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management of issues refers broadly to firms’ activities seeking to reduce the negative
impact of issues on its performance. As such, a great deal of attention has been placed on
defining the issues that matter to firms (Wartick & Mahon, 1994) and on strategically
identifying and responding to issues brought about by arising circumstances (Ansoff,
1980). An extensive literature review by Wartick and Mahon (1994) yielded a new
definition of corporate issues, anchored in three basic features shared by extant
definitions: the issue’s impact on the ability of the firm to meet its objectives, the
contestability of issues among the firm’s stakeholders, and issues’ symbolization of the
gap between stakeholders’ expectations and firm performance. In a general way, the issue
management literature suggests that firms attend to the issues that threaten the
accomplishment of their objectives.
The corporate political activity (CPA) view maintains that issue salience increases
with the level of awareness and support garnered among constituents (Bonardi & Keim,
2005). This view implies that firms accord salience to those issues that become important
to stakeholders because they seek to maintain legitimacy. Thus, it is the institutional
pressure surrounding firms that directs their attention to specific issues and compels their
actions toward a conduct deemed acceptable by their stakeholders (Bansal & Clelland,
2004). Furthermore, as an issue becomes widely important and opinions converge on the
actions that public policy should take in its regard, the less effective are firms’ political
strategies attempting to shape the treatment of such issue (Bonardi & Keim, 2005;
Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Therefore, in the CPA view, firms do best by identifying early the
rising issues and taking appropriate steps to shape public policy as well as communicate
their position on the issue to their stakeholders.
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Finally, the interpretive view, sponsored mainly by Dutton and colleagues (Dutton &
Dukerich, 1991; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Dutton, Walton, & Abrahamson, 1989;
Jackson & Dutton, 1988), proposes that managers attribute meaning to strategic issues
and that the labels used to define issues (mostly in terms of threats or opportunities)
determine the actions that managers will carry out. This view of issue salience is
particularly pertinent to the effort of this dissertation because it addresses how managers’
cognition and firm identity influence managerial attention toward select issues. It
purports that managers’ attention is directed to a restricted number of issues which are
subsequently interpreted and imparted meaning through categorizing and labeling which
reflect the firm’s own identity. These categories and labels contribute to the infusion of
meaning on subsequent issue stimuli and eventually guide managerial action. A summary
of these three takes on the importance of issues to salience is presented in Table 6 below,
with the addition of a social movement perspective predicting the industry condition
under which issues become salient to managers.
Table 6. Four Views Revealing the Importance of Issues on Salience
Author(s)

Issue definition

View

Issue salience argument

Bonardi &
Keim, 2005

Widely salient when
it becomes important
to a broad segment of
likely voters whose
opinions are
coalescing around
one or two policy
options. P.555

Corporate
political
activity

Issues become salient by
following first a reputation
cascade among experts and
reporters, then an information
cascade in public opinion which
informs government’s adoption
of public policy for the issue.
Firms can prevent the rise of
widely salient issues by
supporting interest groups with
views that are both similar and
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opposed to their own interests.
Hillman &
Hitt, 1999

Highly salient when it Corporate
becomes an “election political
issue”: raises enough activity
interest to generate
election debate. P.832

Firms will act collectively rather
than individually when issues are
highly salient to engage in
political activity.

Wartick &
Mahon,
1994

A corporate issue is a
controversial
inconsistency based
on one or more
expectational gaps
involving
management
perceptions of
changing legitimacy
and other stakeholder
perceptions of
changing cost/benefit
positions that occur
within or between
views of what is
and/or what ought to
be corporate
performance or
stakeholder
perceptions of
corporate
performance and
imply an actual or
anticipated resolution
that creates
significant,
identifiable present or
future impact on the
organization. P.306

Issue
management

What is a corporate issue must be
redefined to incorporate the three
themes that typically define
issues: their impact, controversy,
and the gap in expectations
between stakeholder perceptions
and corporate performance.

Ansoff,
1980

A strategic issue is a
forthcoming
development, either
inside or outside of
the organization,
which is likely to
have an important
impact on the ability

Issue
management

A strategic issue management
system (SIM) is a systematic
procedure for early identification
and fast response to important
trends and events both inside and
outside an enterprise, which can
operate through strong or weak
signal. SIM is an alternative
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of the enterprise to
meet its objectives.
P.133

system to periodic strategic
planning which best suits specific
circumstances.

Can be an
opportunity/internal
strength or a
threat/weakness.
Dutton &
Jackson,
1987

A strategic issue is
that which is
perceived as having
the potential to have
an effect on achieving
organizational
objectives. P.76

Interpretive
organizational
decisionmaking

Decision-makers selectively
ignore and attend to some issues.
Those selected are subsequently
interpreted and infused with
meaning, which is not inherent in
the environmental events or
developments but rather stems
from the organization’s internal
environment (ideology or
structure). Meanings attached to
strategic issues are imposed by
categories that decision makers
employ to describe an issue,
engaged by using linguistic
labels. The two labels most
frequently applied to strategic
issues are threat and opportunity.
Once applied, labels initiate a
categorization process that
affects the subsequent cognitions
and motivations of key decision
makers; these, in turn,
systematically affect the process
and content of organizational
actions.

Reid &
Toffel
(2009)

Not defined per se,
focused on
environmental issues

Social
movement

Organizations are more likely to
respond to social movements’
issues by engaging in new
practices if they, or other
members of their institutional
field, have been subjected to
formal shareholder pressure or
are threatened by government
regulation on a related issue.
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Table 6 indicates that the salience of an issue is dependent upon both firm objectives
and perceptions of external pressure to address certain issues. Indeed, these varied
perspectives testify to the necessity to streamline the prominence of the issue to
managerial attention in line with the fundamental assumption of the present work
concerning firms’ desire to maintain legitimacy. Therefore, in the same manner that the
preceding chapter set forth a superordinate attribute to define how groups are perceived
by the firm, the following section turns to the social approval literature to describe how
issues are accorded attention based on their prominence.
Issue Prominence as an Attribute of Salience

Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory of salience proposes that stakeholders are
evaluated along the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency in determining salience.
The previous chapter presented the need to rethink the weight and relevance of these
attributes in light of the newly-formed stakeholder tetrad, where groups are ascribed
power and legitimacy (of a normative and/or derivative type), and claims are attributed
urgency and legitimacy (of a cognitive and socio-political type). As a result, this section
explores the attribute that best describes how managers accord salience to specific issues
and rests on two assumptions: the issue, independent of a group, has meaning for the
firm; and, some issues will be perceived as more important than others by the firm.
Hence, the relevance of issue legitimacy and urgency is addressed first, followed by the
proposition of a new attribute distilled from the social approval literature argued to best
encapsulate the meaning of issues to managerial action, that is, issue prominence.
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Issue Legitimacy
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the concept of legitimacy has received a great
deal of attention in the past fifteen years (Bitektine, 2011), which allows a more
multifaceted analysis of this construct. Table 1 in Chapter 1 presented the three types of
legitimacy that matter to the explanation of salience: firms’ need to maintain legitimacy
to survive, the legitimacy of stakeholder groups as perceived by managers, and the
legitimacy of stakeholder issues and requests. This section focuses on the latter, honing in
on two alternative categories of legitimacy that become important to the assessment of
issues: cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. The term legitimacy is thus imparted a
different meaning in the present context than when discussing the normative and
derivative legitimacy pertaining to stakeholder groups discussed in Chapter 3, as
presented in Table 1 of this dissertation.
Cognitive legitimacy is acquired and maintained through actions that do not raise
questions; these actions are, rather, so familiar and unpeculiar that they become takenfor-granted (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine, 2011). By contrast, socio-political
legitimacy refers to the acceptance of an organization’s actions as appropriate and
desirable by stakeholders, the public and key opinion leaders, given existing norms and
laws (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine, 2011; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). These two
categories of legitimacy matter in the theory of salience, independently and together,
because managers evaluate stakeholder issues and requests along their appropriateness
both as perceived by the firm and as they appear to broader constituents. Thus,
considering issue legitimacy as including socio-political and cognitive aspects (Aldrich &
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Fiol, 1994; Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011) is important to our understanding of the issues
that matter to managers for it enables to reconcile the influence of stakeholders in
directing attention to certain issues (the socio-political type) and the fit of the issue with
the firm’s existing practices (the cognitive type).
Issue Urgency
In a similar way, it is proposed that the attribute of urgency pertains to the issue and
not the group (Eesley & Lenox, 2006), as can be inferred from the original theory of
salience. In fact, in the body of literature that Mitchell and colleagues (1997) rely upon,
urgency is fundamentally centered on the description of issues, as opposed to people or
relationships (cf. Wartick & Mahon, 1994). For instance, in Jones’ (1991) model, moral
intensity is clearly attributed to the issue and not to the people affected by the issue.
Indeed, while groups can form expediently in response to a rising issue, they do not
present a time-sensitivity, a “pressing” or “imperative” attribute in and of themselves, as
implied by Mitchell and colleagues (1997).
In addition, as demonstrated by the empirical testing of urgency in subsequent
literature, defining urgency as pertaining to the time-sensitivity and criticality of either
the relationship or the stakeholder claim adds unnecessary ambiguity to the model
resulting in researchers choosing to interpret Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) definition
in their own way (cf. Agle et al., 1999; Boesso & Kumar, 2009; David et al., 2007;
Eesley & Lenox, 2006). As a result, urgency appears more relevant to the investigation of
how issues become more legitimate to stakeholders and propels them to the forefront of
managerial attention.
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Still, there is an interesting interplay to explore between issues’ legitimacy and
urgency in that the more widespread an issue becomes, the more urgent it appears and
likewise, the more urgent an issue is, the more widespread the concern in its regard. It has
been noted that the media plays a considerable role in assigning importance to some
issues by selecting the stories that receive attention and raising their visibility (Bansal,
2005). Visibility, in turn, influences which issues matter to managers by rendering them
more prominent. Indeed, all three views addressing the importance of issues to salience
described above suggest that managers likely rank issues according to their prominence: a
mixture of an issue’s relevance to the firm’s individual context, notwithstanding an
issue’s overall importance to society and thus to corporate survival in general.
Issue Prominence
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) suggested that attributes of salience may interact to
generate greater salience and as such it is possible that managers perceive issues as more
prominent when they are both legitimate to a large constituency (as suggests the CPA
view) and urgent. For this reason, a comprehensive model of salience must include
considerations grounded in the social approval literature to explain how firms’ quest to
maintain legitimacy directs their attention to select issues and to explore, even if for no
other reason than probing Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) claims, the role that issue
legitimacy and urgency play in salience.
Issue prominence encompasses the importance of an issue to a larger constituency
(Bonardi & Keim, 2005) as well as the specific relevance of the issue to the firm’s
identity and practices (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). It is here defined as the
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degree of awareness that an issue holds among a wide range of stakeholders and its
relevance to the firm. And, it is posited in this dissertation as the attribute that more
precisely describes how managers ascribe salience to issues, capturing the effect of issue
legitimacy and urgency.
Firms operate under time constraints and institutional pressures that factor in their
decisions and the attention that they accord to their constituents and the issues that
concern them. As such, the present model makes note of the fact that failing to act on
prominent issues may threaten the legitimacy of the firm insofar as not adopting
legitimating elements – the standard operating procedures of organizational behavior –
will threaten a firm’s survival (Zucker, 1987). This reason explains precisely why issue
prominence represents a better suited attribute of salience: while the importance of issues
to stakeholders and the relevance of issues to the firm’s activities matter in the selection
of issues to address, it is ultimately firms’ need to conform with stakeholder expectations
that propels an issue to greater salience.
Therefore, it is argued that issue prominence more accurately describes how
managers award salience. The attribute of prominence in effect captures the notion that
legitimate issues are likely to have both socio-political and cognitive elements and a
sense of urgency, and address the fundamental assumption of this dissertation that firms
respond to the issues that threaten their legitimacy, that is, to prominent issues. As such:
H2: Managerial perceptions of issue prominence are positively related to
salience.
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In a recent study using social movement theory, Reid and Toffel (2009) confirm that
firms are more likely to engage in practices promoted by activist stakeholders when other
firms in the same industry were pressed on the same issue, called the spillover effect. Den
Hond and de Bakker (2007) also show that a firm’s responsiveness to a stakeholder
demand is influenced by the responsiveness of peer firms on the same issue. For example,
Reid and Toffel (2009) find that when firms are being challenged by a shareholder
resolution to alter their practices, other firms in the same industry are motivated to
proactively embrace some of the proposed changes. In fact, these authors show that each
additional environmental shareholder resolution filed against a firm in the focal firm’s
industry increases by 7% the probability that the focal firm will publicly report on the
issue.
From a network perspective, Rowley similarly observes that “firms do not simply
respond to each stakeholder individually; they respond, rather, to the interaction of
multiple influences from the entire stakeholder set” (1997: 890). Clark and Crawford
(2012) also find empirical evidence supporting the idea that firms are more likely to
positively respond to the requests for disclosure regarding their impact on the natural
environment when the issue is brought up by multiple groups. Taken together, these
findings and observations support that firms are responsive to increases in pressure on an
issue, and that this ensuing prominence is a function of the number of groups or
supporters that advocate for an issue. Put simply, it appears probable that such spillover
effect has an effect on salience as the greater the number of constituents expressing
concern for the same issue, the more widespread the issue becomes and the more it
garners legitimacy and urgency resulting in greater prominence.
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Even so, while actors may present concerns on a number of issues (Freeman, 1984;
Savage et al., 1991), groups make specific requests in regard to their issue of concern.
Without requests, firms may find an issue prominent, but may be unclear about what they
are expected to do – if anything (i.e., the requested action) – in response. Therefore, as
argued by Eesley and Lenox (2006), it is important to consider the impact of requested
actions, a new term not addressed in the original theory of salience.

Requested Actions
In regard to an issue, a group may request a number of different specific actions from
the firm (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). For example, it can request that the firm discloses more
information about a particular practice, or that the firm changes certain operations. It
seems important to isolate this concept from the group’s issue because requested actions
carry salience independently. And, while this dissertation has advanced the notion that a
group’s salience is determined by its status, and that an issue’s salience is determined by
its prominence, in a similar way this dissertation proposes that the salience of a requested
action emerges from managers’ perceptions of its legitimacy. These developments in fact
suggest that a complete understanding of salience is a much more nuanced process than
that implied by Mitchell and colleagues (1997), one that takes into account the status of a
group, the prominence of an issue and the legitimacy of the request.
Recalling the discussion above about cognitive and socio-political legitimacy, it is
suggested that requested actions also garner salience from managers when they possess
both elements: requested actions must fit with recognized taken-for-granted norms and
must also align with what the firm perceives as appropriate actions to undertake. The
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widely-accepted definition of legitimacy by Suchman (1995), also relied upon by
Mitchell and colleagues (1997), refers to the conformity of a firm’s actions with social
norms and expectations, and it is often used in the literature to describe the gap between
firms’ practices and stakeholder expectations (Bansal & Clelland, 2004), thus referring to
its socio-political element. In this light, a legitimate requested action is one that fits
within the firm’s opportunities for improvement, one that is appropriate to carry out
because it aligns with the practices and activities that stakeholders expect from the firm.
Yet, Eesley and Lenox (2006) also suggest that some types of requested actions may
be more successful than others simply because the request presents less risk. These
authors propose that firms may be more likely to respond to requests for which costs and
benefits are more easily calculated and find that these actions are more likely to be
implemented because they are relatively simple to fulfill and there is little risk in doing
so. As such, they might be considered more cognitively legitimate.
As managers evaluate how to respond to groups that present requests, the group can
be perceived as promoting a prominent issue, but requesting an action with low
legitimacy, resulting in lower salience. For example, even though human health is likely
to be perceived as a prominent issue by most firms, a request to Phillip Morris to stop
producing cigarettes is likely to be perceived as an illegitimate requested action, even
though it is inscribed within a prominent issue. This would be the case because Phillip
Morris has taken-for-granted that its primary constituents – employees, stockholders,
suppliers and consumers – overall expect it to keep producing cigarettes. As such, it is
suggested that requested actions can be salient in and of themselves, increasing the
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likelihood of managerial attention the more appropriate and actionable they are. It is
proposed that:
H3: Managerial perceptions of requested action legitimacy are positively
related to salience.
In much the same manner, when a group wishes to bring a request to the firm, it must
select a request tactic to do so and this choice will carry a salience assessment in itself as
well. In what follows are analyzed the nuances of the tactic used for a request.

Request Tactics
A number of tactics are available to groups seeking change, from letter-writing
campaigns, to issue-specific surveys and dialogue with management, to protests and civil
lawsuits. Literature seeking to enlighten which tactics groups use to influence firms
generally consider an instrumental logic of cost effectiveness: groups seek to spur change
in management practices while firms operate under the profit motive, with both parties
trying to achieve their ends for the lesser possible cost (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). In
their study, Eesley and Lenox (2006) control for the impact of a tactic on salience but do
not attribute the request tactic with salience characteristics, an attempt that is undertaken
in the present section.
The social movement literature provides some insight as to which tactics are likely to
receive managerial attention (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; King, 2008a; Reid
& Toffel, 2009), generally endorsing the idea that tactics imposing greater risk to the
survival of the firm (such as civil lawsuits) are more likely to receive attention than
tactics that have little bearing on the firm’s continued activities or incentives to managers
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(such as letter-writing campaigns). The rationale being that the latter fail to impose an
economic burden on the firm while the former create a sense of urgency (Eesley &
Lenox, 2006). This “logic of damage” (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007) makes the costs of
the advocacy to the firm rise so high that the firm becomes better off yielding to the
request than fighting the activist’s challenge (King, 2008b; Rowley & Berman, 2000).
By involving the media in a requested action, for example, stakeholders can create
damage to the reputation of the firm (Wartick, 1992) such as a threat to its stock value
(Chan, 2003). The media, therefore, play an important role in amplifying the tactics used
by stakeholders to influence the firm. For example, King (2008a) finds that firms are
more likely to concede to boycotts which receive a large amount of media attention. By
using the media, stakeholders aim to convince the public, and through them political
decision makers, that the firm has lost legitimacy in some way (den Hond & de Bakker,
2007). In turn, by affording the issue greater prominence, certain tactics inflict symbolic
damage on the firm and garner support from a wide audience.
Moreover, by appealing to a large number of constituents, the use of a certain tactic
invokes the “logic of numbers”, which affords the requested action greater salience by
increasing the number of supporters, especially supporters with high visibility and
reputation (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Clark and Crawford (2012) find that firms are
more likely to disclose information related to climate change when pressured to do so by
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), an initiative supported by thousands of powerful
investors and environmental activists, than when the same investors individually
expressed the same request to the same firms via a single shareholder resolution. Elsbach
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and Sutton (1992) also demonstrate that by garnering support from several constituents,
activists using illegitimate (i.e., disruptive) request tactics can obtain managerial attention
as well as legitimate their behavior in doing so.
In fact, while tactics are the medium through which groups make their issue and
requested action known to the firm, the tactic carries a salience assessment in and of itself
because it contains the capability to affect firms’ legitimacy. Recall that Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) suggest that managers accord greater salience to legitimate stakeholder
claims, and define legitimacy in a socio-political sense, in terms of conformity with
social norms. As such, it appears that it is not only the legitimacy of the tactic used that
determines salience but also, as suggests the fundamental premise of this dissertation, the
extent to which a tactic threatens the legitimacy of the firm by drawing from the logics of
damage and numbers.
To be sure, although it is possible that firms prefer to enter in a relationship with a
stakeholder who is less militant, it often takes an aggressive or disruptive tactic to
effectively attract managerial attention (Bliss, 1996). From the arguments elaborated
above, it follows that requested actions are more likely to be fulfilled when they are
brought to the firm through tactics that succeed at attracting greater support for the issue
and that impose greater cost threats to the firm, rendering the tactic more legitimate. Such
conditions boost the issue’s prominence and render the requested action more legitimate,
altogether increasing the likelihood of receiving managerial attention. As such, the extent
to which the request tactic generates a compounding effect between the logic of damage
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and the logic of numbers affects managers’ perceptions of its legitimacy, which is a key
determinant of salience. Therefore:
H4: Managerial perceptions of request tactic legitimacy are positively
related to salience.

A NEW MODEL OF SALIENCE
In light of the discussion presented above, it is clear that after fifteen years, managers
need a redefined model of salience, the focus of this section. Using Mitchell and
colleagues’ (1997) and Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) frameworks as a guide, the salience
concept is expanded and reworked to offer a tetrad of interrelated elements including
primarily a stakeholder group and its claim, the latter specifically consisting of a
requested action on an issue of concern, and the request tactic used to make the group’s
request known to the firm. This new conceptualization of the stakeholder elements that
matter to managerial salience go well beyond the original focus on additive salience
characteristics attributed to homogenous stakeholders, implicitly referring to their claims,
proposed in the original theory of salience.
The attributes that determine the salience of each element are also rethought and,
following the underlying principle that firms seek to maintain legitimacy through their
stakeholder interactions, the social approval literature informs the choice of new
attributes of salience that better capture the ways in which managers perceive their
stakeholders, issues and requests. These developments contribute to the creation of a new
model of salience seeking to comprehensively represent who and what is likely to receive
managerial attention in the form of either or both observable changes in performances
and in the firm’s activities. This new model is presented in Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4. A New Model of Salience
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The model shows that stakeholder group status is posited as the primary determinant
of salience. Yet, groups present claims to the firm, which, as mentioned above, consist of
a specific requested action on an issue of concern brought about via a request tactic, each
with individual attributes of salience. It is also suggested that these constructs are
interrelated to a large extent, which is illustrated in the use of the encompassing box.
To clarify, the interrelation between these constructs operates at two levels. First, this
dissertation has argued that conceptualizing salience as pertaining only to the stakeholder
group, as did Mitchell and colleagues (1997), is insufficient to offer a good explanation
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of managerial attention. Rather, it has proposed that issues and requests also impact
salience. Yet, it is possible that by the nature of a group, issue or request, other elements
follow. For instance, the status of a group might influence the range of issues that it is
concerned with, and the actions that it requests from the firm.
Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) demonstrate that lower and higher status groups are
bolder in their actions because the first does not have any status to lose and the latter feels
confident due to its higher status. As such, perhaps lower and higher status stakeholder
groups request bolder, less legitimate actions from firms than middle status groups who
thrive on conformity in hope to reach the high status bracket. It is also possible to
envision that higher status groups might care about more prominent issues while lower
status groups promote less prominent issues, or simply specific ones, as would an
environmental NGO or a women’s rights organization.
It is also possible that certain groups can favor the use of certain tactics, and that
specific tactics are more appropriate to convey certain requested actions than others.
Studies tying the different means of influence to the identity, the interests, or the ideology
of groups seeking change (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Fitzgerald & Rodgers, 2000;
Frooman, 1999; Snow, 2001) suggest that radical or marginalized groups tend to rely
more on innovative and alternative tactics than their more formalized, institutionalized
activist counterparts (Fitzgerald & Rodgers, 2000).
For example, some empirical evidence shows that at times, radical groups use
disruptive tactics to pave the way for reformative groups to be heard on a specific issue
(den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Yet, radical groups also use tactics that are highly
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legitimate, such as filing shareholder resolutions (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). As
such, both observations and empirical evidence indicate that the choice of tactic by
certain groups is not as easily predictable as the identity, interests or ideology of these
stakeholders (Meyer, 2004) but that, rather, it is more dependent on the type of issue and
the status of the group (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992).
Eesley and Lenox (2006) note that salience is not only determined by stakeholder
attributes but also by the nature of the requested action and tactic and, it is argued here,
by the prominence of the issue and the status of the group as well. By expanding the
number of factors that affect salience, this dissertation in fact suggests that salience
results from managers’ evaluations of the four stakeholder elements interacting together.
This dynamic represents the second level of interrelation between the elements of the
stakeholder tetrad, in that it is possible that there are significant interaction effects created
throughout the tetrad. As such, it is suggested that salience will generally increase with
each aspect of the tetrad being perceived as more salient, but in a non-linear fashion.
Hence, it is expected that:
H5: Managerial perceptions of stakeholder elements and attributes
interact such that combinations of higher status groups requesting more
legitimate actions on more prominent issues by way of a more legitimate
tactic obtain the highest degree of salience.

Managerial Perceptions and Salience
As noted above, managers (as a stakeholder group at the center of the firm’s nexus of
contracts with stakeholders) occupy a unique role in the firm-stakeholder relationship.
The idea that managers’ characteristics – and firm-level factors – might play an important
role in firm-stakeholder engagements has been suggested in the literature (Agle et al.,
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1999; Berman et al., 1999; Dutton et al., 1989; Jones et al., 2007). Yet, Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) do not elaborate on the moderating role of managers’ characteristics in
their theory of stakeholder salience, and an extension of this theory empirically testing
the role of CEO values as a moderator of salience showed no significance (Agle et al.,
1999). Accordingly, this dissertation leaves out the task of examining managers’
cognition processes in terms of how managers form perceptions of their constituents.
Nevertheless, since salience is issued of managerial perceptions, broad strokes outlining
the mechanisms that operate within organizations to shape managerial perceptions of
external constituents are presented in this section.
Managers operate as decision-makers in the context of an organization that directs
their values and beliefs through the influence of corporate culture, termed orientation as it
specifically refers to the firm’s approach to interacting with stakeholders (Berman et al.,
1999; Jones et al., 2007). It has been demonstrated that the firm’s culture, defined as the
“shared beliefs, values, and evolved practices regarding the solution of recurring
stakeholder-related problems” may predispose managers to be more responsive to either
power or moral legitimacy threats (Jones et al., 2007: 137).
Freeman (1984) supports that an enterprise level strategy, a conscious orientation of
the firm’s efforts toward certain groups whose interests align with the firm’s values and
strategic goals, is an essential determinant of the normative and descriptive way the firm
manages its stakeholders. Shafritz and colleagues (2005: 284), in a summary of pivotal
studies of organization theory, offer that organizational goals “provide the official
rationale and the legitimacy for resource-allocation decisions.” Jones and colleagues
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(2007) create a typology of five firm stakeholder cultures, arguing that firms with selfregarding values tend to be more responsive to stakeholder groups’ derivative legitimacy
(power, in Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) terminology) and that firms with otherregarding values tend to be more responsive to stakeholder groups that harbor normative
legitimacy. Finally, Greenley and colleagues (2004) suggest that while firms have an
orientation to each stakeholder group, these orientations can exist simultaneously, giving
the firm a multiple stakeholder orientation profile (MSOP). They argue that different
MSOPs lead firms to pursue the satisfaction of different sets of stakeholder interests, and
influence their attitudes towards the importance of various groups.
The other dynamic that underlies managerial perceptions is their ascription of
meaning to the issues and requests that they encounter (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). As
such, the language, labels and sense-making that occurs within organizations contribute
to the categorization of issues and requests as desirable to undertake or not (Dutton &
Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). In fact, it has been argued that an important
factor of managerial response to stakeholder issues lies in the packaging, involvement
and timing of issues’ presentation, what is referred to as “issue selling” (Dutton, Ashford,
O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001). Therefore, while this dissertation acknowledges the
cognitive structures that affect managerial behavior, it leaves to future research the task
of generating a more thorough appreciation of firms’ internal dynamics and of managers’
own cognitive processes.
The model indicates that managerial perceptions of their stakeholders and
stakeholders’ claims produce two outcomes: salience, the degree of priority accorded to
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the stakeholder’s request, and possible changes in the firm’s activities and performance.
For example, managers may respond positively to a request by engaging with the group
on the issue, yet be unwilling to effect change in their practices due to the high costs of
doing so to the firm. Likewise, managers may be reluctant to engage with a group,
perhaps because of its radical form, but give credence to its issue and requested action,
resulting in changes in the firm’s activities. A feedback loop connects the outcome of
managerial perceptions to the stakeholder claim, since the salience accorded to a request
is likely to affect future requests made by the group. As such, the feedback loop is
important to show the dynamism of the model.
Now that a new model of salience has been set forth, the task of this dissertation
shifts to empirically testing these new constructs and the hypothesized relationships that
connect them. Hence, the following two chapters present the sample, data and measures
as well as the empirical analysis and results, respectively.
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CHAPTER 5
___________________________________________________

SAMPLE, DATA AND MEASURES
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The purpose of this chapter is to relate empirical evidence to the theoretical model set
forth previously in this dissertation. To date, empirical tests of the original theory have
shown the necessity for an expanded model of salience, with refined concepts, such as the
first four chapters of this dissertation have outlined. The present chapter thus presents the
empirical analysis’ design, complete with a definition of the sample, data and measures.

DESIGN
In providing a new model of salience, this dissertation offers paths of answer to two
overarching questions: 1) what stakeholder elements affect salience? 2) Which of these
stakeholder elements and attributes are most relevant to the explanation of salience?
While these questions have been answered theoretically in the previous chapters of this
dissertation, the present analysis aims to explore how the empirical evidence supports the
newly defined model of salience. As such, the first phase of this analysis is designed to
investigate how group status, issue prominence and requested action legitimacy affect
firm responsiveness to these requests, that is, salience. These tests correspond to
hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 5 stated throughout the theoretical development presented in
Chapters 3 and 4. Hypothesis 4 was enunciated in order to provide a complete theoretical
model, but is not tested in this analysis since the request tactic is isolated to the
shareholder resolution process. The empirical test is followed by four supplemental
analyses designed to explore related questions of salience and shareholder activism.
These matters are explored in the context of shareholder activism because shareholder
resolutions enable to examine how firms respond to groups of differential status, on
various issues and requests, within a chosen tactic. Shareholder resolutions constitute a
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tool that activists from a wide range of status levels use to request social and
environmental change in management practices. And, because resolutions are filed
through the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), they publicize that a firm’s
practices do not conform to social expectations which effectively threatens the firm’s
legitimacy (Rehbein, Brammer, Logsdon, & Van Buren, 2009). Therefore, firms’
responses to this tactic carry important weight. The shareholder resolution process is
explained in greater detail later on in this chapter but first, the specific questions that are
investigated herein are summarized below.

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTED AND QUESTIONS FOR
INVESTIGATION
In the first phase of this analysis, the objective is to determine the impact of group
status, issue prominence and requested action legitimacy on salience. The four
hypotheses tested in this section correspond to H1, H2, H3 and H5 elaborated throughout
the theoretical development of this dissertation (Chapters 3 and 4):
H1. Managerial perceptions of stakeholder group status are positively related to
salience.
H2: Managerial perceptions of issue prominence are positively related to
salience.
H3: Managerial perceptions of requested action legitimacy are positively related
to salience.
H5: Managerial perceptions of stakeholder elements and attributes interact such
that combinations of higher status groups requesting more legitimate actions on
more prominent issues by way of a more legitimate tactic obtain the highest
degree of salience.
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In a second tense, the aim is to further our understanding of salience by mining the
comprehensive dataset at hand. Questions pertaining to salience and shareholder activism
are explored:
1) Do firms exhibit patterns of responses to shareholder resolutions that vary
over time?
2) Do managers consider prominent the same issues that filers do?
3) How do managers rank the legitimacy of requested actions?
4) How do firms’ responses to shareholder resolutions vary by industry?
For the salience literature, these questions provide important insight into the relationship
between measures of issue prominence and requested action legitimacy and actual
managerial actions, assumed to reflect the tone of these managers’ perceptions. For the
shareholder activism literature, these questions enable to explore whether the shareholder
resolution tactic, in general, became more or less effective over time, and the specificity
of managerial responses to proposals that address industry-related issues.

A FOCUS ON STOCKHOLDERS
Opportunities and Limitations of the Sample
While it is not explicit in the original theory of stakeholder salience set forth by
Mitchell and colleagues (1997), it is presumed that the model applies to the dynamics of
public companies. In this context, studying stockholders is particularly relevant for
several reasons. Recalling the stockholder and stakeholder views of the firm,
stockholders are the one stakeholder group at the intersection of these two theories of the
firm because many shareholder activists in fact belong primarily to other stakeholder
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groups (such as NGO’s or the community) and become shareholders for the very purpose
of pursuing their advocacy goals. As such, they embody several layers of influence, from
more morally-grounded ones to more economically-rooted pressure.
Indeed, stockholders that choose to use the shareholder resolution channel to
communicate with firms are further defined as activists because they take the initiative to
bring forth proposals that request changes from the firms in which they are involved,
changes that often relate to social and environmental issues and which are, by definition,
outside the scope of ordinary business (as required by the SEC’s guidelines for
shareholder proposal filing). Moreover, within this select group of stockholders who
decide to bring forth specific requests to firms, there is clear heterogeneity in the power,
size, historical legacy, and motive for filing shareholder proposals. This heterogeneity is
precisely what enables the capture of differential salience attributed to specific groups
based on status, and to propose generalizations from the new salience model that hold for
a broader range of stakeholders than stockholders alone.
Still, in Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) typology, stockholders are a definitive
stakeholder group (possessing all three attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency),
posited to elicit the highest level of salience from managers. Furthermore, as Mitchell and
colleagues (1997) argue, they possess a set mechanism to communicate and make their
concerns known to the firm (the process of shareholder proposal filing), suggesting that
firms might be responsive to this tactic. Yet, empirical evidence has shown that
shareholder resolutions are rarely successful and that firms certainly respond in various
ways to these resolutions (Gillan & Starks, 2007; O'Rourke, 2003). For all these reasons,
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they represent an ideal context in which to test the importance of other stakeholder
elements (group status, issue prominence and requested action legitimacy) in obtaining
salience.
Furthermore, while several empirical studies of salience have focused on secondary
stakeholders (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008b), the present research provides insight
into the salience of both primary and secondary stakeholders by studying shareholder
activists, whose heterogeneity include unequivocally primary stakeholders (e.g., those
large and influential institutional investors) and groups that are more representative of
secondary stakeholders (e.g., those activist groups that purchase a minimum number of
shares for the purpose of pursuing their own organization’s advocacy goals). And, as the
focus is placed on public companies’ behavior, studying shareholders is highly relevant
to partake in the stakeholder-stockholder dialogue in search of a compelling and
comprehensive theory of the firm. Therefore, shareholder resolutions represent an
interesting lens through which to study the theoretical framework presented in the first
part of this dissertation.
On the other hand, restricting this empirical investigation to the activist shareholder
group presents some limitations. Indeed, while shareholder activists are more common
and increasingly sophisticated in their engagement strategy with the firm (O'Rourke,
2003), they still represent a select group within the generic stockholder group (Eesley &
Lenox, 2006). Additionally, it is possible that higher status stockholder activists choose
other tactics to communicate their requests to managers, such as face-to-face meetings
which might be granted to those stockholders of higher status but not to other activists,
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who must then resort to the shareholder resolution mechanism. Therefore, this sample
might be biased by the exclusion of the highest status stockholder activists. Nevertheless,
because status is a relative standing within a frame of reference, the present test should
permit the evaluation of the effect of status among those who do file shareholder
resolutions.
Another contention of this dissertation is that the use of a sample composed of
heterogeneous shareholder activists enables the examination of firms’ responses to
broader constituents since shareholder activists do not all represent the typical interests of
stockholders, and that in fact several of these activists are representative of other
stakeholder groups. Yet, it is important to note that while the analysis is broadened from
the generic stockholder group, it is still confined to those stakeholders who have the
ability to use the shareholder resolution process to communicate their request with the
firm. In other words, it is possible that the analysis does not represent firms’ responses to
other types of groups who do not benefit from the ability to engage through resolutions,
such as fringe stakeholders for example. Finally, by limiting the analysis to the
resolutions filed on U.S. firms, and in consideration that the process of shareholder
resolution filing might entail different beliefs, values and expectations in other countries,
the external validity of the results is somewhat limited to the North American context.

Shareholder Activism and the Process of Shareholder Resolution Filing
Shareholder activism in the form of shareholder resolution filing has greatly evolved
since its inception in 1946, when the SEC adopted rule 14a-8 which requires firms to
include shareholder resolutions in their proxy materials (Gillan & Starks, 2007;
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O'Rourke, 2003). Three decades ago, Vogel (1978: 3) recognized that shareholder
resolutions constituted a “new form of political expression” often to the dismay of many
corporate boards and managers who felt, at the time, that this shift in activist tactics was
an attempt to make the corporation an arena for debate about issues which should be
more appropriately decided through the legislative process (Vogel, 1983). As such, these
tactics have a political element that is often urgent which is why shareholder activists are
frequently resorting to this tactic instead of the legislative process (Reid & Toffel, 2009).
Today, shareholder resolutions are filed by a number of varied proponents, from large
institutional investors to pension funds, to religious or issue-specific organizations, to
individuals and mutual funds (Bauer et al., 2010; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Mathiasen &
Welsh, 2009; Sjöström, 2008), and cover a variety of social and environmental issues
(Mathiasen & Welsh, 2009; O'Rourke, 2003).
These proponents’ engagement with firms generally testify of their dissatisfaction
with managerial practices (O'Rourke, 2003; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Sikavica & Hillman) as
shareholder resolution campaigns often aim at enhancing the firm’s performance in a
weak area (Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004). As such, shareholder activism
represents a more sophisticated way for the investor to engage with the firm than simply
to invest, not to invest, or divest from the company (O'Rourke, 2003) by asserting voice
on a specific issue of concern (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Furthermore, this mode of
engagement is proving to carry more and more weight in setting firm’s agenda regarding
social and environmental issues (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006).
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The request tactic by which stockholders bring their requested actions to the firm on
issues of concern is the process of shareholder proposal filing. Filing a shareholder
proposal is relatively accessible to anyone wishing to bring forth a requested action to a
public firm, although a bureaucratic procedure. Indeed, the requirements for filing a
proposal are basically that shareholders own a minimum of $2,000 or 1% of the firm’s
market value for a minimum of one year and through the date of the shareholder meeting
(http://taft.law.uc.edu). In the United States, such process is highly legitimized as it is
institutionalized and managed by the SEC. It also presents urgency in that it imposes
timelines for response by the firm.
Only a limited number of actions can be taken in regard to a proposal: the firm can
respond reactively by requesting an omission, defensively by putting the proposal in its
proxy materials for vote, or accommodatingly by negotiating a withdrawal with the filer
(Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009). Activists prefer the latter response, for it signifies that
firms are willing to engage with the stakeholder on the issue, and together both parties
agree to the actions that will be undertaken by the firm. Moreover, because shareholder
resolutions establish precedents for following years, there is an implicit duty to craft and
defend the proposal adequately. Therefore, this tactic stands to impose significant threats
of damage to the firm, both in the direct costs related to dealing with the proposal6 and
the indirect costs such as those associated with reputation loss (Rehbein et al., 2009).

6

The SEC data reports that firms claim an average cost of $170,000 to deal with each received proposal
(www.sec.gov).
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This tactic also rests on the logic of numbers to effectively augment the proposal’s
salience, as filers promote their proposals to the wide shareholder base and attempt to
publicize their requests to garner supporters. As such, choosing to focus on stockholders
and their request tactic of filing shareholder proposals enables to test differential status
within a salient category of constituents, differential prominence accorded to issues and
differential legitimacy accorded to requested actions while isolating a highly salient
request tactic.
By extension, the request tactic imposes urgency on the requested action as well as on
the issue. Recall that Mitchell and colleagues (1997) define urgency as the degree to
which an issue calls for immediate attention. They qualify urgency as pressing and
compelling. The urgency of the requested action and the issue is further exacerbated by
the criticality of the relationship between the firm and its stockholders, a primary
constituent. In examining the work of Jones (1991) on moral intensity, from which
Mitchell and colleagues (1997) derive the concept of urgency, it appears that firms would
be more likely to accord salience to proposals that are ‘close to home’ and to proposals
“that have immediate effects as opposed to those that have effects in the distant future”
(Jones, 1991: 371).
Prior research has shown that shareholder activists typically target firms that are poor
performers in the area of the requested action (Rehbein et al., 2004). In other words,
requested actions by and large do hit ‘close to home’ with firms that receive them,
making them urgent to the targeted firm. For example, while PETA and Calvert Asset
Management, two known shareholder activist groups, can file the same resolution to a
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number of different firms. Each of these firms is likely to perceive the issue and
requested action to possess criticality and time-sensitivity as the proponents have
specifically targeted these firms because of the urgency and relevance of the requested
action to the firm in view of its current activities. Proponents of shareholder proposals do
so because of the tedious procedure that they undergo to file a proposal, and because the
SEC might allow the firm to omit the proposal if it does not relate to operations that
account for at least 5% of the firm’s assets or earnings, or if it addresses matters of
“ordinary business” (www.sec.gov), both conditions being rather subjective and largely
arguable (www.professorbainbridge.com). Thus, shareholder filers consider their
proposals and targets carefully and, in doing so, render this tactic a particularly pertinent
setting for the present empirical test.

SAMPLE, DATA AND MEASURES
Sample
The sample consists of all shareholder resolutions on social and environmental issues
proposed in the United States between 2004 and 2008. This five year sample yields 1,864
individual resolutions, filed with 535 companies by 164 different proponents.
Nevertheless, some resolutions were filed with firms that merged or declared bankruptcy
within the year, such that the annual meeting did not take place. These resulted in missing
values which were excluded for the purposes of this analysis. The final sample consists of
1,851 observations on 523 companies by 156 different proponents. This data was
obtained through Riskmetrics, the main data provider on social policy shareholder
resolutions (David et al., 2007; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Rehbein et al., 2009). The
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comprehensiveness of this dataset as well as the inclusion of all the possible outcomes to
shareholder proposals (omissions and withdrawals in addition to votes) represent another
contribution of this analysis, as very few studies have considered such a broad approach
(Bauer et al., 2010).

Dependent Variable
Salience

Mitchell and colleagues (1997) define salience in terms of the degree of managerial
attention granted to a stakeholder. Eesley and Lenox (2006), in a subsequent empirical
study of secondary stakeholder actions, redefine salience to mean a positive response by
the firm to a stakeholder request. This latter definition is preferred because it offers
greater empirical precision by positing salience as inscribed within the context of a
response to a stakeholder request therefore addressing one of the drawbacks of Mitchell
and colleagues’ (1997) theory, which conceptualized salience in a more general way. As
noted above, for the specific request tactic of shareholder proposal filing studied here,
there are three possible firm responses, from least to most salient: an omission, a vote, or
the negotiation of a withdrawal with the shareholder filer.
Several grounds enable firms to exclude proposals from their proxy materials, the
most common being that the proposal addresses an issue that managers deal with in the
course of ordinary business. Proposals can also be omitted when the firm lacks the
authority to implement the requested action or when the proposal already is in the process
of being implemented. Other reasons might refer to technical grounds, such as the
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compliance with ownership or filing requirements. In turn, the shareholder filer can also
challenge the firm’s request for omission through the SEC, at which point the SEC takes
on the role of the arbitrator in the so-called ‘proxy-fight’ (O'Rourke, 2003).
If the SEC refuses to issue a no-action letter, that is, if it does not grant the requested
omission to the firm, the firm must include the proposal in its proxy materials. When a
proposal goes to a vote, it is the duty of the activist to solicit support for its proposal
among other shareholders, to create the materials and promote its request for
endorsement. Nevertheless, even a strong positive vote on a proposal does not bind the
firm to action, but it enables the filer to gain voice, and to possibly file the proposal again
in the following year.
If firms are denied an omission and wish to avoid putting the proposal in their proxy
materials, or if they determine that the proposal is legitimate, firms can also choose to
negotiate a withdrawal with the shareholder filer. To be sure, the primary reason why
shareholder filers withdraw a proposal is because the firm has indicated sincere
willingness to collaborate on the requested action, often in the form of a written
commitment. Shareholder filers perceive withdrawals as victories (O'Rourke, 2003),
because they indicate that the filer has successfully led the firm to acquiesce to the
fulfillment of a requested action in a satisfactory way to both parties. For this reason,
withdrawals represent the highest degree of salience, coded ‘2’, votes a lesser degree of
salience, coded ‘1’, and omissions the lowest degree of salience, coded ‘0’.
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Independent variables
Group Status
In testing Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) model of salience, empirical studies
examining shareholders have attempted to measure their power, legitimacy and urgency
(Agle et al., 1999; Boesso & Kumar, 2009). However, the contention of this dissertation
is that status is a superordinate attribute that more accurately describes how managers
initially perceive their stakeholders and accord them salience. Therefore, the present test
is concerned less with the operationalization of Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) attributes
of salience and more with validating the role of group status in obtaining salience.
Previous empirical tests have reported a palpable difficulty in separating the effects of
quality or merit-based differences when trying to evaluate the impact of status
(Washington & Zajac, 2005). As such, it has been suggested that three mechanisms:
historical legacy, positive associations and negative associations present bases for
unearned privileges related to status that yet differ from merit-based accomplishments
(Washington & Zajac, 2005). Using data from the NCAA postseason basketball
tournament for the period 1989-1996, Washington and Zajac (2005) show that historical
legacy and positive associations generate status privileges, for status emanating from
prior participation in the NCAA tournament, or from having played against teams that
had previously been invited to the tournament, results in greater likelihood of an
invitation.
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Notwithstanding these contributions, status has been operationalized in a multitude of
ways in the literature, some of which including merit-based aspects and therefore
reflecting that status is, perhaps, most accurately envisioned as an attribute that
encapsulates both social and economic elements. Scholars have used status as a
dependent variable (Jensen & Roy, 2008), an independent variable (Phillips &
Zuckerman, 2001) and as a moderator (Pfarrer et al., 2005). A summary of the ways in
which status has been operationalized in the literature is provided in Table 7 below.
Table 7. Operationalizations of Status in the Literature
Author(s)

Argument/Findings

Model

Podolny, 1993 Status acts as a signal of
quality for producers
whereby higher status
producers benefit from
lower costs and higher
revenues for manufacturing
a good of a given level of
quality, which in turn
perpetuates status positions.
Elsbach &
Organizational members
Kramer, 1996 respond to threats to their
perceptions of their
organizational identity by
emphasizing their
organization’s membership
in select groups that call
attention to positive identity
dimensions not included in
the initial threat trigger.
Benjamin &
An actor's status position
Podolny, 1999 influences the quality at
which
the actor chooses to
produce, as well as the
economic returns the actor
derives from producing at a
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Dichotomous
logistic

Operationalization of
status
Ranking: Higher status
banks occupy higher
positions in syndicates
published on
Tombstone ads.

Qualitative,
interview,
archival

Ranking: Higher status
business schools occupy
a higher position in the
Business Week top 20.

Longitudinal
case, 19801991

Ranking: Higher status
wineries are affiliated
with appellations that
stand higher in the
deference ordering.

Thye, 2000

Phillips &
Zuckerman,
2001

Gould, 2002

Huberman et
al., 2004

given quality. And, an
actor's current affiliations
affect and constrain returns
to subsequent affiliations,
yielding a relatively stable
hierarchy over time.
While positive status
characteristics accentuate
the perceived value of
resources, high-status
subjects are most often
chosen as preferred
exchange partners and also
obtain the greatest share of
resources indicating power
use.
There exists a U-shaped
relationship between status
and conformity, such that
high and low status actors
are more likely to dissent
from the prevailing view
(they are “emboldened to
deviate”) while middle
status actors are more likely
to conform for fear of losing
legitimacy and being
demoted to the low status
bracket.
Consistent with both
economistic and
sociological models,
socially influenced
attributions enhance status
differences, following which
status hierarchies are selfreproducing.
The desire for status and
prestige is a universal
human characteristic, which
intrinsic value has relative
importance depending on
the power distance index of
one’s culture.
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Multi-stage
experiments

Stratification: Relative
status is defined as
higher, lower or similar
status of an exchange
partner assigned
explicitly in experiment
through a combination
of age, GPA and
program major.

Hazard rate,
logistic
regression

Stratification: High,
middle and low status
brackets are delineated
from 2 empirical
settings:
1) The proportion of
law firms’ attorneys
that have degrees from
six of the elite law
schools
2) The rank/overall
score assigned to
securities’ analysts by
Institutional Investor.
Ranking: Higher status
actors receive more
positive attachments
than they repay to
others i.e., they present
greater positive
asymmetries.

3 longitudinal
network cases

Two-stage
experiment

Binary: Status is
granted through
recognition and
approval from others
(applause) for winning
a competition; no status
otherwise.

Washington
& Zajac, 2005

Schools’ basketball team
status, derived from
historical legacy, positive
and negative associations, is
a determinant of its
likelihood to receive a
NCAA post-season
tournament invitation.

Longitudinal
analysis 19891996, Max
likelihood
logistic
regression

Pfarrer et al.,
2008

As firm status increases, the
effect of informal forces
weakens and the effect of
formal forces strengthens a
firm’s decision to come
forward and restate its
earnings.
A firm’s choice of auditor
status is dependent on its
level of accountability to
institutional investors,
security analysts, and stock
exchange.
High status firms can secure
greater effort from lower
status partners than they can
from firms of similar status,
which translates in higher
product quality for the high
status firm as well as
mediates the negative effect
of affiliating with a lower
status partner.
Organizations have to
struggle for their position in
the institutionalized status
order and behaviorally
negotiate their position in it.

T-tests, Cox
proportional
hazards
regression

Jensen &
Roy, 2008

Castellucci &
Ertug, 2010

Bitektine,
2011
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Binary: High status is
denoted by prior
invitations to participate
in NCAA post-season
tournaments and a
team’s opponents’ prior
invitations histories;
low status is measured
by membership to
Divisions other than
Division I.
Ranking: Lower status
firms are ranked 1,
higher status firms are
ranked n with n equal to
the total number of
firms in the industry.

Maximum
likelihood
probit
regression

Binary: High status
auditors are coded “1”
if they pertain to the
Big 4;
“0” otherwise.

Hazard rate,
partial
adjustment
model

Ranking: Higher status
firms obtain more
media counts in
LexisNexis, regardless
of the tone of the media
stories.

Theoretical

Stratification: High
status organizations are
well-known in their
domain of activity, low
status organizations are
unknown in their
domain of activity,
middle status
organizations lie in
between.

As presented in Table 7, influential voices in the status literature have typically
proposed that evaluations of status can be ranked and follow a three-tier model (where
actors have high, middle, or low status) (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008;
Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). Nevertheless, observers have noted that a tier separation of
status ranks into high, middle and low is “troubling because it seems rather arbitrary”
(Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 381) and that it is thus incumbent to the researcher to
demonstrate the reliability of status brackets.
Recent studies of status provide clearer bases as to the delimitation of status brackets
by referring to, in a first tense, higher- or lower-status actors (Bitektine, 2011; Gould,
2002; Jensen & Roy, 2008), and secondly by situating middle status actors at the
periphery of high-status groups. As an example, Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) classify
as high status the investment banks that enjoy security in their membership in the
institutional sphere, as middle status the banks that operate on the margin of that
interface, and as low status the banks that are notable outsiders to these groups. Indeed,
when status is posited to emerge not as a result of performance or merit but rather from
the perpetuation of a class system, it is largely accepted that high status can result solely
from historical legacy (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Washington & Zajac, 2005).
Furthermore, Bitektine (2011) argues that the assessment of a group’s status occurs
under conditions of incomplete information, time constraints and short attention span
such that a group with undetermined status is likely to be placed in the lowest status
group. Thus, he places actors that are well-known in their domain of activity in the high
status bracket and unknown organizations in the low status category (Bitektine, 2011). In
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Jensen and Roy’s (2008) study of firms’ choice of auditors, auditors from the Big 4 firms
are accorded high status, and all other firms low status. In a subsequent analysis, these
authors then create a middle status class of auditing firms just outside the periphery of the
Big 4, such as Grant Thornton, to test the accuracy of their status brackets. In this way,
they concur with Phillips and Zuckerman’s (2001) classification of status categories.
It is interesting to note that Jensen and Roy (2008) segregate the Big 4 as the high
status group arguing that taken together, these firms represent a homogeneous group that
is easily identifiable and the best-recognized status bracket. Hence, in the three studies
presented above, status is operationalized as a ranking variable that situates an actor/a
firm in its industry, and a status score – a richer variable than a status category – is often
used in the statistical analysis, where low, middle and high status brackets are later
superimposed on the analysis’ results.
Another set of studies emphasize the relative feature of status by positing it in relation
to one’s own status position, whereby the group of interest has lower, higher or similar
status (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Gould, 2002; Thye, 2000). In this view, a theoretical
status homophily is expected to result from firms’ desire to engage with groups of at least
similar status to reap the benefits of these positive associations (Washington & Zajac,
2005). Castellucci and Ertug (2010) challenge this view by observing that high status
firms at times create relationships with lower status groups. They explain this
phenomenon by proposing that high status firms can secure greater effort from lower
status partners because groups of lower status are willing to exchange effort for
association with a higher status partner.
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Castellucci and Ertug (2010) conduct a seven year study of relationships between
Formula One racing teams and their engine suppliers, finding that when the racing teams
affiliate with engine suppliers of lower status, they indeed obtain greater effort from the
supplier, also resulting in greater performance for the team. In this study, the independent
variable team status is obtained by regressing yearly article counts containing the name
of a race team in Lexis-Nexis, regardless of media tone, on the total points scored by a
team; this method is used to isolate status and performance, given that the Formula One
setting of the study lends itself to confounding perceptions of status and performance.
These authors also validate the press visibility measure of status with three other
measures: 1) a random poll of Formula One experts’ perceptions of team status, yielding
a correlation of 0.74 with the residualized press measure, 2) a measure of sponsorship
value for each team, taking into account their performance level, showing a 0.76
correlation with the residualized press measure, and 3) a study of personnel movement
across teams, assuming that affiliations with lower performing teams would only occur
when compensated by the higher status of the new employer or the promise of a higher
salary, presenting a 0.71 correlation with the residualized press measure. Taken together,
these validations assert the accuracy of yearly article counts in Lexis-Nexis to measure a
group’s status.
Given the meticulous operationalization of status by Castellucci and Ertug (2010), the
measure used in this dissertation is inspired, to a large extent, by this detailed study. Yet,
the concept of group status is a new lens through which to evaluate a stakeholder group’s
impact on salience. As discussed above, literature attempting to test status reports
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stumbling blocks in the identification of status categories and the importance to use
conceptual sense in choosing a measure of status. Therefore, while the present context is
greatly amenable to a test of differential status among specific groups of stockholders, the
next section discusses the path followed to create a measure of group status.
An Exploratory Pilot Test
Because status is a perceived evaluation of rank that may be specific to each firm, a
most accurate measure of status would in fact be to survey each firm of the sample in
regard to each group that filed a resolution with it in each of the five years of interest.
This method implies the possibility of going back in time to evaluate perceptions of status
in each time period and of collecting such an extensive and complete dataset. In face of
these constraints, it is offered that a second-best alternative could be to survey a sample
of firms that received shareholder resolutions and ask managers of these firms to rank all
of the filers. This alternative forces the assumptions that status is relatively stable over
time and that all firms perceive filers to be of the same status rank. As it applies to
shareholder resolutions, however, these assumptions seem reasonable to hold because
filers tend to target several peer firms each year, and because firms tend to gather
information about the filers and the resolutions process from the same sources.
Accordingly, a list of the 156 filers was distributed to approximately 40 targeted
companies for scoring, on a scale of 1 (the lowest status filers) to 10 (the highest status
filers). The survey instrument is presented in Appendix II of this dissertation. Since no
responses were returned from this source, four interviews were then conducted with
managers knowledgeable in the handling of shareholder resolutions at four large public
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firms as an exploratory pilot. These four managers independently reported two pitfalls to
creating a scale measure (e.g., from 1 -10) of all filers, explaining that: 1) they did not
know many of the filers on the list because they were familiar with only those few groups
that filed a shareholder resolution with their firm, specifically, and 2) they were unable to
meaningfully differentiate between the prestige of several of the unknown groups.
This exploratory pilot was thus very helpful in gaining an understanding of how
managers evaluate their constituents. It led to the conclusion that a broad survey of
managers was not ideal for a large sample of filers, but rather that managers are more
accurate at identifying filers within their own network of influence. Second, it suggested
that managers perceive filers of shareholder resolutions by reference to categories of
organizations, corroborating scholars’ observations that shareholder filers pertain to one
of five broad categories: individuals, coordinated activists, unions, religious groups and
institutional investors (Bauer et al., 2010). Therefore, these categories were integrated
with the insights from Castelluci and Ertug’s (2010) study to create a status index and
thus propose a more fine-grained measure of status applied to the shareholder activism
context.
An important benefit of moving to archival data to measure group status is the
elimination of managerial response bias (Agle et al, 1999; David et al., 2007; Eesley &
Lenox, 2006). In the present case, it seemed especially pertinent to consider the
limitations that response biases would have produced in the analysis, since managers
might have tended to accord greater prestige to those groups to whom they had
previously responded positively, in effect correlating the dependent and independent
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variables in the analysis. Details on the creation of the status index are provided in the
following section.
A Status Index
Previous studies have discussed the preponderant role of institutional shareholders in
the proxy proposal process, arguing that these investors have the most power and
incentives to influence other investors according to their view, and demonstrating their
outstanding ability to score negotiation agreements with managers (Bauer et al., 2010;
Gillan & Starks, 2007). And, because institutional investors (which include pension
funds) have a large pool of money to invest, they usually become activists to improve the
firm’s practices in the belief that they will benefit from these changes, as investors. This
motive comes in contrast with that of coordinated activists, who typically pursue activism
as a means to foster their own advocacy objectives, typically without any significant
financial investment. Religious groups have also arisen to become influential shareholder
filers (Mathiasen & Welsh, 2009; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006) as they too manage their own
investments; these groups often file in conjunction with other filers.
Following Bitektine (2011), who proposed that organizations unknown to the firm are
those accorded the lowest level of status, individual filers are classified in the lowest
category, coded ‘1’. While there are some very notable individual filers, they often
encounter roadblocks in the bureaucracy required to file proposals (for example in
proving ownership) such that their proposals are more easily omitted. In much the same
manner, coordinated activist groups are less well-known of managers because they are
not market exchange partners in the course of ordinary business. Coordinated activists
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represent organized groups who promote social, environmental or economic issues and
they typically do not manage any funds invested. In other words, these organizations are
not primary constituents of the firm but seek to engage with the firm by purchasing a
minimum number of shares, just enough to get access to the high-profile shareholder
resolution filing tactic (Rehbein et al., 2004) which they use to pursue their own
organization’s advocacy goals. As such, coordinated activists are classified in the second
lowest status category and coded ‘2’.
Unions as shareholder activists have been discussed scarcely in previous studies
(Gillan & Starks, 2007; Sjöström, 2008). Yet, unions are important players in firms’
environment and they typically own shares for investment purposes rather than solely
activism. As a result, unions represent the middle status category in the present ranking
and are coded ‘3’. Finally, institutional investors are placed in the highest status category,
coded ‘5’, and religious groups in the second highest category, coded ‘4’ given both of
their high level of influence. Still, while categories of filers impact managerial
perceptions, validating this measure with filers’ visibility in the media, as did Castelluci
and Ertug (2010) provides additional robustness to the evaluation of filers’ status. Thus, a
status index is created with these two measures.
Previous research has indicated that the media plays an important role in shaping
managers’ perceptions of their stakeholders as it endorses “the important role of setting
and maintaining standards of acceptability” (Deephouse, 1996: 1025). In other words, the
media is an important force shaping norms of legitimacy. Agle and colleagues (1999),
based on social cognition theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), also offered that managers
derive their perceptions of stakeholders from the elements dominating their visual field,
137

their personal experience, as well as the social salience of these constituents.
Accordingly, using the total volume of media coverage is not only a common measure of
the prominence of a topic or firm in a given time frame (Holt & Barkemeyer, 2010), but
also appropriate to discern the social salience of certain groups and the extent to which
they dominate managers’ visual fields.
Specifically, yearly article counts of press mentions have been used in previous
research to assess an organization’s status, with higher article counts indicating higher
status regardless of the media tone (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Podolny, 1993). In fact,
the well-known KLD Research & Analytics scores also use media coverage as part of its
evaluation of firms’ performance on environmental, social and governance issues7.
Nevertheless, this method assumes that managers recognize the status of a filer by its
visibility in the media, with most visible groups being accorded higher status. And, it
assumes that managers of all the firms included in the sample have the same media
exposure. Furthermore, it could be argued that simple article counts do not take into
account positive or negative media attention; however, previous research has found that
higher status groups typically receive higher media attention and that media visibility
counts actually reflect expert rankings of groups’ status with high correlation (Castellucci
& Ertug, 2010).
Following previous studies (Bansal, 2005; Barkemeyer, Figge, Holt, & Hahn, 2009;
Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Holt & Barkemeyer, 2010; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001;
7

Sources used in KLD research include company documents (10k, proxy, annual report, CSR report,
company website); third parties (NGOs, government data – OSHA, EPA) and press. Source: Email from
Randy O’Neil, Managing Director, KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., Sept. 18, 2008 to Cynthia Clark
Williams..
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Siggelkow, 2002), a media visibility count is obtained by searching the filer’s name in the
LexisNexis Academic database. The filer’s name is searched in “All news” documents,
which include newspapers, newswires and press releases, blogs, web-based publications,
industry trade press, magazines and journals as well as news transcripts8. All of these
news media were included so as to reflect as much as possible of the influence under
which managers form perceptions of their shareholders. The search is specified between
the 1st of January and the 31st of December of the year that the proponent filed a
shareholder proposal. If the proponent filed a proposal in more than one year, a media
visibility count is performed for each year in which it filed. The search is limited to North
American media outlets, so as to match the sample of companies. The results of this
search are plotted against the cumulative number of observations to obtain a Lorenz
curve, following Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) in their delimitation of a three-tier status
category. A graph showing media counts and cumulative observations is presented in
Figure 5 below.
Figure 5. Media Counts and Cumulative Observations: a Lorenz Curve

8

A spot-check of found documents was effected for each search. If documents found were not related to
the topic, the locution “AND ‘shareholder’” was included with the filer’s name in the search terms. This
happened mostly for religious organizations, and enabled me to avoid counting obituaries, for example.
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The Lorenz curve demonstrates that it is possible to segregate the sample in three
categories of low, middle and high status based on media counts. By revealing the
inequality of the distribution, it provides a visual illustration of the different status groups
and provides a solid rationale for the division markers between status categories. A first
point of inflexion appears at approximately 100 counts, and a second more pronounced
point of inflexion around 500 counts. The vertical axis illustrates that a large proportion
of the sample is situated in the low status media count category while middle and high
status categories contain a much smaller number of observations.
This finding is consistent with prior studies that have reported unequal category sizes
(Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001) and is conceptually in sync with the definition of status as
a competitive ranking whereby higher status is a scarcer resource. The low status media
counts category is thus defined by filer-year combinations that obtain less than 100
counts and is coded ‘1’. The middle status category is defined as those filer-years that
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obtained between 100 and 499 counts, coded ‘2’, and the high status category comprises
those that obtained more than 500 counts, coded ‘3’.
In order to merge the two measures of filer status – filer category and media counts
category – into an index, the categories are normalized according to the weights of each
measure in determining salience. Accordingly, an ordinal probit regression is performed
with these variables in a full model to obtain the coefficients that pertain to each measure.
This regression can be modeled as follows, where β1 and β2 represent the weights
assigned to each measure in the calculation of the status index:
Salience = β0 + β1*filer category (1-5) + β2*media counts category (1-3).
Specifically, results indicate that the status index can be calculated by adding
0.0391474*filer category + 0.0046814*media counts category.
Issue Prominence
Throughout this dissertation, it has been argued that managers perceive issues in
terms of their prominence, that is, their relevance to the firm notwithstanding the issue’s
overall importance to broader constituents. In selecting a measure for this variable, the
aim is to avoid the biases associated with polling managerial perceptions directly (Eesley
& Lenox, 2006) yet to most accurately reflect how prominent issues appear to managers.
Previous research has found that filers of shareholder resolutions are closely attuned
to firm-specific issues in that they tend to target firms that present poor performance on
the issue addressed by the proposal (Rehbein et al., 2004), in effect hitting ‘close to
home’ with their targets. Filers have too much to lose in time and resources to draw up
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proposals that are not relevant to the targeted firm. Furthermore, Riskmetrics asserts that
the issues raised in shareholder proposals reflect “the headlines and political debates of
the year” (Mathiasen & Welsh, 2007: 3), suggesting that these issues are widespread and
important among a vast array of constituents, thus representing highly salient issues
(Bonardi & Keim, 2005). Because firms’ legitimacy is threatened when they do not
address prominent issues, this measure also captures the idea that there are isomorphic
pressures compelling firms to respond to prominent issues by taking into account how
other firms are affected by, and respond to, those issues.
Given that issues are carefully selected by shareholder filers to represent as closely as
possible the issues that concern their targeted firm, the contention is that all issues are
prominent to some extent, yet some are more prominent than others to a targeted firm.
And, because issues that matter to managers are also likely to be those where the firm
exhibits poor performance, it is argued that filers’ and managers’ perceptions of
prominent issues correspond to one another; this possibility is further enabled by the
direct observation of firm performance by both parties.
Prior research has indicated that managers are also influenced by the values of their
organization as well as those of their professional associations (Jones et al., 2007; Scott,
2008) in shaping perceptions in regard to their constituents, both of which are strongly
influenced by isomorphic pressures (Deephouse, 1996). According to DiMaggio and
Powell (1983), firms’ quest for maintaining legitimacy yields homogenization in mature
fields. Isomorphism is a constraining force that encourages firms to resemble each other
under similar environmental conditions and is fueled by three mechanisms: the political
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influence that coerces firms to similar practices, the mimetic decisions taken by managers
in response to uncertainty in their environment, and the professionalization of firms’
constituents, which encompasses the similarity of values taught to managers in
educational settings as well as the isomorphic tendencies of professional associations
themselves. In this way, while filers’ acute observations of firms’ performance yields
grounds on which to mobilize, filers’ proposals are likely to address the very issues that
concern managers in the timeframe of reference, with the number of proposals being an
indication of the level of concern that mounts for a particular issue.
Therefore, issue prominence is captured by computing a ranking reflecting the
prominence of issues each year, as offered in the Riskmetrics’ reports. To do so, the
number of shareholder proposals addressing each issue in the selected year is tabulated.
The issue that receives the least amount of proposals ranks first, with the issue that
receives the largest amount of proposals last. The ranking is presented in this counterintuitive order to convey the ordinal meaning of this variable in the analysis, whereby
issues with a greater rank number are expected to have a greater positive impact on
salience. Using a yearly ranking of issue prominence also enables to control for the
fluctuation of issues’ popularity in certain years, as it is possible that there is a general
tendency for issues to surface as prominent in time. The proposed ranking thus represents
a good measure of the issues’ prominence to firms in a given proxy year.
Requested Action Legitimacy
The requested action is found in the description of the shareholder proposal itself. An
example of requested action is that the firm ‘reports on and commits to reducing its
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greenhouse gas emissions’. These requested actions are available through yearly
Riskmetrics’ reports.
As was the case for the status measure, in face of the impossibility to question each
firm on each proposal in the year when it was received to assess its perceived legitimacy,
previous research has proposed that the requested action affects perceptions of salience
based on the level of uncertainty associated with the costs and benefits of fulfilling the
request (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Eesley and Lenox (2006) assign requested actions to
four categories of legitimacy and find that firms are most likely to fulfill requests to label
products and processes, followed by those that request to report on operations, to make
operation changes, and finally to adopt principles or pledges. However, Eesley and
Lenox’s (2006) study examines requests brought about through a wide range of tactics,
from more legitimate ones (shareholder resolution filing) to more disruptive and
confrontational ones (civil lawsuits), and do not control for the possibility that some types
of actions are only requested through certain types of tactics. For example, it is unlikely
that activists use civil lawsuits to request that the firm adopts principles or pledges, a
requested action more likely to take place via a shareholder resolution. Therefore, it is
possible that the ranking of firms’ responsiveness to certain actions be biased by the
tactic used to make the request.
In addition, Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) study is limited to requests pertaining to the
natural environment, whereas the present analysis includes all social and environmental
issues that were the object of a shareholder proposal between 2004 and 2008.
Accordingly, where Eesley and Lenox (2006) present four categories of requested
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actions, a fifth category of action is included in the present test to represent proposals that
request high-level changes in the firm’s governance, labeled make administrative or
governance changes. Because administrative and governance changes are generally
perceived to be easier to execute than operational changes (Roth, Schweiger, & Morrison,
1991), Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) rank is augmented with this new category to suggest
that firms will perceive as more legitimate requests to label products and processes,
coded ‘5’, followed by requests to report on operations, coded ‘4’, to make administrative
or governance changes, coded ‘3’, to make operation changes, coded ‘2’, and finally to
adopt principles or pledges, coded ‘1’. Again, the ranking appears counter-intuitive to
convey the ordinal nature of the variables in the analysis whereby labeling products and
processes is the most legitimate type of request and adopting principles or pledges the
least legitimate.
The dataset comprises 256 different requests. Requests were coded in one of the five
categories above independently by both myself and a research assistant. An inter-rater
reliability test indicated that 87% of our coding was identical. Posteriori discussions with
the research assistant also echoed my initial doubts concerning the categorization of
‘adopting principles and pledges’ as the least legitimate request, as suggest Eesley and
Lenox’s (2006) findings. Therefore, while the analysis is performed with the ranking
outlined above, this issue is addressed further in the analysis, which is presented in
Chapter 6.
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Control Variables
To prevent sources of heterogeneity that are unaccounted for in the observed
variables to affect the model, variables shown to present some significance in prior
studies of shareholder activism are included in the analysis.
Size
Previous research has shown that size, measured herein as the log of a firm’s total
assets in the year that it received a shareholder resolution, can impact the firm’s response
to a stakeholder request (Patten, 2002; Reid & Toffel, 2009) or its propensity to engage in
social and environmental behavior (Waddock & Graves, 1997).
Industry
Previous studies have also shown the importance of controlling for industry, an
important source of potential heterogeneity in the data. The first two digits of a firm’s
SIC code are used to classify firms in the sample (Agle et al., 1999; Patten, 2002; Reid &
Toffel, 2009). Yet, some SIC codes present too few observations to be included in the
model, resulting in more omitted variables. Therefore, these observations are manually
grouped together into a closely related industry category. For example, only one
observation belonged to the SIC code 02, which stands for ‘agricultural production –
livestock and animal specialties’. This observation was grouped with SIC 01, which
stands for ‘agricultural production – crops’ because both firms operate in the agricultural
production industry. A total of 22 industries are represented in this sample.
Financial Performance
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Financial performance has also been demonstrated to be a potential determinant of the
firm’s ability to respond to shareholder resolutions (Eesley & Lenox, 2006) or to engage
in socially and environmentally responsible behavior (Waddock & Graves, 1997). In the
present study, it is measured by a firm’s return on assets (ROA) (David et al., 2007;
Waddock & Graves, 1997).
Number of Resolutions Faced by a Firm in a Given Year
Rehbein and colleagues (2009) found a significant negative relationship between the
number of resolutions faced by a firm in a given year and the proportion of positive
responses issued to shareholder filers. As such, it is possible that the total number of
resolutions faced by a firm in a selected year has a non-negligible impact on salience.
Year
Few studies have controlled for the year. However, Eesley and Lenox (2006) thought
important to do so in order to account for as much as the unobserved heterogeneity of the
results as possible. A year control is thus added in this study in order to offer a more
complete analysis and observe, by the same token, whether there is a general trend in
firms’ responses to shareholder resolutions, whereby this tactic could be viewed as a
more prevalent mode of communication with constituents and be more effective over
time, for example. A control for the year enables to discern whether this is the case or
not. The next chapter presents the execution of the empirical test developed herein, with
exhaustive methodological description and results.
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CHAPTER 6
___________________________________________________

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
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This chapter describes the analysis performed to test the hypotheses outlined in
previous chapters of this dissertation. Descriptive statistics, models and a discussion of
the results form the empirical test, while supplemental analyses complete this chapter.
First, a review of the variables is presented with descriptive statistics.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 8. Table 9 further
indicates that firms negotiate withdrawals with shareholder filers 31% of the time, the
most positive response to a group’s request and correspondingly the highest degree of
salience. Firms respond to shareholder proposals by voting on 53% of the proposals and
obtain omissions, the lowest degree of salience, 16% of the time. Pair-wise correlations
are presented in Table 10 and indicate that there are no multicollinearity issues with the
independent variables used in this analysis. In fact, the highest correlation occurs between
a firm’s size and the number of resolutions that it faces in a given year – representing two
control variables – with a coefficient of 0.265.
A summary of the twenty-two industries that compose the sample is outlined in Table
11, revealing that most proposals target firms in the chemical and consumer goods
industries, closely followed by firms in the industrial goods and materials industry as well
as then the financial industry. These statistics are consistent with prior research finding
that firms pertaining to environmentally-sensitive or close to the consumer industries are
more likely to be targeted by shareholder resolutions (Rehbein et al., 2004; Reid &
Toffel, 2009). The implications of industry-specific proposals and responses are
discussed later on in this chapter, as a supplemental analysis.
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Total obs.

Salience

1.1572

0.6695

0

2

1851

Issue prominence

6.7752

5.4331

1

27

1851

Request legitimacy

2.8887

1.1249

1

5

1851

Filer status index

0.1535

0.0561

0

0.2098

1851

Size

4.4248

0.7899

1.6721

6.3399

1744

Financial
performance

0.0614

0.0812

-0.8538

0.3049

1745

Nbr resolutions
faced

1.2253

0.6312

1

6

1851

Table 9. Resolution Outcomes: Salience
Salience

Frequency count

Percent

Withdrawals (‘2’)

583

31.50

Votes (‘1’)

976

52.72

Omissions (‘0’)

292

15.78

Total

1851

100.00
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Table 10. Correlations Between Independent Variables
Year Industry Size

ROA

Nbr
resol.
faced

Filer Issue
status prominence

Requested
action
legitimacy

Year

1.000

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

Industry

0.024

1.000

_

_

_

_

_

_

Size

-0.007

0.207

1.000

_

_

_

_

_

ROA

-0.072

-0.193

-0.010

1.000

_

_

_

_

Nbr resol.
faced

0.080

-0.104

0.265

0.135

1.00

_

_

_

Filer status

0.051

-0.026

-0.166

-0.006

-0.069

1.00

_

_

Issue
prominence

0.098

-0.006

-0.019

-0.065

0.043

0.039

1.00

_

Requested
action legit.

0.023

-0.019

0.039

-0.042

-0.011

0.059

0.075

1.00

Table 11. Sample Industry Composition
Industry

Frequency

Percent

1

Agricultural production

12

0.65

2

Coal and metal mining

22

1.19

3

Oil and gas exploration

53

2.86

4

Construction

30

1.62

5

Food processing

93

5.02

6

Tobacco

37

2.00

7

Textile products

20

1.08

8

Lumber and wood products

60

3.24
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9

Chemical

225

12.16

10

Petroleum refining

117

6.32

11

Industrial goods and materials

182

9.83

12

Transportation

114

6.16

13

Consumer goods

218

11.78

14

Logistics

52

2.81

15

Telecommunications

73

3.94

16

Utilities

102

5.51

17

Food service

65

3.51

18

Financial services

147

7.94

19

Insurance

67

3.62

20

Real estate

22

1.19

21

Services

99

5.35

22

Conglomerates

41

2.22

Total

1851

100.00

MODELS
Given that the dependent variable (salience) is of ordinal nature, an ordered probit
regression is the best suited method to perform this analysis. Ordered probit
specifications enable to account for the impact of other variables specified in the model
while recognizing the categorical and ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Table 12
presents the results of two regression models attempting to predict the likelihood of high
salience (shareholder resolution withdrawals).
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Table 12. O-probit Regression Results, Models 1-2
Model 1

Model 2

Filer status

6.441
(0.488)**

5.806
(0.526)**

Issue prominence

0.036
(0.005)**

0.041
(0.005)**

Requested action
legitimacy

-0.073
(0.024)*

-0.064
(0.026)*

Controls
Year

-0.007

Size

-0.241**

Financial performance

-0.462

Nbr resolutions faced

-0.132**

Industry dummies

Included
235.56

321.76

Log likelihood

-1719.659

-1564.188

Observations

1851

1744

LR χ2

Significance at p < 0.05*; p< 0.01**

Model 1 includes only the primary independent variables of interest: filer status, issue
prominence and requested action legitimacy. This model obtains a chi-square of 235.56
and shows high significance for all the variables’ coefficients. In Model 2, control
variables are included. The chi-square value increases to 321.76 and shows once again
high significance for all the main variables 9. In Model 1, the coefficient indicating the

9

Pseudo R-squared values are not reported because the McFadden’s pseudo R-squared obtained in Stata for
an ordered probit regression is not an equivalent statistic to the widely-used R-square that serves to
estimate the goodness-of-fit of OLS regressions. Ordered probit regressions are calculated through an
iterative process and not to minimize variance, as do OLS regressions. Therefore, pseudo R-squared values
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impact of filer status on salience (6.441) is much larger than those indicating the impact
of issue prominence (0.036) and requested action legitimacy (-0.073), in a ratio of 179:1
and -88:1, respectively. This result denotes the importance of filer status in determining
salience compared to the prominence of the issue and the legitimacy of the requested
action. Therefore, while filer status presents a large, positive and significant impact on
salience confirming Hypothesis 1, issue prominence presents a much less impactful but
positive and significant effect on salience also confirming Hypothesis 2. Finally,
requested action legitimacy shows a relatively small, significant but negative effect on
salience, which is contrary to the relationship predicted in Hypothesis 3.
In Model 2, which includes all the control variables specified in the theory
development, the coefficient obtained for filer status is still large, positive and significant
(5.806), this time in a ratio of 157 to the coefficient of issue prominence (0.041) and in a
ratio of -100 to the coefficient of requested action legitimacy (-0.064). This model
demonstrates the strong relationship between filer status and salience; in fact, results may
suggest that managers primarily pay attention to the status of the groups with whom they
enter in relationships, and then subsequently to the attributes of the issues and requests
made by these groups.
Given the significance of the effect of group status on salience in relation to the
impact of the other variables specified in the model, the reader might consider whether
filers of higher status tend to promote issues of greater prominence and requested actions

for ordered probit regressions cannot be interpreted as OLS R-squared. Academic Technical Services,
UCLA http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/psuedo_rsquareds.htm
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that are more legitimate. For this reason, it is important to consider the correlations
between the independent variables (presented in Table 10 above), which indicate that
there are no systematic relationships between filer status, issue prominence and requested
action legitimacy. However, it is possible that managers actually perceive issues and
requests set forth by filers of higher status to be of greater prominence and legitimacy, a
point that is addressed below in testing the interaction between the elements of the tetrad
(H5) and in the supplemental analyses.
Model 2 also indicates a negative coefficient for the requested action legitimacy
variable (-0.064). This result suggests that as the legitimacy of the requested action
increases, the salience accorded to a request by managers diminishes. This result appears
counter-intuitive and is contrary to the relationship between requested action legitimacy
and salience found by Eesley and Lenox (2006) and predicted in H3. A possible
explanation lies in the ordering of the requested action legitimacy, which the research
assistant and myself questioned during our initial categorization effort. Specifically, we
questioned whether “adopting principles or pledges”, the category found to be the least
legitimate by Eesley and Lenox (2006), was not in fact the most legitimate category in
the eyes of managers because adopting principles or pledges seems relatively simple: it
does not require any changes to current activities, and no penalties ensue if firms do not
follow on their pledges. Therefore, while Eesley and Lenox (2006: 771) claim to be “well
aware that alternative orderings are possible”, this dissertation contends that an
alternative ordering might in fact be more accurate. This suggestion is addressed as a
supplemental analysis later in this chapter.
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Finally, Model 2 demonstrates that two other variables impact salience: the size of the
firm targeted by a shareholder resolution and the number of resolutions faced by a firm in
a given year. Both of these variables are shown to have a negative and significant impact
on salience of -0.241 and -0.132, respectively. It is interesting to note that these control
variables apply to characteristics of the firm and not of the stakeholder. This finding
contributes to our understanding of salience by demonstrating the importance of firm
characteristics in managerial responses to their constituents’ requests and further support
the addition of the double-set box representing firms’ orientation around managerial
perceptions of stakeholder salience in the model.
Models 3-5 include the interaction terms designated to test the interaction effects
specified in H5. These tests enable to gain precision on how the elements of the tetrad
work together to affect salience. Models 3, 4 and 5 thus include all the variables of Model
2 but also include the interaction terms ‘filer status X issue prominence’, ‘filer status X
requested action legitimacy’ and ‘issue prominence X requested action legitimacy’,
respectively. Results of these ordered probit regressions are presented in Table 13 below.
Table 13. O-probit Regression Results, Models 3-5
Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Filer status

4.900
(0.805)***

1.069
(1.445)

5.800
(0.516)***

Issue prominence

0.060
(0.014)***

0.041
(0.005)***

0.018
(0.015)

Requested action
legitimacy

-0.064
(0.025)***

0.174
(0.072)**

-0.121
(0.043)***
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Filer status X Issue
prominence

-0.134
(0.091)*
-1.587
(0.452)***

Filer status X Requested
action legitimacy

-0.008
(0.005)*

Issue prominence X
Requested action
legitimacy
Controls
Year

-0.005
(0.020)

-0.009
(0.020)

-0.006
(0.020)

Size

-0.237
(0.052)***

-0.232
(0.053)***

-0.240
(0.053)***

Financial performance

-0.456
(0.389)

-0.480
(0.389)

-0.469
(0.389)

Nbr resolutions faced

-0.138
(0.051)***

-0.137
(0.050)***

0.134
(0.050)***

Included

Included

Included

323.97

334.17

324.54

Log likelihood

-1563.08

-1557.99

-1562.80

Observations

1744

1744

1744

Industry dummies
LR χ2

Significance at p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01***

In Model 3, the three main variables are highly significant. The interaction term ‘filer
status X issue prominence’ presents a marginally significant coefficient of -0.134
indicating that as the prominence of the issue rises, the status of the filer plays a lesser
role in determining salience. Model 4 presents the highest chi-square of the three
interaction models. The coefficient for filer status appears much lower than in models 3
and 5, while the coefficient of requested action legitimacy becomes positive. The
interaction term ‘filer status X requested action legitimacy’ is also highly significant with
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a coefficient of -1.587, indicating that it is the most impactful determinant of salience in
this model. As such, the interaction term denotes that as the legitimacy of the requested
action increases, the importance of the filer’s status in determining salience becomes
significantly less important to overall salience. Still, the positive coefficient of requested
action legitimacy suggests that this variable might suffer from misspecification, as
signified earlier in this manuscript, where it was suggested that there could be a more
accurate alternative ranking of requests’ legitimacy. Finally, Model 5 suggests that only
filer status and requested action legitimacy are significant in factoring salience, together
with the interaction term ‘issue prominence X request legitimacy’. This latter term
presents marginal significance with a very small coefficient, -0.008, demonstrating that
the importance of issue prominence to salience diminishes slightly as the legitimacy of
the requested action increases.
Together, these models suggest that salience may present a non-linear relationship
with stakeholder elements, where combinations of stakeholder attributes interact to affect
managerial perceptions, supporting the interaction effects predicted in H5. However,
when solving the equation for overall salience in Models 3-5, it is noteworthy that each of
these models predicts a same degree of salience. That is, overall salience does not appear
to increase with the combination of salient stakeholder elements. These results imply that
while there are significant interaction effects between the variables, as suggested in H5,
these effects are overshadowed by the magnitude of the main effects, notably by the
importance of stakeholder group status to salience.
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In light of these results, it is proposed that the interaction between the tetrad’s
elements may simply signify that the impact of any one of the tetrad’s elements changes
with the variation of other elements. Indeed, this dissertation has argued that when
managers prioritize their stakeholders’ requests they consider all four elements: the
group’s status, the issue addressed, the legitimacy of the requested action and the
legitimacy of the tactic by which the request is made known to the firm. Hence, it is
possible that for each stakeholder request, one or several of these elements generates
greater salience based on the specific characteristics of the tetrad. As one characteristic
becomes more salient, the impact of the other elements of the tetrad on overall salience
may become less pronounced, resulting in a non-linear functional form.
In order to probe this line of inquiry further, and given the previous results
demonstrating the importance of group status on salience, another triad of models is
devised to test specifically how managers accord salience within groups of differential
status. To do so, the sample is divided in three unequal parts, corresponding to groupings
of lower, middle and higher status. Following Phillips and Zuckerman’s (2001) claim that
status delimitations must make intuitive sense to the researcher, a chart presenting the
cumulative observations among the status index categories is created (Figure 6 below). It
is possible to notice that the chart presents three clear categories where the low status
groups obtain a status index between 0 and 0.1315, the middle status groups between
0.1613 and 0.1659, and the high status groups between 0.2004 and 0.2098.
Figure 6. Cumulative Observations in Status Index Categories
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For each group, an ordered probit regression is performed with the three main
variables, all the controls and the interaction term ‘issue prominence X requested action
legitimacy’. Results are presented in Table 14 below. Model 7, examining groups of
middle status, is only marginally significant. However, Models 6 and 8 are highly
significant, presenting a chi-square of 89.42 and 162.87, respectively. Only group status
presents a significant coefficient (6.245) in Model 6 while requested action legitimacy is
the significant variable (with a coefficient of -0.175) in Model 8. In both cases, the
interaction effect is not significant.
These models are useful to gain more precision as to how salience is accorded within
groups of varying status. The results signify that for low status groups (Model 6), it is
precisely the evaluation of individual groups’ status that determines salience and thus that
these groups and individuals do not represent a homogeneous category. By contrast, for
stakeholders of high status (Model 8), the legitimacy of the requested action appears the
main determinant of salience, implying that once a group is perceived to possess high
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status, it becomes part of a category where individual status characteristics matter less.
Taken together, these results strongly support the non-linear relationship discussed above,
posited to provide a better explanation of the tetrad’s compounding effect, which
represents a fruitful area for future research.
Table 14. O-probit Regression Results, Models 6-8
Model 6
Lower status

Model 7
Middle status

Model 8
Higher status

6.245
(1.684)***

42.335
(51.620)

69.249
(46.251)

Issue prominence

0.032
(0.028)

0.027
(0.033)

0.032
(0.025)

Requested action
legitimacy

-0.016
(0.078)

0.002
(0.118)

-0.175
(0.065)***

Issue prominence X
Requested action
legitimacy

-0.007
(0.009)

-0.000
(0.013)

Year

-0.003
(0.039)

0.039
(0.043)

-0.002
(0.031)

Size

-0.056
(0.103)

-0.054
(0.139)

-0.426
(0.077)***

Financial performance

0.204
(0.855)

-0.429
(0.784)

-0.694
(0.589)

Nbr resolutions faced

-0.057
(0.085)

-0.242
(0.095)**

-0.223
(0.099)**

Industry dummies

Included

Included

Included

89.42***

40.86*

162.87***

Log likelihood

-463.04

-352.49

-686.35

Observations

535

416

793

Filer status

-0.005
(0.008)

Controls

LR χ2
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Significance at p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01***

Furthermore, these results demonstrate that the new model of salience accurately
interlinks the elements of the stakeholder tetrad by showing how the effect of one
element is impacted by the others and that, in fact, the salience accorded to requests by
managers is dependent upon the combination of all the elements of the tetrad, with filer
status playing the primary role. Given these findings, it is interesting to consider whether
firms’ desire to maintain legitimacy drives their aspiration to entertain relationships with
groups of higher status, to benefit from this association, and whether this primary concern
initially overshadows other considerations.
The role of issue prominence and requested action legitimacy would become, in this
view, moderators of the primary relationship that exists between firms and their
constituents. In this way, the prominence of issues and the legitimacy of the requested
actions enhance firms’ initial wish to accord resources to a higher status group or severs
firms’ intention to do so. Or, it could be that managers make salience decisions in a
multi-stage process where group status is the initial and primary determinant of the
outcome, as suggested in Jensen and Roy’s (2008) study of managers’ choice of market
exchange partners. Below is offered a series of supplemental analyses designed to
investigate valuable points raised in this first phase of the analysis.

SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES
This section explores additional questions of empirical nature. Because these
questions are not issued from theoretical deductions, the following analyses do not seek
to test hypotheses but rather to inform our understanding of salience and shareholder
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activism based on empirical evidence. Therefore, results are presented as a reflection of
the inductive techniques used to discuss the following questions.

1) Do Firms Exhibit Patterns of Responses to Shareholder Resolutions
that Vary Over Time?
This question reflects the possibility that firms may exhibit patterns of responses to
shareholder resolutions that are not linked to the variables studied in this dissertation, but
rather simply because shareholder resolutions are an increasingly popular mechanisms for
activists to voice their concerns to managers (O'Rourke, 2003; Reid & Toffel, 2009).
Indeed, the efficacy of shareholder resolutions over time is an important topic for this
stream of literature (Smith, 1996). By adding the ‘year’ control variable in Model 2 as
opposed to year dummies, it is possible to test whether there is, in fact, a time trend in
firms’ responses to shareholder resolutions. The year coefficient (-0.007) shows no
significance and a negligible negative impact on salience. As such, it appears that there is
no time trend in firms’ response patterns. That is, firms do not tend to accord greater or
lesser attention to this tactic in any significant way.

2) Do Managers Consider Prominent the Same Issues that Filers Do?
Theoretically, this dissertation has argued that managers are more likely to accord
salience to requests that address more prominent issues. This claim has been
operationalized by proposing that managers negotiate the withdrawal of shareholder
resolutions that address what they believe are more prominent issues. Yet, this
dissertation has also used a measure of issue prominence that represents the importance
of issues to shareholder filers. Indeed, as the number of shareholder proposals addressing
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an issue increased, the issue was deemed to be more prominent. The leap between filers’
and managers’ perceptions of issue prominence was permitted notably through
Riskmetrics’ assessment of shareholder proposals as representative of the issues that
matter to society and politicians in a given year (Mathiasen & Welsh, 2009), which
represents the institutional environment in which managers operate, combined with the
knowledge that filers specifically target firms with poor performance on an issue
(Rehbein et al., 2004), thus making the proposal very relevant to each targeted firm.
Therefore, this question seeks to examine whether filers and managers indeed
perceive issue prominence along the same ranking. By tabulating the issues on which
managers withdraw the most proposals, overall, it is thus possible to rank issues
according to their prominence to managers and to compare this result with the measure of
issue prominence to filers used in the first part of this analysis. This test is an important
step toward assessing how managerial perceptions can be represented through archival
measures, so as to avoid the self-reported biases identified by previous researchers of
salience (Agle et al., 1999; Boesso & Kumar, 2009).
An ordered probit regression with salience as the dependent variable is run with issue
dummies, excluding issue 5 (climate change) from the analysis to use it as a baseline
because climate change was the most important issue as determined by this dissertation’s
measure. The test is performed for the sample year 2008, the most recent year, because
issue prominence to filers varies across years. Table 15 presents a comparison of issues’
prominence ranking, on the left-hand side being the measure used in this analysis,
reflecting Riskmetrics’ data (prominence to filers), and on the right-hand side
164

representing withdrawals (prominence to managers). It is possible to see that the overall
prominence of issues to filers and managers does not necessarily correspond. Results
indicate that filers consider climate change as the most prominent issue overall while
managers respond most, in the aggregate, to board diversity issues. Nevertheless, both
filers and managers consider privacy as the least prominent issue.
Table 15. Prominence of Issues to Filers and Managers
Issue

Prominence to Filers

Prominence to Managers

1 (most important)

12

Political contributions

2

7

Human rights

3

8

Equal employment

4

3

Sustainability

5

2

Animal welfare

6
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Healthcare reform

7

4

Environmental management

8

13

Safety

9

14

Global labor standards

10

5

Military

11

11

Charitable contributions

12

10

Northern Ireland

13

9

Board diversity

14

1 (most important)

Product toxicity

15

6

Banking issues

16

20

Tobacco

17

17

Executive-social pay link

18

19

Drug marketing

19

21

Genetic engineering

20

15

Climate change
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General governance
Privacy

21
22 (least important)

16
22 (least important)

3) Is There an Alternative Ordering of ‘Requested Action Legitimacy’
that Best Represents How Managers Perceive Requested Actions?
In a similar way, results from Model 2 have prompted the examination of the
requested action legitimacy ranking. Recall that there were 256 different requested
actions, classified into five categories of legitimacy by myself and a research assistant
according to a scale adapted from Eesley and Lenox (2006). In doing so, we both
independently felt that the category “adopting principles or pledges” might be misplaced
in the ranking. This category comprises 275 observations, which represents
approximately 15% of the sample. As such, it is worth investigating the robustness of the
predicted negative impact of the requested action legitimacy variable on salience based
on this single category. When recoded as the most legitimate type of requested action, the
coefficient for this variable becomes positive, albeit not significant (0.038), indicating
that, in fact, managers may perceive these categories along a different order of
legitimacy.
To gain some insight into the ranking along which managers perceive – based on their
responses – requested actions, an ordered probit regression is performed including all the
control variables but substituting ‘requested action legitimacy’ for a series of four dummy
variables representing the four categories of requests above the baseline, ‘labeling
products and processes’. Results indicate that managers perceive requested actions’
legitimacy in the following order, from least to most legitimate: ‘label products and
processes’, ‘make administrative or governance changes’, ‘report on operations or
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governance activities’, ‘make operational changes’, and finally ‘adopt principles or
pledges’. Table 16 summarizes the coefficients and standard errors obtained in this
regression, and compares this new ranking with the initial ranking that was used in this
analysis, adapted from Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) results.
Table 16. Comparison of Requested Action Legitimacy Orderings

Requested Action

Initial Ranking
Position, Adapted
From Eesley &
Lenox (2006)

Label products and/or processes
1 (most legitimate)
Report on operations or governance
activities

2

Make administrative or governance
changes

(not included)

Make operational changes
3
Adopt principles or pledges
4 (least legitimate)

Rank and O-probit
Regression
Coefficients
(Standard errors)
5
Baseline
(least legitimate)
3
0.122
(0.234)
4
0.084
(0.238)
2
0.208
(0.239)
1
0.330
(0.241)
(most legitimate)

4) How Do Firms’ Responses to Issues Vary by Industry?
Given the breadth of industries represented in the sample, and the specificity of issues
to certain industries, considering the impact of industry affiliation in greater detail might
reveal additional information on the issues that managers consider important. Indeed,
studies of stakeholder management have highlighted the importance of evaluating a
study’s results within industries (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997),
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which is likely a relevant concern for studies of shareholder activism as well. Thus, all
the relevant interaction terms representing industry-issue combinations addressed by
shareholder resolutions are generated, and included as independent variables in an
ordered probit regression with salience as the dependent variable. In Stata, regression
results are then transformed into predicted probabilities, which indicate each probability
of salience = 0, 1 or 2, for each industry-issue combination. This exhaustive table of
predicted probabilities is presented in Appendix III.
From the table of predicted probabilities, the ranking of issue(s) to which each
industry is predicted to be most responsive is compiled. Table 17 reports the top three
issues that have the highest probabilities of high salience for each industry, recalling that
high salience corresponds to shareholder proposals withdrawn. For example, the table
illustrates that the chemical industry is most responsive to the issue of board diversity,
while the petroleum refining industry is most likely to give attention to the healthcare
reform and Northern Ireland issues. The industrial goods and materials industry is most
responsive to safety, the consumer goods industry to violent videos, the transportation
industry to the global health pandemic issue and the financial industry to governance.
While not all industry-issue combinations represent a large enough sample to draw
significant conclusions, it is possible to observe marked differences in managers’
responsiveness to issues across industry affiliations, as presented in Table 17. It is
noteworthy to point out that some industries are inherently predisposed to being
concerned by certain issues and not others (e.g., the chemical industry likely considers
the issue of violent videos less prominent). Still, this table’s value resides in the
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compilation of the issues that are most prominent across industries. The implications of
these findings are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
Table 17. Most Important Issues to Managers, by Industry
Industry

Issue(s) accorded
greatest salience*

Second

Third

Agricultural production

Human rights

Animal welfare

Political
contributions

Environmental
management

Governance
(general)

Genetic
engineering
Coal and metal mining

Equal employment

Human rights

Climate change

Reporting

Climate change

Sustainability

Climate change

Health – global
pandemic

Global labor
standards
Oil and gas exploration

Executive-social
pay link
Sustainability

Construction

Environmental
management
Equal employment

Food processing

Product toxicity

Environmental
management

Tobacco

Tobacco issues

Animal welfare
Global labor
standards
Healthcare reform
Political
contributions

Textile products

Environmental
management
Genetic

Equal employment
Global labor
169

Political
contributions

engineering

standards

Reporting
Sustainability
Lumber and wood
products

Board diversity

Climate change

Equal employment

Chemical

Board diversity

Healthcare reform

Sustainability

Petroleum refining

Healthcare reform

Human rights

Equal employment

Northern Ireland
Industrial goods and
materials

Safety

Political
contributions

Equal employment

Transportation

Health – global
pandemic

Equal employment

Environmental
management

Reporting
Consumer goods

Violent videos

Climate change

Sustainability

Logistics

Global labor
standards

Sustainability

Board diversity

Sustainability

Equal employment

Sustainability

Healthcare reform

Political
contributions

Equal employment

Human rights
Telecommunications

Board diversity
Military

Utilities

Board diversity
Equal employment
Executive-social
pay link

Food service

Board diversity
Consumer
advocacy
Healthcare reform
Human rights
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Tobacco issues

Financial services

Governance
(general)

Board diversity

Sustainability

Insurance

Northern Ireland

Environmental
management

Equal employment

Climate change

Animal welfare

Equal employment

Environmental
management

Military

Animal welfare

Sustainability
Real estate

Equal employment
Human rights
Northern Ireland
Sustainability

Services

Climate change
Healthcare reform
Sustainability
Violent videos

Conglomerates

Equal employment
Healthcare reform

*Because this table has been generated from a table of probabilities, several issues can be predicted to
obtain the “greatest salience”, that is, if these issues exhibit the same probabilities of garnering the highest
degree of salience. For this reason, it is interesting to consider the first three rank positions of highest
probabilities of salience.

171

CHAPTER 7
___________________________________________________

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
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This chapter serves to reflect on the theoretical development and results that have
been the object of this dissertation. In essence, it draws the implications of the new model
of salience for future research in the field and presents new questions arising from the
results of the empirical study. Managerial implications and a general conclusion complete
this chapter.

SUMMARY OF THIS DISSERTATION’S CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation offers primarily a theoretical contribution by proposing a new view
of stakeholder salience. In the fifteen years since Mitchell and colleagues (1997)
proposed their original theory of salience, scarce and ambiguous empirical and
managerial applications have highlighted that some problems inherent to the theory of
salience justify the need to revisit the model. Refining the elements that matter to
managerial attention and the attributes that direct salience is in fact a critical exercise to
the survival of stakeholder theory if it is to overcome its criticism for presenting little
guidance to managers’ pragmatic need to prioritize the interests of certain groups over
others. As such, this dissertation used Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) generous effort as
a springboard to the creation of a new model of salience that moves beyond the simple
addition of salience attributes proposed in the original model.

Theoretical Advancements
While the original theory of salience developed by Mitchell and colleagues (1997)
draws on several theories to derive that managers pay attention to powerful, legitimate
and urgent stakeholders, this dissertation is guided by the fundamental assumption that
firm-stakeholder relationships are driven by firms’ need to maintain legitimacy and thus
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conform to institutional pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In this way, this dissertation
seeks to offer a more comprehensive and interconnected view on salience. Accordingly,
in addition to analyzing the contribution of Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) attributes –
power, legitimacy and urgency – to the explanation of salience, this dissertation considers
the social approval literature to develop new, more compelling attributes of salience, as
well as additional elements that matter to managers’ decision related to stakeholder
prioritization.
First, this dissertation supports that salience is influenced not only by stakeholder
groups but also by their claims, which – building on the work of Eesley and Lenox
(2006) – are further conceptualized as requested actions made via a request tactic in
regard to an issue of concern. In the present empirical test, claims were evaluated by way
of shareholder resolutions. Second, the original attributes of salience set forth by Mitchell
and colleagues (1997) – power, legitimacy and urgency – are rethought and reworked to
expose that some attributes are more relevant to certain stakeholder elements and not
others: groups do not present urgency in and of themselves, and issues and requests are
not powerful, for example. As a result, this dissertation develops new attributes of
salience rooted in the social approval literature in order to explain the role of group
status, issue prominence, requested action legitimacy and request tactic legitimacy on
salience. A new model of salience integrating these new developments was set forth in
Chapter 4.
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Empirical Insights
An empirical test is performed to validate the constructs developed in the new model
of salience. The test examines 1,851 shareholder resolutions filed during the 2004-2008
period. Shareholder resolutions are chosen because they offer an opportune setting to
distinguish firms’ responses to issues of varying prominence and requested actions of
varying legitimacy proposed by filers of relatively heterogeneous status levels
representing the interests of stockholders and more diverse stakeholder groups as well.
Furthermore, focusing on shareholder resolutions enables to set the boundaries of the
analysis within a highly salient tactic.
Results demonstrate that group status is a highly significant determinant of salience,
but that the prominence of the issue promoted and the legitimacy of the requested action
also matter to obtaining managerial attention. Therefore, while stockholders may benefit,
on the whole, of higher status by virtue of their role and proximity to the firm’s
operations, the new model demonstrates that high salience can also be accorded to lower
status groups when they present legitimate requested actions on prominent issues by way
of a legitimate request tactic. In fact, a crucial argument developed in this dissertation is
that examining salience implies the recognition of stakeholder group heterogeneity in
distilling specific groups and individuals’ status. As such, the new model suggests that
stakeholders are more accurately conceptualized by acknowledging their individuality, as
opposed to grouping them by generic groups such as shareholders, customers or
employees, for example.
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Envisioning stakeholders in this way enables to look beyond typical categories of
stakeholders and to focus instead on each group’s status. This distinction means that an
individual shareholder requesting an action with low legitimacy could garner less
salience than a high status member of the community caring for a prominent issue, for
example. This situation illustrates that the new model predicts phenomena that appear
contrary to what Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) theory would anticipate based on their
conception that salience is accorded to stakeholders perceived to possess - cumulatively power, legitimacy and urgency. As a result, this new view of salience offers renewed
support to a stakeholder theory of the firm. Through its empirical test, it also begins to
reconcile the stakeholder-stockholder views by proposing a new frame in which
stockholders (especially activists) can symbolize the interests and identity of stakeholders
typically less salient to the firm.
Another finding of this empirical test is that stakeholder elements interact to impact
salience. As such, even though group status appears to dominate managers’ initial
response to their stakeholders, the combination of group status, issue prominence and
requested action legitimacy yields a non-linear relationship with salience. This finding
confirms that salience is issued of more complex managerial evaluations than Mitchell
and colleagues’ (1997) additive model where salience results from the cumulative
number of any of the three specified stakeholder attributes (power, legitimacy and
urgency). Therefore, this new conceptualization of salience as compounding and
interactive represents an important contribution of the present work.
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Supplemental analyses indicate that there is no time trend inherent to the shareholder
resolution tactic; that is, that shareholder resolutions have not necessarily become a more
salient tactic over time. It also appears that even though issue prominence is determined
through both relevance to the specific targeted firm and importance of the issue in
general, filers of shareholder proposals highly attuned to firms’ and societal concerns still
perceive issue prominence differently than managers do. For instance, filers considered
climate change as the most prominent issue while eleven issues were considered more
prominent than climate change by managers. Likewise, managers accorded greatest
salience to the issue of board diversity, which only came in fourteenth position of
prominence for filers. However, both filers and managers assessed privacy as the least
important issue. The comprehensive dataset used in this analysis also enables to provide a
ranking reflecting managers’ perceptions of categories of requested actions’ legitimacy.
Finally, the data confirms the value of evaluating firms’ responses to stakeholder issues
within industries by underscoring the differences in issue salience that permeate
managers’ decisions across twenty-two industries.

NEW RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The Importance of Group Status
Empirical findings suggest that a group’s status has the greatest impact on salience,
even though issue prominence and requested action legitimacy are also significant. These
results lead to the question of whether there is a layered, asymmetrical relationship
between each element of the stakeholder tetrad and to the role of interaction effects
between the tetrad’s elements. For example, it appears that managers’ relationship with
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the groups supersedes their evaluation of the issue’s prominence and the requested
action’s legitimacy. Therefore, future research might investigate whether the issue and
the requested action are in fact moderators or mediators of the primary relationship that
firms entertain with their constituents, or whether managers make salience decisions in a
multi-stage process where they initially evaluate the status of the requesting group, and
then assess the issue and the request. And, since salience appears to follow a non-linear
relationship with the interaction of the four stakeholder elements, future research would
do well to specify further the nature and form of the salience-stakeholder function.
Second, it appears a fruitful endeavor to examine more carefully the direction of
causality between strong firm-stakeholder relationships and group status. For instance,
while studies of status suggest that managers purposely seek to strengthen their
relationships with stakeholders perceived to possess higher status, there is a possibility
that managerial cognition processes lead them to perceive groups with whom they
already nurture strong ties as having higher status than those with whom they are not in a
relationship. Finally, the present analysis isolates the request tactic in order to better tease
out the dynamics between the other elements of the tetrad; future research could isolate
other elements of the tetrad while varying the tactic to demonstrate the impact of this
element on salience.

Managerial Perceptions and Firm Actions
Previous research on salience has used both direct polls of managers and firm actions
in attempt to represent, as accurately as possible, how managers perceive their
constituents. While the choice of one or the other represents a weighty decision in
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salience studies, this dissertation opted to rely on firm actions to determine salience in
order to avoid the important biases that arise from surveying managers directly. In
addition, the supplemental analyses offer some insight into the precision of the measures
used in the empirical test by uncovering the issues that managers consider most
prominent and the requested actions that they perceive as most legitimate, based on their
responses to stakeholders.
While these analyses rely on firms’ responses as a proxy to managerial perceptions,
future research would benefit from investigating whether managerial perceptions
correspond, in fact, to the actions taken by their firm so as to reconcile these apparently
contrasting methods. A mixed method design, allowing both the collection of primary
data to determine managerial perceptions and correspondence of these perceptions with
archival firm action data might be best suited to realize this research project.

Industry Specificity
While it is intuitive that some issues and requests are more prominent and legitimate
in certain industries, the role of industry affiliation in salience might be greater than
anticipated in the elaboration of a general model. Table 17 of this dissertation presents
the issues to which managers respond to the most, by industry, showing a wide range of
priorities across industries. These results generally support that managers are more
responsive to stakeholder issues, which are specific to a firm’s operational context, than
to social issues, a point elaborated earlier in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. However,
these findings also indicate that industry affiliation inform issue prominence, an
important consideration to incorporate in subsequent studies of salience. Indeed, in a
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review of twenty-five years of research on stakeholder management and financial
performance, Griffin and Mahon (1997) identify a critical bias of these studies in the lack
of industry specificity. Several scholars have in fact raised the importance of controlling
for this variable since industry affiliation dictates an important part of firms’ resource
allocation (Graves & Waddock, 1994). Another question for future research thus
proposes to investigate whether there are other industry-specific customs that impact
salience, such as tendencies to be more responsive to certain tactics or to be more
responsive to threats to the firm’s legitimacy, resulting in a greater desire to associate
with higher status constituents.

Shareholder Activism
The analysis presented in this dissertation focuses on firms’ responses to shareholder
activists. A valuable finding of this study is that managers and filers appear to perceive
issues and requests along different scales of prominence and legitimacy, respectively. As
such, a new question of interest lies in the process by which groups render their issues
important to the firm. A starting point to this investigation could be Dutton and
colleagues’ (2001) notion of issue selling, which suggests that stakeholders can effect a
number of moves that include the packaging of an issue, the linguistic terms used to
describe it, the timing of its proposal as well as the different individuals or groups
involved in the request, to direct managerial attention. Drawing on the sensemaking
approach (Weick, 1979) could also likely enrich this perspective.
Indeed, if managers respond to legitimate requests addressing prominent issues, the
task of the group is to convey the prominence of their issue, and they can do so by using
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other elements of the tetrad since it has been determined that they play a significant role
in obtaining salience. Questions of interest include: do groups of lower status seek the
support of higher status partners to join in their filing of a proposal? What role does the
tactic of shareholder resolution filing play in assigning prominence to an issue and
legitimacy to a proposal?

The Stakeholder Group, Issue and Request Tetrad
Since the new model of salience proposes to expand our understanding of who
stakeholders are and what their claims represent to the firm, this dissertation offers new
research directions in the meaningful connections between stakeholder activism, social
movement and collective identity to understand how groups form and influence the firm.
And, on the other hand, it also suggests that the issue management literature as well as
studies of managerial characteristics and firm orientation could help to grasp how
managers form perceptions of their constituents and respond to these groups’ requests.
It has been suggested that groups wanting to gain the attention of management for the
purpose of organizational change form around common interests and identities, often
spanning several generic categories of stakeholders (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).
Defining who groups really are, then, beyond acknowledging their heterogeneity, might
start with first determining how individuals come together to form coalitions of influence,
and how successful these coalitions are at garnering salience. For instance, it would be
interesting to investigate whether shareholder filers obtain greater salience when they file
in conjunction with others, in effect increasing the pressure for a positive firm response.
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Many social movement researchers have made note of the fact that individuals use
collective action (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; King, 2008b; Reid & Toffel, 2009) when
making a request to the firm, and that such groups coalesce around common issues of
concern for a period of time. It has been suggested that without collective action,
individuals lack opportunities and structures to communicate with the firm such that their
dissatisfaction toward management practices does not necessarily translate into requests
for the firm to change (King, 2008b). These arguments endorse the view that a collective
action approach is in fact necessary for managers to perceive their constituents as
consequential (King, 2008b). Therefore, it could be that relying on theories of collective
action would provide an insightful lens to envision stakeholder influence.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Managing Heterogeneous Stakeholders
An important indication of this dissertation is that firms receive requests from groups
that are increasingly heterogeneous in interest and status. These groups also appear
increasingly savvy in crafting requests in regard to their issues of concern as well as in
conveying these requests to managers by way of impactful tactics. As a result, managers
must respond to groups that are heterogeneous in composition, interest and status, which
altogether creates a challenge intensified by the mounting awareness of the constituents’
network and by sizeable repercussions for the firm’s survival.
Against this background, managers’ calculated responses to their constituents and
careful handling of the requests and issues on the table become tantamount to good
business practices. Hence, the new model of salience and empirical analysis presented in
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this dissertation contribute to enlightening how managers generally perceive and respond
to external pressure, with the indication that stakeholders benefit from some degree of
influence on firm’s social agenda-setting through salience.

Responding to Shareholder Activists
As shareholder activism becomes a preponderant tactic used by groups and
individuals dissatisfied with managerial practices, this dissertation offers insight into the
issues and requests that receive firms’ attention. In addition, it highlights that filer status
is a strong driver of salience. For managers, this simply means that constituents become
more attuned to developing groups that draw specifically on their higher status
characteristic to improve their ability to influence the firm. That is, as mentioned above,
managers are more likely to face coalitions of influence as stakeholders seek to increase
their status in hope of garnering greater salience.
For example, a boutique social investment firm, Clean Yield, offers advocacy
services to its clients. Although it has been in business for almost thirty years, its size
simply does not warrant a focus on filing shareholder proposals. As such, it often pairs
with other shareholder activists from other (higher status) organizations in order to
support or initiate a proposal10. This coalition approach is entirely designed to accomplish
two goals expected to generate higher salience: 1) to increase the status of the filer, and
2) to increase pressure on managers by signaling that the issue endorsed is prominent
among several constituents and that the proposal appears legitimate to more than a single

10

Interview with Rick Hausman, Clean Yield, February 24th, 2012.
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organization. It also underscores that managers can reduce the threat of shareholder
activism targeted at their firm by consciously addressing the issues that flare up to filers,
that is, those socially prevalent issues on which the firm exhibits a relatively poor
performance.

CONCLUSION
The objective of this dissertation was to revisit Mitchell and colleagues (1997)
original model of stakeholder salience so as to offer a more precise and comprehensive
understanding of this important topic. Two questions were of specific interest: 1) what
stakeholder elements affect salience? 2) Which of these stakeholder elements and
attributes are most relevant to the explanation of salience? The first question yielded the
consideration of four interrelated elements: stakeholder groups requesting specific
actions, via a request tactic, for the firm to undertake in regard to an issue of concern. In a
second tense, it was argued that power, legitimacy and urgency as salience attributes
needed to be rethought and that group status, issue prominence, requested action
legitimacy and request tactic legitimacy more accurately represent how managers
perceive and accord salience to their constituents. This is the case because the problem of
salience is underpinned by firms’ desire to maintain legitimacy and, thus, engaging with
groups of higher status while according attention to more legitimate requests on issues
that are more prominent contribute to this goal. Together, these developments have
enabled the construction of a new model of salience that moves beyond Mitchell and
colleagues’ additive representation of salience. The new model also presents dynamism
by showing that managers’ responses to groups’ requests likely impact future actions
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taken by these groups. Likewise, each stakeholder action might influence how the firm
perceives groups’ status.
The key constructs pertaining to the new model of salience were then tested in a five
year dataset of shareholder resolutions, representing a tactic, on which stakeholder groups
of heterogeneous status requested specific actions from the firm on a multitude of issues.
Results validate that group status is the most important determinant of salience, but that
issue prominence and requested action legitimacy are also significant. Building on the
new model and the results of the empirical test, several lines of inquiries have been
identified for future research, and managerial implications of these findings have also
been presented.
As the business and society field continues to explore if, under what circumstances,
and how stakeholder management is and should represent prevalent managerial practices,
the question of stakeholder salience takes an important place in the dialogue. Indeed, if
managers are to implement a stakeholder approach, then they must be able to overcome
the difficulty of assigning importance and priority to stakeholders and their claims. While
this dissertation has attempted to provide a comprehensive model of stakeholder salience,
many avenues remain for future theoretical and empirical work. Hence, this dissertation
is submitted in hope to have provided a thorough and sound leap toward a new view of
salience and to have generated enthusiasm toward the exploration of stakeholder-related
theoretical, empirical and pragmatic challenges.
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APPENDIX I
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE BUSINESS AND
SOCIETY FIELD
The field of business and society, conceived of in a general systems theory
perspective, has long encouraged thought leaders from both academia and the
practitioners’ arena to explore how firms interact with, are influenced by, and take
responsibility for the broader society, with a specific emphasis on how firms can create
value for society beyond profits. Operating in a more inclusive social structure with
which they constantly interact, firms are subject to pressures from various groups who at
once shape and are affected by organizations. These pressures act in a similar way to the
ecological metaphor offered by Boulding (1978: 83-84) whereby society is analogous to a
“great pond” within which business firms are a special species whose “survival depends
very much on the dynamics of the interaction of the populations of all other species.”
More specifically, this view harbors that the survival of firms depends on both market
and non-market factors, with an emphasis on the latter. Market factors are characterized
by the ability to generate a profit by skillfully managing resources. By contrast, nonmarket factors refer to the firm’s need to comply with the expectations of the threat
system (i.e., the sanctions amenable by law) and most importantly, the integrative system
(i.e., the perceptions of status, identity, loyalty, community) (Boulding, 1978), centered
on the legitimacy of the business institution. In Freeman’s (1984: 107) words: “corporate
survival depends in part on there being some ‘fit’ between the values of the corporation
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and its managers, the expectations of stakeholders in the firm and the societal issues
which will determine the ability of the firm to sell its products”.
Yet, social expectations change over time and as corporations – especially large ones
– have acquired a remarkable amount of power in the last few decades, there has
followed a parallel intensification in pressure on firms to serve the interests of a broader
set of constituents by taking a more preponderant role in social responsibility (Lawrence
& Weber, 2011). Because conforming with social expectations is so critical to firms’
survival through the maintenance of legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), it has been
noted that firms increasingly respond to pressures from various constituents by endorsing
more varied and more committed forms of social responsibility. In this way, the effective
management of stakeholders relies on the recognition that the corporation has obligations
to multiple groups and that each of these groups must be taken into account in some way.
The recognition of the relevance of multiple stakeholder groups for the firm, coupled
with the rise of stakeholder management as the dominant paradigm in CSR, highlight the
importance of the model of stakeholder salience, that is, the question of ‘who and what
managers are likely to pay attention to’, and its place in the business and society
literature. Indeed, this managerial approach requires an action orientation capable of
yielding concrete steps toward specific groups and individuals (Freeman, 1984).
Moreover, because the stakeholder concept is rooted in the notion of “those groups which
make a difference” (Freeman, 1984: 42), it is key to firms’ effectiveness to manage the
demands of stakeholders, particularly the demands of particular interest groups, and
issues, upon which organizations depend for resources and support (Pfeffer & Salancik,
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1978: 2). But with limited time, organizational resources, and multiple, conflicting claims
on the firm by stakeholders, managers must adopt ways to recognize the stakeholders
who matter most to the objectives of their firm in alignment with their organization’s
values and set up transactions that effectively address the needs of these groups.

Stakeholder and Stockholder Views
In Freeman’s (1984) typology of enterprise strategies, the specific stakeholder
strategy (the concentration of firm efforts towards satisfying the needs of a small number
of specific stakeholder groups) and the stockholder strategy (the concentration of firm
efforts towards satisfying the needs of shareholders) are posited as two different
strategies, while the author explains that the stockholder strategy is in reality nothing but
a special case of the specific stakeholder strategy. It is these varied interpretations that
produce a tension that is commonly referred to as the dual purpose of the firm, on the one
hand as serving and as a product of society, and on the other as controlled by owners who
created or invested in the firm for the purpose of extracting value and whom are ‘owed’
fiduciary duties by managers.
As Freeman (1984) notes, depending on the way one views the purpose of the firm,
differences in priorities are inevitable. Two views, in particular, inform the issue of
stakeholder salience. The view which supports that firms owe stockholders the
prioritization of their interests above all others – thus that stockholders are the most
salient group of stakeholder in every event – posits the firm as a private property owned
by stockholders who elect a board to represent their best interest in the firm’s business
practices. The firm is understood as the property of its owners whose purpose is to
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maximize long-term market value. In this view, the marketplace dictates the best use of
the firm’s resources (including its social and community capital) as managers act as
fiduciaries of stockholders’ interests (Buono & Nichols, 1990). The owners’ interests
take precedence over the interests of all other groups because of the recognition of a
special relationship between the firm and its stockholders, even though this relationship
may (Marcoux, 2003) or may not (Boatright, 1994) be considered as ethically different in
a fiduciary sense.
The stakeholder perspective, by contrast, endorses the view that the broader role of
firms in society is to create value by attending to the interests of a variety of constituents,
from employees to governmental agencies, from the community to the natural
environment (Freeman, 1984). While it is acknowledged that firms must turn out a profit,
the purpose of the firm is to create value for society in other ways as well. In this view,
the salience of one stakeholder group over another is not clearly defined.
In an attempt to clarify and justify the stakeholder perspective over a stockholder
approach Donaldson and Preston (1995) conceptualize it as the interaction between
descriptive, instrumental and normative arguments. Stakeholder theory is used in a
descriptive and empirical manner to argue that the stakeholder approach is more
representative of how firms truly operate. Donaldson and Preston (1995) contend that
stakeholder theory also supports an instrumental rationale, characterized by attempts to
find evidence of connections between increased attention to stakeholders and a more
positive financial performance at the firm level.

189

However, they argue, stakeholder theory is fundamentally normative in its guidance
of right and wrong firm behaviors. In other words, a stakeholder approach should be
adopted simply because it is the right thing to do. These authors argue that stakeholder
theory presents a managerial component as well, in that it requires managers to endorse
the attitude that all stakeholders have a legitimate stake in the firm because of their
intrinsic value. They maintain that a stockholder approach, which treats one group as
superior and most highly salient, is therefore not morally supportable.
Indeed, a stakeholder approach suggests that the firm’s relationships with
stakeholders is based on normative commitments to treating its stakeholders with morally
founded principles as opposed to addressing these groups’ concerns with the aim to
maximize profits (Berman et al., 1999); yet, it has also been argued that morally
committing to stakeholders in this way can provide the additional benefit of improving
the firm’s performance: “A stakeholder approach to strategic management is both viable
and necessary if U.S. business is to be responsive to its environment, and address the
‘bottom line’ issues of how to be more effective (Freeman, 1984: 83)”. Hence Mitchell’s
and colleagues’ (1997: 880) assertion that “stakeholder theory… holds the key to more
effective management and to a more useful, comprehensive theory of the firm in society”
appears to express the dominant paradigm in the business and society literature.
Yet, stakeholder theory is not without its criticisms. Stockholder theorists claim that a
stakeholder approach is morally and practically unworkable to orient firms’ decisions that
bear on the fiduciary duties of managers to anyone but stockholders (Marcoux, 2003).
Marcoux (2003) adds that because stockholders hold a special moral status in their
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relationship with managers, a stakeholder approach is morally inadequate. Fiduciary
duties exist when there is a reposing of confidence and faith on one side, and domination
and influence on the other (involving the notion of peculiar vulnerability), such that
stockholders can be perceived as engaged with managers through fiduciary duties that
may go beyond what is written in the law (Marcoux, 2003) in granting them superior
salience.
This description of fiduciary duties refers to a notion of prioritization, a commitment
to advancing the interests of that special group over those of another party. From this
perspective, Marcoux (2003) denounces that stakeholder theory demands that the
manager-stockholder relationship be non-fiduciary in character, and that because a multistakeholder approach requires trade-offs and compromises, multiple relations cannot be
fiduciary because of the very meaning of the word. Hence, regardless of stockholders’
special moral status argued by Marcoux (2003), a multi-fiduciary approach is in any case
morally conflicting and unachievable from a practical standpoint. Still, Marcoux’s (2003)
argument echoes the criticisms of some stakeholder theorists who have pointed to its
impracticality for managers to determine which stakeholders they must prioritize
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Elms et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 1997) even though in
reality, managers must make such choices.
Berman and colleagues (1999) notice the discrepancy between the necessity for
managers to proactively address stakeholders’ interests and the lack of evidence related to
the changes in performance resulting from managers’ treatment of stakeholders in either
an instrumental or a morally supported manner. Accordingly, the authors empirically test
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the impact of two stakeholder management models on firm performance. They find that
managing stakeholders in an instrumental way – whereby the nature and extent of
managerial concern for a stakeholder group is determined solely by the perceived ability
of such concern to improve the firm’s financial performance (i.e., to advance the interests
of stockholders) – has a positive effect on firm performance. All the same, they find no
evidence of the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model in their sample.
Notwithstanding the arguments presented above, it has recently been suggested that
the stockholder-stakeholder debate is in fact a false dichotomy. For one, a multiple array
of stakeholders can benefit from managers prioritizing the interests of stockholders
(Boatright, 2006). For example, it is possible that all constituents are better off when the
firm is run for stockholders because, in part, it forces an accountable management of the
firm’s assets (Boatright, 1994) and creates greater overall wealth (Boatright, 2006). It is
also acknowledged that a pure stockholder managerial approach where the interests of
stakeholders are neglected or alienated is doomed to failure. Boatright (2006: 108)
advances that “any successful corporation must manage its relations with all stakeholder
groups, if for no other reason than to benefit the shareholders.” Such stakeholder
management is achieved, Boatright (2006: 108) argues, not necessarily by serving each
group’s interest, but by considering their interests “sufficiently to gain their cooperation”.
Besides, since most firms today have evolved from the traditional family-operated
business to corporations with dispersed ownership, there are several subsets of specific
interest groups even within the shareholder group (Freeman, 1984). For example,
shareholders can be long-term investors interested in a retirement income, short-term
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investors seeking to make a noticeable profit every quarter, or activists who acquire a
share of the firm in order to press interests as varied as environmental preservation to
women’s rights or animal protection (Freeman, 1984). Understanding stakeholder groups
as heterogeneous entities is perhaps a more accurate representation of how managers
consider their constituents along diverse sets of interests, a point that is addressed further
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, academics argue that a basis for both the stockholder and the
stakeholder theories of the firm exists in the law, through the concept of fiduciary duties.
But while traditional American law posits firms as fiduciaries of their owners (the
shareholders), most states have amended the law to allow managers to take into
consideration a wider range of other stakeholders’ interests (Lawrence & Weber, 2011),
reflecting the increasing pressure by multiple stakeholders for firms to endorse
responsibility and accountability in social issues hand-in-hand with economic issues.
Freeman (1984: 40) reported long ago that “isolating social issues as separate from the
economic impact which they have, and conversely isolating economic issues as if they
had no social effect, misses the mark both managerially and intellectually”. Yet, with
limited resources to allocate, the question remains as to who and what managers
should/do pay attention to and in what priority, making the question of stakeholder
salience even the more timely and relevant. More specifically, managers and theorists
alike wonder, which stakeholder groups or issues should/do take precedence over others?
To be sure, nowhere is it clearly stated to whom, or what, the firm is responsible and
accountable. Traditional views of the firm tend to acknowledge that business operates in
193

society and hence must consider its impact on society, but have a propensity to prioritize
the interests of stockholders over that of stakeholders (Boatright, 1994; Jones, 1995;
McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). This preference could have emerged out of pure
practicality in the sense that stockholders are typically a well-defined group of people
with a relatively congruent interest who, moreover, have a contractual agreement with the
firm (Freeman & Reed, 1983). By contrast, stakeholders are a diverse group of people or
organizations who promote a vast array of interests in a variety of ways, resulting in a
sometimes less responsive management in comparison to requests by stockholders.
Nevertheless, as noted above, it could be that choosing between a stockholder and a
stakeholder approach is a false choice – as they are often the same people – such that
understanding how managers perceive the salience of any one group, issue or request and
how that informs their decision-making is perhaps the more central element to
formulating an adequate theory of the firm.
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APPENDIX II
SURVEY INSTRUMENT: MANAGERIAL PERCEPTIONS OF
SHAREHOLDER FILERS’ STATUS
Instructions: Please rank these organizations according to their relative prestige as
shareholder resolution filers:
1 = those filers that you perceive to have the least prestige,
10 = filers that you perceive as having the most prestige.

Name of the shareholder filer
Action Fund Management
Adrian Dominican Sisters
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO)
Amalgamated Bank Fund
American Baptist Church
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
Amnesty International
Arbagi, Martin
As You Sow Foundation
ASC investment
Bandell, Kay
Barbieri, Donald
Basilian Fathers/Toronto
Benedictine sisters
Birnie
Borelli, Thomas
Boston Common Asset Management
Brethren Benefit Trust
Brown, Virginia
Burk, Martha
California State Teachers' Retirement
Calvert Asset Management Co.
Camilla Madden Trust
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Score:
between 1
and 10

Capuchins
Catholic Healthcare West
Catholic Funds
Center for Reflection, Education & Action
Central Laborers Pension Welfare and Annuity Fund (CLPWA)
Christian Brothers Investment Services
Christus Health
Church of the Brethren
Citizens' Environmental Coalition
Citizens Funds
Clean Yield
Communication Workers of America
Connecticut Retirement Plans
Crapo, John
Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina
Davis, Evelyn
Dee, R.
Domini Social Investments
DuPont workers
Egleston, Bill
Episcopal Church
Epstein, Aaron
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA)
F&C Asset management
Firefighters' Pension System, Kansas City MO
Forr, Patricia and Thomas
Fox, Jennifer
Francekevich, Al
General Board of Pensions (United Methodist Church)
Glenmary Home mission
Global exchange
Goodwin, Neva
Gorman, Jerry
Green Century Capital
Hamblin, Martha
Harrington Investments
Harrington, John
Hessler-Grisel, Marie
Human Life International
Humane Society
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Hurley, Robert
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR)
International Union of Electrical Workers/
Communications Workers of America (IUE-CWA)
Jesuit Conference USA
Jewish Voice for Peace
Katherine Knight Trust
Kimmerle, John
Klein, M.
Laborers' Local union
Lalanne, Mario
Long, Russell
LongView
Marianist society
McGovern, James
Mercy Investment
Meyer, Marcella V.
Miller, Kirk
MMA Praxis
Minnesota State Board of Investment
Nathan Cummings Foundation
National Legal and Policy Center
Naylor, Bart
Needmor
New England Friends
New York City Employees Retirement System (NYCERS)
New York City Police
New York City public pension funds
New York Jesuits
Newground
Northstar Asset Management
New York State Retirement
Oblates Mary Immaculate
Olson, Carl
Oneida trust
Osborn, J.
PACE Workers
Passionists
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
Perlman, M.
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Peterson, Marvin
Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM)
Porter, Judith
Presbyterian Church
Pride Foundation
Pro Vita Advisors
Providence Trust
Rattner, Ronald
Real Assets Investment Management
Rogele Living Trust
Rossi Family
Ruddy, Raymond
Sambell, Ken
Saville, Michael L.
School sisters of Notre Dame
Schroeder, B.
Seidenberg, Mark
Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
Shaneyfelt, Garth
Sheet Metal Workers
Siegal, Robert
Sierra Club
Sinsinawa Dominicans
Sisters Charity
Sisters of Loretto
Sisters of Mercy
Sisters of St. Francis
Sisters of St. Joseph
Sisters/Holy Names Jesus/Mary
Society of Jesus/WI
St. Joseph Health
Steel Workers
Strobhar, Thomas
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Treiber, L.
Trillium Asset Management
Trinity Health
Trowel Trades
United for a Fair Economy (UFE)/Responsible Wealth
United Methodist Women (UMW)
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Unitarian Universalist (UUA)
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC)
United Association Fund
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Jointers
Viederman, Steve
Walden Asset Management
Webb, R.G.
Weborg, Keith
Wilson, Frederick P.
Woodard, Charles T.
Wubbolding, K.
Dosee, R.L.
Zhao, Jing and Andrew
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APPENDIX III
PROBABILITIES OF MANAGERIAL RESPONSIVENESS TO
ISSUES, BY INDUSTRY
Industry

1 (Agricultural
production)

2 (Coal and metal
mining)

3 (Oil and gas
exploration)

Issue

% Prob.
Salience =
0

% Prob.
Salience =
1

% Prob.
Salience =
2

1

20.43

59.14

20.43

2

7

20.43

59.14

20.43

2

10

20.43

59.14

20.43

2

12

53.85

42.14

4.01

2

17

4.01

42.14

53.85

2

20

4.01

42.14

53.85

2

5

27.24

58.01

14.75

8

7**

68.20

30.12

1.67

6

8

0

0

100

1

11

0

0

100

1

17

20.43

59.14

20.43

3

2

100

0

0

1

3

7.57

51.06

41.37

3

5**

3.09

38.42

58.49

18

8*

3.89

41.70

54.42

6

9

0

0

100

1

17

9.09

53.37

37.54

7
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Obs.

4 (Construction)

5 (Food processing)

6 (Tobacco)

20*

5.42

46.46

48.12

7

23**

0.42

15.90

83.68

6

25

0

0

100

4

5

17.76

58.92

23.32

18

7

0

0

100

1

8

0

0

100

2

11

20.43

59.14

20.43

2

23

20.43

59.14

20.43

4

25*

1.67

30.12

68.20

3

1

16.52

58.64

24.83

12

4

9.09

53.37

37.54

7

5

20.43

59.14

20.43

1

7*

7.70

51.29

41.01

15

9

53.85

42.14

4.01

2

10

13.61

57.44

28.96

13

11

11.88

56.26

31.86

10

14

100

0

0

1

15

7.73

51.34

40.93

3

17

27.24

58.01

14.75

8

20

9.09

53.37

37.54

7

22

0

0

100

1

23

100

0

0

1

25

13.13

57.15

29.71

12

1

20.43

59.14

20.43

3

11

20.43

59.14

20.43

2

201

7 (Textile products)

8 (Lumber and wood
products)

16

20.43

59.14

20.43

2

20

20.43

59.14

20.43

1

27

17.16

58.80

24.04

29

6

100

0

0

1

7

0

0

100

1

8

4.01

42.14

53.85

2

10

0

0

100

1

11**

4.01

42.14

53.85

6

16

20.43

59.14

20.43

1

20

7.73

51.34

40.93

3

22

20.43

59.14

20.43

1

23

0

0

100

1

25

0

0

100

1

27

20.43

59.14

20.43

2

1

4.01

42.14

53.85

2

3

0

0

100

2

4

100

0

0

1

5*

4.01

42.14

53.85

4

7

16.52

58.64

24.83

12

8*

6.59

49.20

44.22

8

9

20.43

59.14

20.43

3

11

28.27

57.68

14.05

7

16

100

0

0

1

17

10.20

54.70

35.10

4

19

20.43

59.14

20.43

3
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9 (Chemical)

10 (Petroleum
refining)

20

11.88

56.26

31.86

10

25

7.73

51.34

40.93

3

1

25.05

58.59

16.36

46

3

0

0

100

1

4

48.12

46.46

5.42

7

5

20.43

59.14

20.43

6

7

29.18

57.36

13.47

19

8**

2.46

35.23

62.31

5

9

20.43

59.14

20.43

6

10

14.05

57.68

28.27

7

11

12.52

56.75

30.74

11

12**

80.51

18.89

0.60

5

13**

48.90

45.90

5.31

32

14

20.43

59.14

20.43

3

15*

8.28

52.22

39.50

16

16**

1.53

28.96

69.52

6

17

53.85

42.14

4.01

4

20*

10.17

54.67

35.17

40

22*

4.01

42.14

53.85

4

24

4.01

42.14

53.85

2

25*

1.67

30.12

68.20

3

26

100

0

0

2

1

20.43

59.14

20.43

5

4

100

0

0

2

5

18.75

59.06

22.19

29
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11 (Industrial goods
and materials)

7

16.81

58.72

24.47

26

8

10.20

54.70

35.09

8

9

26.40

58.26

15.35

9

11

0

0

100

2

15

13.05

57.10

29.85

6

16

0

0

100

1

17

9.49

53.88

36.64

11

19

0

0

100

1

20

23.69

58.86

17.45

16

25

100

0

0

1

1

4.01

42.14

53.85

2

3***

1.46

28.45

70.08

16

4

13.09

57.13

29.78

6

5

10.11

54.61

35.28

8

7**

2.46

35.23

62.31

5

8***

1.15

25.60

73.25

36

9

13.13

57.15

29.72

6

11**

6.21

48.39

45.40

23

15

40.93

51.34

7.73

3

16

20.43

59.14

20.43

1

17

11.11

55.61

33.28

18

18

16.82

58.72

24.46

13

19

15.33

58.25

26.42

9

20***

0.60

18.89

80.51

5

22

7.73

51.34

40.93

3
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12 (Transportation)

13 (Consumer goods)

23

10.11

54.61

35.28

4

24

0

0

100

1

25***

5.85

47.55

46.61

22

27

100

0

0

1

3

100

0

0

1

4

13.09

57.13

29.78

6

5

31.89

56.25

11.86

25

7

4.01

42.14

53.85

2

8***

1.67

30.12

68.20

9

9

20.43

59.14

20.43

4

11

20.43

59.14

20.43

6

15

0

0

100

2

16

29.72

57.14

13.13

6

17

15.33

58.25

26.42

9

18

20.43

59.14

20.43

21

20

15.32

58.25

26.43

18

23

0

0

100

1

25

35.28

54.61

10.11

4

1

23.03

58.96

18.01

20

2

53.85

42.14

4.01

2

3

20.43

59.14

20.43

4

4

53.85

42.14

4.01

4

5***

3.39

39.73

56.88

15

7

11.85

56.24

31.91

10

8

11.24

55.73

33.03

23
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14 (Logistics)

9

11.90

56.29

31.81

5

10

13.13

57.15

29.71

6

11

11.70

56.12

32.18

39

12

100

0

0

1

16

37.82

53.21

8.97

7

17

20.43

59.14

20.43

1

19

11.90

56.29

31.81

5

20

15.81

58.42

25.77

20

22

16.17

58.54

25.29

11

23

46.30

47.76

5.94

5

24

15.27

58.23

26.50

9

25

10.14

54.64

35.22

24

26

20.43

59.14

20.43

1

28

0

0

100

6

3**

2.76

44.40

52.84

6

4

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

5

5.77

54.94

39.28

3

11

0

0

100

1

17

0

0

100

1

20

17.80

64.40

17.80

14

23

100

0

0

1

24

52.24

44.90

2.86

8

25***

0.56

23.90

75.54

8

0

0

100

3

52.84

44.40

2.76

2

15
3
(Telecommunications)
4
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16 (Utilities)

6

100

0

0

1

8

8.92

60.24

30.83

9

9

17.80

64.40

17.80

10

11

11.48

62.56

25.96

7

12

100

0

0

1

16

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

17

39.28

54.94

5.77

3

18

0

0

100

1

20

15.40

64.18

20.43

20

21

100

0

0

3

24

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

25**

0.56

23.90

75.54

4

26

100

0

0

1

27

10.83

62.09

27.08

6

1

100

0

0

1

3

0

0

100

1

4

17.80

64.40

17.80

2

5**

5.93

55.30

38.77

37

7

28.04

61.66

10.30

17

8

0

0

100

11

9

0

0

100

1

11

100

0

0

2

12

100

0

0

1

16

2.76

44.40

52.84

2

17

17.80

64.40

17.80

1
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17 (Food service)

18 (Financial
services)

20

6.81

57.10

36.08

17

23

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

24

17.80

64.40

17.80

3

25**

2.38

16.21

83.55

6

1

9.26

60.63

30.11

26

3

0

0

100

2

6

0

0

100

1

7

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

8

5.77

54.94

39.28

3

10

17.80

64.40

17.80

13

11

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

14

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

16

0

0

100

2

17

0

0

100

1

19

17.80

64.40

17.80

7

20

2.76

44.40

52.84

2

25

10.61

61.92

27.47

6

27

5.77

54.95

39.28

3

2

13.87

63.76

22.36

23

3**

7.32

26.86

72.41

7

4

17.80

64.40

17.80

11

8

5.83

55.08

39.09

12

9

17.80

64.40

17.80

3

11*

61.38

36.98

1.64

5

12

0

0

100

1
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19 (Insurance)

20 (Real estate)

17

17.80

64.40

17.80

13

20

17.80

64.40

17.80

44

21

67.72

31.22

1.06

3

25**

2.07

40.26

57.67

9

26***

85.87

13.96

0.17

7

3

4.38

51.10

44.52

5

4

52.84

44.40

2.76

4

5

38.52

55.47

6.01

3

7*

1.06

31.22

67.72

3

8**

2.76

44.40

52.84

6

9

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

11

100

0

0

1

15

100

0

0

1

16

17.80

64.40

17.80

4

19

0

0

100

1

20

8.00

59.04

32.96

20

25

0

0

100

5

27

14.45

63.95

21.60

14

1

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

5**

2.76

44.40

52.84

8

6

100

0

0

1

7

100

0

0

2

8

0

0

100

3

17

0

0

100

5

19

0

0

100

1

209

21 (Services)

22 (Conglomerates)

25

0

0

100

1

1

100

0

0

2

2

100

0

0

1

3*

5.11

53.27

41.63

11

4

52.84

44.40

2.76

2

5

0

0

100

1

6

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

7

2.76

44.40

52.84

3

8***

2.02

39.92

58.06

16

9

29.39

61.00

9.61

5

11

17.80

64.40

17.80

5

12

52.84

44.40

2.76

2

16

0

0

100

1

17

23.02

63.58

13.40

21

19

6.58

56.66

36.76

10

20**

4.38

51.10

44.52

16

21

100

0

0

1

25

0

0

100

1

28

0

0

100

2

1

5.77

54.94

39.29

3

4

17.80

64.40

17.80

2

5

17.80

64.40

17.80

3

6

100

0

0

2

7

10.61

61.92

27.47

6

8

0

0

100

1
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9

52.84

44.40

2.76

2

11

32.69

59.20

8.11

4

16

0

0

100

1

17

17.80

64.40

17.80

1

18

2.76

44.40

52.84

2

19

0

0

100

1

20

9.61

61.00

29.49

5

25

7.93

58.94

33.13

4

26

100

0

0

2

27

17.80

64.40

17.80

2
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